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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78A-3-102, U.C.A.

i

ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue 1: Issues related to whether the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's request
for attorney fees in this guardianship and conservatoi ship pi occeding.
Determinative Law: This is a case of first impression in the State of Utah. Other
jurisdictions have already addressed this issue and those jurisdictions have ruled that as a
matter of law the protected person's estate should pay tl ic: attoi nc y lees incurred by a
petitioner who successfully establishes protection for the protected person. In the instant
case, a conservator was appointed by the trial court.
Standard of Review: Questions of whether the correct legal standards were applied
are questions of law and are reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
Issue 2: Issues related to whether the trial court erred in denying the Rule 59 Motion
to amend its order denying attorney fees to Petitioner.
Determinative Law: Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governs requests to
vacate or modify orders issued by the trial court.
Standard of Review: The denial of a Rule 59 Motion by a trial court is normally
reviewed for a?i abuse of discretion. Here, however, the trial court's initial order was
based on its interpretation of a stipulation that was not found to be ambiguous. Therefore,
the review should fall under a correctness standard. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp,
2002 UT 43.
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KEY LEGAL PROVISIONS
The following legal provisions are included in Addendum A.

1. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
2. Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-303
3. Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-424

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case,
This case began as a simple, straight forward guardianship and conservatorship
proceeding when Margaret Guynn's daughter, Catherine Ortega, filed a petition to
appoint a guardian and conservator for her mother. However, it quickly became
complicated and contentious when Margaret's son, Bruce Guynn, first objected to his
sister, Catherine, being appointed as guardian and conservator and then demanded that his
mother fire her court-appointed attorney.
Upon learning of the petition, Mr. Guynn immediately retained counsel and sought a
different attorney for his mother. Through a referral from his attorney, he demanded that
his mother, Ms. Guynn, fire Ms. Bradford and hire attorney Elizabeth Conley.
Eventually, Ms. Conley began representing Ms. Guynn under the guise that it was actually
Ms. Guynn's idea to hire Ms. Conley when it was in reality Mr. Guynn's demand.
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Although no formal evaluation of Ms. Guynn was ever conducted, she clearly
exhibited diminished capacity. This was highlighted by conflicting statements from the
two attorneys who represented her. However, to eliminate further hostile litigation,
Petitioner agreed to enter into a stipulation with Ms. Conley and Mr. Guynn's attorney,
Kent Alderman, to appoint Mr. Guynn as the conservator for Ms. Guynn.
To avoid further legal fees and costs, Petitioner's counsel requested that Ms. Conley
include in the stipulation a provision to pay Petitioner's legal fees from the estate of
Ms. Guynn. However, Ms. Conley refused. Since the parties did not agree on the issue
of attorney fees, the stipulation drafted by Ms. Conley focused solely on the appointment
of a conservator. The issue of attorney fees was at that time unresolved.
Since the issue of attorney fees remained open without any agreement between the
parties, Petitioner filed a motion to have her attorney fees paid from Ms. Guynn's estate.
This request was based on the fact that Petitioner successfully obtained a protective order
to protect Ms. Guynn's estate, and it was also based on the common practice in Utah for a
petitioner's legal fees to be paid from the estate of the protected person whenever a
protective ordered is entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. In this case, that
protective order was in the form of a conservator being appointed for Ms. Guynn.
The trial court then denied Petitioner's request for attorney fees to be paid from the
protected person's estate, and this created the primary question and issue before this
Court. Should such fees be paid from the protected person's estate?
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B. Course of Proceedings/Disposition in the District Court Below,
This case commenced in the trial court by a petition filed by Petitioner/Appellant.
Two days later, the district court appointed Petitioner as a temporary guardian and
conservator for the Ward, Margaret Guynn. The district court also appointed counsel for
the Ward. After an objection was filed by Ms. Guynn's son, Bruce Guynn, the matter was
referred to mediation and to the trial court assigned to the case.
Fairly soon thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation for the appointment of a
conservator; the trial court accepted the stipulation and appointed a conservator for
Ms. Guynn. But at that time, the issue of attorney fees for Petitioner remained an open
dispute between the parties. The stipulation never was intended to resolve the issue of
Petitioner's attorney fees.
Following the appointment of a conservator. Petitioner filed a motion to have the
estate of the protected person pay the legal fees incurred by Petitioner for Petitioner's
efforts in obtaining protection for Ms. Guynn.
The trial court denied Petitioner's motion solely based on its interpretation that the
stipulation didn't contain any provision for attorney fees.1 Since the trial court's order
was based solely on the stipulation to appoint a conservator and had nothing to do with

1

It appears that the trial court's logic was that if there was no provision in the
stipulation for attorney fees, then no attorney fees should be awarded to Petitioner.
However, the trial court's ruling did not express that logic and no other basis was
articulated by the trial court except that the stipulation didn't provide for fees.
-4-

attorney fees, Petitioner then filed a Rule 59 Motion claiming that the trial court erred as a
matter of law because the stipulation was never intended to address attorney fees.
The trial court then denied the Rule 59 Motion. Instead of considering its prior
reliance on the stipulation, it supported its Rule 59 denial on a general analysis of attorney
fees unrelated to the stipulation. More importantly, the trial court's analysis failed to
acknowledge the law from other jurisdictions that allow such fees to be paid from the
estate of the protected person. This appeal then followed that denial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Petition to Appoint Guardian and Conservator,
On August 31, 2009, Catherine Ortega, Petitioner/Appellant, filed a petition to
appoint a guardian and conservator for her mother, Margaret Guynn. (R. 1-3; Add. B. at
B001-B004.) The petition also requested that a temporary guardian and conservator be
appointed until September 23, 2009. Id. On September 2,2009, an ex parte motion was
filed to appoint counsel for Ms. Guynn as required by § 75-5-303, U.C.A. (R. 5-6.)
As an add-on to the regular law and motions probate calendar2 ("Probate Court") held
on September 2, 2009, the petition and the ex parte motion were briefly heard. The

2

It is the practice of the Third District Court in Salt Lake City to have all probate
matters initially heard on a law and motions probate calendar that is generally heard each
Wednesday morning. Such calendar is presided over by a rotating judge who presides for
six months: January through June and July through December. If there are no objections
to the petition, the "probate judge" then signs the appropriate order being requested. If
there is an objection, then the matter is first referred to mediation and then to the trial
court that is assigned to the case.
-5-

Probate Court then entered on that day orders temporarily appointing Petitioner as
guardian and conservator for Ms. Guynn (R. 10-11.) and appointing attorney
Wendy Bradford to represent her. (R. 7-8.) The petition was set for hearing on the
regular weekly law and motions probate calendar for September 16, 2009. (R. 15-16.)
Proper notices were then sent and posted by the Probate Court as required for this next
hearing.
On September 14, 2009, Bruce Guynn, the son of Ms. Guynn, filed an objection to
the appointment of Petitioner as guardian and conservator. (R. 19-22.) On
September 16, 2009, at the scheduled hearing, Petitioner and her attorney were present
along with Ms. Guynn and her appointed attorney, Ms. Bradford, and another attorney,
Elizabeth Conley, who alleged that she had been retained by Ms. Guynn. Ms. Conley had
been referred to Ms. Guynn by Bruce's attorney, and Bruce then instructed Ms. Guynn to
hire Ms. Conley. Since there was an objection on file at the time of the hearing on
September 16, 2009, the matter was referred by the Probate Court to mediation and then
to the trial court assigned. (R. 23.)
B. Negotiations, the Stipulation, and the Appointment of Conservator.
During the following two months, the attorneys engaged in negotiations over whether
or not Ms. Guynn needed any protection and if so who should serve as guardian and/or
conservator. After agreeing to allow Bruce to serve as the conservator for Ms. Guynn,
Petitioner Catherine Ortega requested that a provision be included in a stipulation that her
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attorney fees be paid from the estate of Ms. Guynn. However, Ms. Guynn's attorney
refused that request. As a result, Ms. Conley drafted a stipulation that omitted any
reference to attorney fees, and after the necessary signatures were obtained the stipulation
was filed on November 25,2009. (R. 38-41; Add. B. at B005-B008.)
Since the stipulation was silent on the issue of attorney fees, Catherine filed on
December 18. 2009, a motion requesting that her attorney fees paid from the estate of
Ms. Guynn, a common practice in these kinds of proceedings. (R. 75-98; Add. B. at
B009-B032.) In fact, it is customary for the newly appointed conservator to simply
reimburse the petitioner who sought the appointment.3 This case represents a departure
from that custom and this departure was apparently based solely on the personal feelings
of Ms. Guynn's attorney, Elizabeth Conley, toward Catherine and her counsel.4

3

In her Reply Memorandum, (R. 232-262.) (Add. B at Bl 11-B125.), Catherine
referenced and attached as exhibits to her memorandum four declarations of three
attorneys who regularly practice in the area of guardianships and conservatorships. In
fact, one of those attorneys is the very attorney who is representing the conservator in
these proceedings. The fourth declaration is from a well-seasoned and experienced
professional who has served by appointment of the district courts in scores of
conservatorship cases. All of their testimonies corroborate the common practice of
having the estate of the protected person pay for the legal fees incurred by the petitioner
who sought such protection in the first place.
4

Ms. Guynn's attorney failed to weigh the costs of refusing to pay Catherine's
legal fees with the costs of defending against the costs, including this appeal. In effect,
Ms. Guynn's attorney was acting on her own issues of principle rather than looking out
for the best economic outcome for her protected client. The same can be said for the
conservator for Ms. Guynn and his attorney. Not reimbursing Catherine's legal fees will
end up being far more expensive for Ms. Guynn that it would have been to compromise
on that issue.
-7-

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS
The trial court entered two relevant rulings in this case:
1. On February 24, 2010, the trial court entered its minute entry in which it denied
Petitioner's request for attorney fees. (R. 283-286.) (Add. B at B033-B036.)
2. On April 7,2010, the trial court entered its minute entry in which it denied
Petitioner's Rule 59 Motion. (R. 324-327.) (Add. B at B054, B057.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When the trial court denied Petitioner's request for attorney fees to be paid from the
estate of Ms. Guynn. the trial court relied on its equitable powers and on the traditional
principle that attorney fees are generally not awarded unless provided by contract or
statute. Unfortunately, the trial court failed entirely to consider the law established in
other jurisdictions. Despite the extensive argument and citations provided to the trial
court, it failed to mention any of the credible citations.
Since Utah's Probate Code is silent on the issue of a petitioner's attorney fees in
guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, we look to other jurisdictions for
guidance. For the particular issue presented in this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
weighed in and held that these kind of protective proceedings are in support of the
protected person and the protected person's estate ought to pay for the legal fees and costs
incurred in establishing the protection. The Nebraska Court also concluded that"... in a
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conservatorship proceeding, the interest to be considered by the court and the principles
to be applied are quite unlike those in an ordinary litigation case."
The trial court in this case did not appreciate the difference annunciated by the
Nebraska Court and instead applied the routine analysis to this conservatorship case. In
doing so, the trial court ignored the substantial benefit to Ms. Guynn and failed to
acknowledge that Petitioner incurred substantial expenses in obtaining that benefit for
Ms. Guynn. Petitioner gained no benefit except possibly to see that her mother's estate is
now protected.
In addition to the strong opinions by the Nebraska Supreme Court and other
jurisdictions cited by the Nebraska Court, there is a strong public policy supporting the
payment of costs and fees incurred by Petitioner. As an example, the Ad hoc Committee
on Probate Law and Procedure published its Final Report to the Judicial Council in
February 2009 and addressed this issue extensively. In its Final Report, the Committee
recommended that the "... reasonable and necessary expenses, costs and attorney fees"
be paid from the estate of the protected person.
The Committee also included in its Report the reasoning for its recommendation.
The Committee reasoned that paying such legal fees will encourage family members who
might otherwise hesitate to file a protective proceeding because of their own lack of funds
to do so. The Committee also opined that it is far better to expend the assets of the estate
to protect the incapacitated person than to preserve them for the heirs.
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In this case, the trial court took a traditional and narrow view of these proceedings
and thereby denied Petitioner's request for costs and fees. Had the trial court considered
the opinions of other jurisdictions and considered the public policy issue, the trial court
more likely would have done the correct thing by granting Petitioner's request.
Finally, Petitioner should also be entitled to the fees she incurred in defending against
the opposition in the trial court and the fees she incurred on appeal under the "fees-forfees" doctrine that is well established in the State of Utah.

ARGUMENT
Utah's Probate Code is silent on the issue of Petitioner's attorney fees in a
guardianship or conservatorship proceeding. Currently, there are only two sections of the
Code dealing with attorney fees in these proceedings.
For a guardianship proceeding, section § 75-5-303(2), U.C.A., provides for attorney
fees to be paid from the protected person's estate for the attorney who represents the
protected person unless the petition is found to be without merit and then those fees are to
be paid by the petitioner:
(2) Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall set a date for hearing on
the issues of incapacity; and unless the allegedly incapacitated person
has counsel of the person's own choice, it shall appoint an attorney to
represent the person in the proceeding the cost of which shall be paid by
the person alleged to be incapacitated, unless the court determines that
the petition is without merit, in which case the attorney fees and court
costs shall be paid by the person filing the petition.
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For a conservatorship, section § 75-5-424(3 )(w), U.C.A., provides the authority for
the conservator to hire and pay attorneys without authorization or confirmation by the trial
court:
(w) Employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisors,
or agents, even though they are associated with the conservator, to
advise or assist him in the performance of his administrative duties; act
upon their recommendation without independent investigation; and
instead of acting personally, employ one or more agents to perform any
act of administration, whether or not discretionary;

Other than these sections, Utah's Probate Code is silent on the issue of attorney fees.

I.

The trial court's ruling relied solely on the contents of the stipulation that was
silent on the issue of attorney fees, and the trial court ignored entirely the case
law from other jurisdictions.
In denying Ms. Ortega's request for attorney fees to be paid from Ms. Guynn's estate,

the trial court entered the following ruling:
The petitioner's motion for payment of her attorney fees is denied.
This (sic) substance of this matter was resolved in November 2009, by a
stipulation signed by counsel for all parties, and an order entered by the court
on November 30, 2009. The stipulation and order did not contain a
provision for attorneys fees; that issue, apparently, arose later after
disagreements between the petitioner and conservator. Based upon the
pleadings filed since the entry of the order, it is apparent to the court that
many of the requested attorneys fees have been incurred since then.
Based on the resolution of this matter, which did not provide for
petitioner's attorneys fees, as well as the increase of fees since the order was
entered, the court declines to award attorneys fees to the petitioner.
(R. 238-286.) (Add. B at B033-B036.)
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First, the trial court was very much mistaken about when the issue of attorney fees
arose. The trial court seems completely unaware that the issue of attorney fees was very
much discussed between the parties prior to them signing a stipulation. In particular,
Ms. Guynn's counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to Petitioner's request for fees
and expressly stated that the issue was discussed during negotiations that led to the
stipulation. (R. 130-158.) In her memorandum, Ms. Guynn's counsel even attached
correspondence that she had with Petitioner's counsel about the issue of attorney fees.
(R. 150-158.). The trial court apparently overlooked these documents. Otherwise, the
trial court would never have made the statement that it did about when the issue of
attorney fees arose. And, the trial court's lack of understanding about the issue likely led
it to believe that the fees in question were not related to or at least not in support of the
establishment of the protective order for Ms. Guynn.
Second, the apparent logic or analysis applied by the trial court is flawed because
there is no basis in law that requires a stipulation to contain a provision for attorney fees,
whether attorney fees are to be paid or not. That is, the trial court denied payment of
attorney fees solely based on the absence of an express provision in the stipulation, a
stipulation that was only intended to appoint a conservator and was never intended to
resolve the dispute about attorney fees. The trial court's ruling relied on the four comers
of the stipulation and nothing else. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying attorney
fees solely based on the stipulation.
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However, the trial court may have relied on the traditional notion of when attorney
fees are to be awarded. That is, attorney fees are generally only awarded if provided by
contract or by statute.5 The stipulation would naturally be deemed to fail under the
contract provision for attorney fees, and no statutory basis was cited for an award of fees.
Therefore, the trial court could have had a separate but legal basis to deny attorney fees,
although the trial court's ruling is entirely silent on any another basis to deny fees.
Nonetheless, the trial court failed entirely to acknowledge or even remotely address
the legal basis for awarding attorney fees that Ms. Ortega extensively cited in her
Memorandum in Support of Wendy Bradford's Motion for Attorney Fees; Memorandum
in Opposition to Ms. Guynn 's Claim That Petitioner's Petition Was Without Merit;
Motion to Disqualify Ms. Conleyfrom Representing Ms. guynn; Request for an
Evidentiary Hearing; and Request for Petitioner fs Attorney Fees. (R. 75-98; Add. B. at
B009-B032.) In support of awarding attorney fees to Petitioner, the foregoing referenced
memorandum contained an extensive argument with appropriate citations to the holdings
in other jurisdictions. Id. Inexplicably, the trial court's ruling never mentions any of the
referenced citations.

5

Later in denying Petitioner's Rule 59 Motion, the trial court expanded on its
analysis and cited cases relating to the trial court's inherent equitable power to award
attorney fees. The trial court also cited the traditional view that attorney fees are
generally awarded only when provided by statute or contract. (R. 324-327; Add. B. at
B054-B057.)
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II. Case law in other jurisdictions supports the payment of attorney fees for the
petitioner who successfully obtains a protective order.
Whether a petitioner who seeks a protective order for an incapacitated person or
person who is in need of financial protection should have his or her attorney fees paid
from the estate of the protected person is an issue of first impression in the State of Utah.
Since this issue is one of first impression, we should also look to other jurisdictions for
guidance. See Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25 f 15.
Specifically, the Nebraska Supreme Court has weighed in on this issue.6 See In re
Guardianship & Conservatorship of Donley, 262 Neb. 282 (Neb 2001).7 The Nebraska
Court acknowledged that it had never before addressed this issue when it made the
following statement:
While we have never considered the precise issue, we are persuaded by
the rule adopted in other states that costs and attorney fees incurred in
the good faith initiation of conservatorship proceedings constitute
necessaries for the support or benefit of the protected person such that
payment of reasonable costs incurred may be assessed against the
protected person's estate, (citing, In re Estate ofBayers, 295 Mont. 89,
983 P.2d 339 (1999); In re Dunn, 239 N.C. 378, 79 S.E.2d 921 (1954);
Penney v. Pritchard & McCalL 255 Ala. 13, 49 So. 2d 782 (1950);
Carney v. Aicklen, 587 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); In re Estate
and Guardianship ofVermeersch, 15 Ariz. App. 315, 488 P.2d 671
(1971); In re Estate of Sherwood, 56 111. App. 2d 334, 206 N.E.2d 304
(1965); In re Bundy, 44 Cal. App. 466, 186 P. 811 (1919).

6

In making its ruling, Nebraska followed the rule adopted in Montana, North
Carolina, Alabama, Texas, Arizona, Illinois, and California. Such states do not
necessarily represent all states that have adopted this rule.
7

For convenience the Nebraska case is included in Addendum B at B058-B65.
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The Nebraska Court further expressed its rationale on this issue:
The rationale supporting the rule is that in guardianship and
conservatorship cases, the applicant most often acts for and on behalf of
one who is unable to act or care for himself or herself. See, In re Dunn,
supra; In re Bundy, supra. Thus, thefilingof the petition and the
hearing thereon are indispensable steps in the preservation of the
protected person's estate. See, In re Bundy, supra; In re Estate and
Guardianship ofVermeersch, supra. It is recognized that when an
individual is in need of physical or financial protection, the law must in
many instances think and act for him or her. See, In re Dunn, supra; In
re Bundy, supra. The state and society have a significant interest in
bringing the estate of individuals in need of protection under the vigil of
the county court. See In re Estate and Guardianship ofVermeersch,
supra. See, also, Penney v. Pritchard & McCall, supra. The court, as
general conservator of the rights of persons in need of protection, is
dependent upon applications being filed by interested persons so that the
court may assume control of the estate and preserve it for the protected
person. See In re Bundy, supra.
In Donley, the Nebraska Court went on to state:
Further, we note that an action to appoint a conservator is not an
adversarial proceeding, but, rather, is a proceeding to promote the best
interests of the person for whom the conservatorship is sought. A
conservatorship action is uniquely nonadversarial in that everyone
involved, including the petitioner and the court, is presumably interested
in protecting the interest of the person for whom the conservatorship is
sought.
Finally, the Nebraska Court stated:
Therefore, in a conservatorship proceeding, the interest to be considered
by the court and the principles to be applied are quite unlike those in an
ordinary litigation case.

In the instant case, the Court should find that Petitioner was at all times attempting to
protect Ms. Guynn from personal and economic harm. Therefore, Petitioner's costs and
-15-

legal fees should be paid from the estate of Ms. Guynn, particularly since Ms. Guynn is
the only beneficiary from Petitioner's efforts. Petitioner received nothing from her efforts
except that Bruce turned their mother against her.

III. Public policy also supports the payment of attorney fees for the petitioner who
successfully obtains a protective order.
While case law in other jurisdictions strongly supports the payment of attorney fees
from the estate of the protected person, public policy also supports such payments. See
Final Report to the Judicial Council by the Ad hoc Committee on Probate Law and
Procedure, dated February 23, 2009. (Add. B. at B066-B0110.)8
The Committee's Final Report makes a number of recommendations, a summary of
which are contained on Pages 4-5. (Add. B. atB074-B075.). The seventh
recommendation is as follows:
"If the court determines that a petition resulted in an order beneficial to
the respondent,9 and if funds are available in the estate, permit the court
or conservator to pay the reasonable and necessary expenses, costs and
attorney fees from the estate/'
(Add. B. at B074.)

8

The Final Report contains 147 pages, only the first 40 pages are included in
Addendum B. Pages 41-147 represent a draft of proposed legislation to implement the
Committee's recommendations. The first 40 pages are sufficient for the purposes of this
brief.
9

The term "Respondent*' in the Final Report refers to the individual who has
diminished capacity or who is alleged to be incapacitated or in need of a protective order.
-16-

Further, in Section 7, Page 17, the Final Report states the following:
u

If a protective proceeding is legally necessary to benefit the respondent,
and if the respondent's estate is ample enough to provide for the
respondent and still pay the expenses of that process, then the court or
conservator should be permitted to pay reasonable and necessary fees
and expenses from the estate. This is the conclusion of the
1997 Uniform Act.10
"If a petition is brought in good faith with the goal of protecting the
respondent, and the court appoints a guardian or conservator, or enters
some other protective order, then the petitioner's costs should be paid, if
possible, by the respondent's estate. This will encourage family
members who may hesitate to file a protective proceeding because of
their own lack of funds. It is far better to expend the estate to protect the
respondent than to preserve it for the heirs."
(Add.B.atB087.)

On the issue of petitioner's attorney fees, the Committee adopted and then proposed
to codify with legislation the common practice that exists among attorneys who regularly
practice in the area of guardianships and conservatorships. Four declarations were filed
in the trial court proceedings: three from attorneys11 and one from a professional
conservator, all of whom strongly support the payment of a petitioner's attorney fees in
guardianship and conservatorship proceedings. (R. 242-262; Add. B. at Bl 11-B125.).

10

Citing to Section 417 of the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings
Act of 1997.
11

Ironically, one of the attorneys whose declaration is in the record is also the
attorney of record for Bruce, the Conservator appointed for Ms. Guynn, and one of the
attorneys who has opposed the payment of attorney fees for Petitioner.
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IV. The trial court erred by not granting Plaintiffs1 Rule 59 Motion.
The denial of a Rule 59 Motion by a trial court is normally reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. However, where the trial court, as here, relied on its interpretation of the
stipulation, the review falls under a correctness standard. See Booth v. Booth,
2006 UT App 144 ^[10 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 860 P.2d 937, 938
(Utah 1993) ("... if the trial court has made a determination of law that provides a
premise for its denial of a new trial, such a legal decision is reviewed under a correctness
standard."). In denying Petitioner's Rule 59 Motion, the trial court stated that "[I]n its
prior ruling, the court made clear that there was no provision in the Stipulation nor in any
other underlying contract or statute that authorized petitioner's request for attorney fees."
(R. 324-327.) (Add. B at B054-B057.) {emphasis added). In fact, the trial court did not
cite any other basis for denying attorney fees when entered its prior ruling. It did so only
in response to the Rule 59 Motion.
The trial court also failed to acknowledge the body of law from other jurisdictions
that have held as a matter of law that a successful petitioner in these proceedings should
have his or her costs and attorney fees paid from the estate of the protected person. Had
the trial court properly analyzed and considered the case law provided to it, the trail court
should have amended its initial ruling and awarded attorney fees to Petitioner.
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V.

Petitioner should also be awarded attorney fees in defending her fees against
the Conservator's and Ms. Conlev's opposition and also on appeal.
There is a well-established principle in Utah known as b'fees-for-fees." See e.g.,

Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895-896 (Utah 1996) {citing James Constructors
v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The Utah Supreme Court
extensively discussed, analyzed, and treated this issue in Salmon as follows:
Although this court has not directly addressed the issue of whether fees
incurred in recovering fees allowed under a statute should also be
awarded pursuant to the statute, we agree with the rationale articulated
in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
3882 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 301 U.S. App. D.C. 293,
994 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1993): Federal courts have repeatedly recognized
that the unavailability of "fees for fees" could render fee-shifting
provisions impotent, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the
underlying statutes
An award of "fees for fees" is not merely a
remote descendant of the underlying action from which it derives.
Rather, it is an integral aspect of the statutory scheme on which the
underlying claim is based. 994 F.2d at 22; see also Commissioner, INS
v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163-64, 110 L. Ed. 2d 134, 110 S. Ct. 2316
(1990); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978);
Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609,614 (1st Cir. 1977). This rationale is
consistent with our prior case law awarding attorney fees for appeals
where attorney fees are initially authorized by statute. See First
Southwestern Financial Servs., 875 P.2d at 556.
Analogously, we have recognized that a contractual obligation to pay
attorney fees incurred in enforcing a contract should also include fees
incurred on appeal. In Management Services v. Development Associates,
617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980), we stated that the purpose of an
attorney fees provision is to indemnify the prevailing party against the
necessity of paying attorney fees and thereby enable him to recover the
full amount of the obligation. Id. at 409. In accordance with this
purpose, we concluded that "a provision for payment of attorney's fees
in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the prevailing party on
appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to enforce the contract."
-19-

Id. Similarly, the court of appeals recently ruled that the prevailing party
in a dispute over a contractual attorney fees provision was entitled, not
only to attorney fees on appeal, but also to the fees it incurred
establishing the reasonableness of the fees for which it was entitled to be
indemnified. James Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674
(UtahCt.App. 1994).
The attorney fees at issue in this case, although they are permitted
pursuant to statute instead of contract, are very similar in purpose-the
reimbursement of attorney fees makes the vindicated public employee
whole. Consequently, if a vindicated employee is required to expend
attorney fees to recover the original fees to which he was entitled, the
cost of these subsequent fees must also be reimbursed. Any other
interpretation would eviscerate the purpose of the statute. In accordance
with this rationale, we conclude that Salmon is entitled to reasonable
fees and costs necessarily incurred in recovering the fees and costs
allowed under section 63-30a-2.
Id. at 895-896.
In essence, the Utah Supreme Court has held that if a person is entitled to his or her
attorney fees, whether by statute or by contract, then the fees expended to recover those
fees should also be reimbursed. While there isn't a particular statute or contract, there
certainly are equitable grounds for awarding attorney fees to Petitioner. Therefore,
Petitioner should also be awarded her legal fees expended in defending her equitable right
to such fees and the reasonableness of them. These fees would include those incurred in
defending against the Conservator's and Ms. Conley's opposition and those fees incurred
on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant/Petitioner respectfully request that the district
court's ruling be vacated and that this action be remanded for proceedings to determine
the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Petitioner, including her fees in defending
against the Conservator's and Ms. Conley's opposition and her fees incurred on appeal.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant/Petitioner respectfully requests oral argument because it will materially
assist this Court in adjudicating the legal issues in this appeal.

DATED this 15th day of September 2010

Michael A. Jensen (^^J
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner Catherine Ortega
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ADDENDA

This Addenda includes the following references and documents divided into two
separate addenda as follows:

Addendum A
Key Legal Provisions

Addendum B
Pleadings, Motions, Memoranda, Minute Entries (signed);

Also, the Donley case from the Nebraska Supreme Court; and

The Final Report of the Ad hoc Committee on Probate Law
and Procedure
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ADDENDUM A

ADDENDUM A
Key Legal Provisions

1.

75-5-303. Procedure for court appointment of a guardian of an incapacitated
person.
(1) The incapacitated person or any person interested in the incapacitated person's
welfare may petition for a finding of incapacity and appointment of a guardian.
(2) Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall set a date for hearing on the issues
of incapacity; and unless the allegedly incapacitated person has counsel of the
person's own choice, it shall appoint an attorney to represent the person in the
proceeding the cost of which shall be paid by the person alleged to be incapacitated,
unless the court determines that the petition is without merit, in which case the
attorney fees and court costs shall be paid by the person filing the petition.

2.

75-5-424. Powers of conservator in administration.
(1) A conservator has all of the powers conferred in this chapter and any additional
powers conferred by law on trustees in this state. In addition, a conservator of the
estate of an unmarried minor as to whom no one has parental rights, has the duties
and powers of a guardian of a minor described in Section 75-5-209 until the minor
attains majority or marries, but the parental rights so conferred on a conservator do
not preclude appointment of a guardian as provided by Part 2 of this chapter.
(2) A conservator has power without court authorization or confirmation to invest
and reinvest funds of the estate as would a trustee.
(3) A conservator, acting reasonably in efforts to accomplish the purpose for which
he was appointed, may act without court authorization or confirmation, to:
(a) Collect, hold, and retain assets of the estate, including land in another state,
until, in his judgment, disposition of the assets should be made, and the assets may
be retained even though they include an asset in which he is personally interested;
Addendum A Pase 1 of 4

(b) Receive additions to the estate;
(c) Continue or participate in the operation of any business or other enterprise;
(d) Acquire an undivided interest in an estate asset in which the conservator, in any
fiduciary capacity, holds an undivided interest;
(e) Invest and reinvest estate assets in accordance with Subsection (2) above;
(f) Deposit estate funds in a bank including a bank operated by the conservator;
(g) Acquire or dispose of an estate asset including land in another state, for cash or
on credit at public or private sale; and to manage, develop, improve, exchange,
partition, change the character of, or abandon an estate asset:
(h) Make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in buildings or other
structures, demolish any improvements, and raze existing or erect new party walls
or buildings;
(i) Subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use; make or obtain the vacation
of plats and adjust boundaries; adjust differences in valuation on exchange or
partition by giving or receiving considerations; and dedicate easements to public
use without consideration;
(j) Enter for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee with or without option to
purchase or renew for a term within or extending beyond the term of the
conservatorship;
(k) Enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal of minerals or
other natural resources or enter into a pooling or unitization agreement;
(1) Grant an option involving disposition of an estate asset or take an option for the
acquisition of any asset;
(m) Vote a security, in person or by general or limited proxy:
(n) Pay calls, assessments, and any other sums chargeable or accruing against or on
account of securities;
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(o) Sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights; consent, directly or
through a committee or other agent, to the reorganization, consolidation, merger,
dissolution, or liquidation of a corporation or other business enterprise;
(p) Hold a security in the name of a nominee or in other form without disclosure of
the conservatorship so that title to the security may pass by delivery, but the
conservator is liable for any act of the nominee in connection with the stock so
held;
(q) Insure the assets of the estate against damage or loss and the conservator against
liability with respect to third persons;
(r) Borrow money to be repaid from estate assets or otherwise; and advance money
for the protection of the estate or the protected person, and for all expenses, losses,
and liabilities sustained in the administration of the estate or because of the holding
or ownership of any estate assets, and the conservator has a lien on the estate as
against the protected person for advances so made;
(s) Pay or contest any claim; settle a claim by or against the estate or the protected
person by compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and release, in whole or in part,
any claim belonging to the estate to the extent that the claim is uncollectible;
(t) Pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the conservator, and other expenses
incurred in the collection, care, administration, and protection of the estate;
(u) Allocate items of income or expense to either estate income or principal, as
provided by law, including creation of reserves out of income for depreciation,
obsolescence, or amortization, or for depletion in mineral or timber properties;
(v) Pay any sum distributable to a protected person or his dependent without
liability to the conservator, by paying the sum to the distributee or by paying the
sum for the use of the distributee either to his guardian, or if none, to a relative or
other person with custody of his person;
(w) Employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisors, or agents,
even though they are associated with the conservator, to advise or assist him in the
performance of his administrative duties; act upon their recommendation without
independent investigation; and instead of acting personally, employ one or more
agents to perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary;
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(x) Prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the
protection of estate assets and of the conservator in the performance of his duties;
and
(y) Execute and deliver all instruments which will accomplish or facilitate the
exercise of the powers vested in the conservator.
3.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 6L a new trial may be granted
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(a)(7) Error in law.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 S State Street, PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City. Utah 84111-1860
Third District Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7162/7164 (Joanne/Lvn) N45 (Probate)

In the Matter of

PETITION TO APPOINT GUARDIAN
AND CONSERVATOR

MARGARET GUYNN
An Alleged Incapacitated Person.

Civil No.

judge //e^fcr
Probate Judae Robert Hilder

Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-301 and § 75-5-401 et seq,
Petitioner Catherine Ortega, by and through counsel, hereby petitions this Court for an
Order appointing Catherine Ortega as guardian and conservator for the above named
incapacitated person, Margaret Guynn, ("the Ward"). Because of emergency conditions
set forth below and as provided by § 75-5-310, Utah Code Ann., Petitioner also requests
the Court to enter a temporary appointment of a conservator until the regular law and
motions hearing is held on this Petition. Petitioner states and represents to the Court that:
1. Pursuant to § 75-5-302, Utah Code Ann., venue is proper in the Third District
Court because the Ward is presently residing in Salt Lake County.

2. The Ward is unmarried and 84 years of age. She presently resides at Atria, a
senior facility located at 10970 S 700 E, Sandy UT 84070-4990.
3. The Ward does not own any real property, but she has approximately $400,000 in
liquid assets.
4. The Ward suffers from confusion and dementia. Upon information and belief,
the Ward is (a) impaired to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to
make or communicate responsible decisions; and (b) unable to manage her financial
affairs. Based on the Ward's condition, the Ward is deemed to be incapacitated as defined
by § 75-1-201(22), Utah Code Ann.
5. The basis for requesting a temporary appointment is as follows. The Ward
appears to be subject to exploitation by Petitioner's son who has been trying to obtain a
power of attorney from the Ward so that he can access her bank accounts. A temporary
conservator is needed until this Court holds a hearing on this Petition, which hearing is
expected to be on either September 16, 2009 or September 23, 2009.
6. No guardian or conservator has been appointed for the Ward.
7. The Ward's children are the only viable or practicable guardians and
conservators, and pursuant to § 75-5-311 and § 75-5-410, Utah Code Ann., they have
priority to be appointed. Petitioner is the only child residing in the State of Utah; her
brother resides in North Carolina. Therefore, Petitioner is likely in the best position to be
appointed to provide the necessary oversight to the Ward's care.
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8. Notice of the time and place of hearing on this petition should be given to the
following persons:
Catherine Ortega
1455 Madera Hills Dr
Bountiful UT 84010-1522
801-598-1109

Margaret Guynn
Atria
10970 S 700 E
Sandy UT 84070-4990

Donald Bruce Guynn
6412 Glendevon Dr
Whitsett NC 27377-9240
336-446-1120

Wendy Bradford (Attorney for the Ward)
147 W Election Rd Ste 200
Draper UT 84020
801-518-3623
bradfordlawoffi ce@gmail. com

Pursuant to § 75-5-303(4), Utah Code Ann., Petitioner also requests the Court to
waive the presence of the Ward and to waive the appointment of a visitor, based on the
physician's letter to be submitted prior to or at the hearing in this matter.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests:
1. The Court to fix a date and time for hearing on this Petition.
2. Notice be given as required by law.
3. The Court appoint, until September 23, 2009, or sooner if a hearing is held prior
to said date, a Temporary Conservator for the above named incapacitated person,
Margaret Guynn, and to serve without bond.
4. Temporary Letters of Conservatorship be issued by the Court to the Petitioner.
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5. Following hearing, the Court appoint Catherine Ortega as guardian and
conservator for the above named incapacitated person, Margaret Guynn, and to serve
without bond.
6. That pursuant to § 75-5-501(5), Utah Code Ann., the order appointing a Guardian
and Conservator also grant to the Conservator the power to revoke any and all powers of
attorney that the Ward may have in the past granted to any persons.
7. Following hearing, Letters of Guardian and Conservator be issued by the Court to
Petitioner.

Dated this 31st day of August 2009.

Michael A. Jensen
Attorney for Petitioner

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

By ^ )

^+<1U

D e p Ut y clerk

ELIZABETH S. CONLEY (4815)
Attorney for Margaret Guynn
3604 Astro Circle
Telephone: (801) 272-0719

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
MARGARET GUYNN,
A protected person.

STIPULATION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF LIMITED CONSERVATOR
Probate No. 093901284 GU
Judge Sandra Peuler

The parties to this action being Margaret Guynn ("Margaret"), represented by
Elizabeth S. Conley, Donald Bruce Guynn ("Bruce"), represented by Kent B. Alderman of
Parsons Behle & Latimer and Petitioner Catherine Ortega ("Catherine"), represented by Michael
A. Jensen, hereby enter into a stipulation and agreement for the appointment of a conservator for
Margaret.
INTRODUCTION
Margaret is an 85 year old woman currently residing at Atria Assisted Living in Salt Lake
County, Utah. Margaret lived on her own in Tyler, Texas until the summer of 2009 when her
son Bruce assisted her in selling her Texas home and moving to Utah.

498848.1

On or about August 31, 2009, Catherine, the daughter of Margaret,fileda petition
seeking appointment as guardian and conservator of Margaret. Bruce and Margaret objected to
the appointment of Catherine as a conservator and guardian.
While Catherine believes that Margaret lacks the capacity to manage her own care and
financial affairs, Bruce and Margaret disagree. Nonetheless, to avoid further litigation, they have
reached an agreement on the level of protection that is now needed. Accordingly, the parties
agree that a limited conservatorship should be established and that Bruce will serve as the
Conservator for Margaret.
STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Therefore, the parties now agree as follows and intend to be bound by the terms of this
Stipulation.
1.

The parties agree that Margaret needs assistance in handling herfinancialaffairs.

2.

The parties agree it is in Margaret's best interest that a limited conservator be

appointed to assist her with herfinancialaffairs and to protect her estate.
3.

The limitations of the Conservator are intended to grant Margaret as much

financial independence and freedom as possible.
4.

To that end, the Conservator shall assist Margaret in herfinancialaffairs by first

consulting with her to ascertain her desires regarding her finances.
5.

The parties agree that Bruce be appointed as Margaret's Conservator with the

limitations described herein.
6.

498848.1

The parties agree not to pursue a guardianship at this time.

2

DATED this K fray of October, 2009.

2v iz- ^iiusflu \J\iii</

U
Elizabeths. Conley
Attorney for Margaret Guynn

Michael A. Jensen
Attorney for Catherine Ortega

-^Kent B. Alderman
Attorney for Bruce Guynn
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DATED this

day of ©CTolJ5rr2009.

Elizabeth S. Conley
Attorney for Margaret Guynn

'-fk/Hdd,
Michael A. Jensen
Attorney for Catherine Ortega

Kent B. Alderman
Attorney for Bruce Guynn
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040: mikefSiitahattornev.corn
Counsel for Petitioner

^ ' £ E $ fil£i«&^ed on 12/17/2009
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street, PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -1860
801-238-7020 (DeVonva); 238-7051 (Kathy); 238-7022 (MaKae); 238-7021 (Rhonda); 238-7509 (Kim)

In the Matter of
MARGARET GUYNN
An Alleged Incapacitated Person.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
WENDY BRADFORD'S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES;
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MS. GUYNN'S CLAIM THAT
PETITIONER'S PETITION WAS
WITHOUT MERIT; MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY MS. CONLEY FROM
REPRESENTING MS. GUYNN;
REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING; AND REQUEST FOR
PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY FEES
HEARING REQUESTED
Civil No. 093901284
Judge Sandra Peuler

Pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner Catherine Ortega, by
and through counsel, hereby joins in support of the motion for attorney feesfiledby
Wendy Bradford and concurrently opposes the opposition filed by Elizabeth Conley,
ostensibly on behalf of Margaret Guynn.

Since a legal representative, i.e., a Conservator, has been appointed for Ms. Guynn,
Petitioner also moves the Court to disqualify Ms. Conley from directly representing
Ms. Guynn pursuant to Rule 1.14, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
Petitioner believes that the objection filed by Ms. Conley is itself without merit since
it is unsupported by any evidence and Ms. Conley's statements are substantially
controverted by Ms. Bradford and by Petitioner's Declaration being filed concurrently
with this memorandum. However, if the Court is not inclined to deny Ms. Conley's
objections or is inclined tofindthat the Petition was filed without merit, Petitioner
expressly requests the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the facts in
these proceedings and to determine whether or not the petition was frivolous or having no
basis in law or fact. In doing so, such evidentiary hearing should include, but not limited
to, the testimonies of Ms. Guynn, Ms. Conley, Ms. Bradford, Mr. Alderman, Ms. Ortega,
Mr. Ennenga (Ms. Ortega's husband), Tim Griffin (employee at Atria), Jeremy and
Rebecca Ortega, and rebuttal witnesses as identified.
Finally, Petitioner should be reimbursed from the estate of Ms. Guynn for
Petitioner's legal fees and costs, since her entire efforts were solely for the benefit of
Ms. Guynn.
FACTS
1. On August 31, 2009, Petitioner filed her Petition to Appoint a Guardian and
Conservator for Margaret Guynn, Petitioner's mother.
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2. On September 2, 2009, the Court appointed Petitioner as temporary Guardian and
temporary Conservator.
3. On September 2, 2009, the Court appointed Wendy Bradford as counsel for the
alleged protected person, Margaret Guynn.
4. Petitioner is the daughter of Margaret Guynn, and she has one sibling,
Bruce Guynn ("Bruce"), who is six years older than Petitioner.
See Decl Catherine Ortega at 1 ^ 1-2.
5. Petitioner is a Physician's Assistant and has been employed as a PA since 1992.
Moreover, she has no criminal background; she has an excellent credit score, and she has
made a sixfigureincome for more than a decade. Id. at 1ffl[3-4.
6. After Bruce left home when Petitioner was about 11 years of age, Bruce has
refused to speak with Petitioner and he has made no attempt to speak with her for more
than 30 years. Id. at 2 \ 7.
7. Right after high school, Petitioner had a son, Jeremy Ortega. Id. at 21j 11.
8. While Petitioner was in the University of Utah's LPN Program, Jeremy was
tended by his grandmother, Ms. Guynn. Id. at 2 \ 14.
9. When Jeremy was nine years of age, his grandparents moved to Texas, and their
contact after that was only occasional and consisted mostly of a couple of telephone calls
each year. Id. at 3 <| 15.
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10. Jeremy's life was somewhat troubled; he had fathered four children with three
different women by the time he was 30 years of age. Id. at 3-4ffif17-22.
11. Jeremy relinquished his parental rights to his first two children, but since
Petitioner had developed a close bond with the children over many years, she intervened
to protect her rights as a grandmother and retained visitation. Id. at 4 f 24.
12. Over an extended period of time, Jeremy didn't keep it a secret that his
grandmother Margaret had been willing to buy him things over the past 10 years or more.
Id. at 5 % 26. She purchased a car for him when he first got married. Id. She bought him
a computer a few years ago, and Ms. Guynn informed Petitioner that she gave Jeremy
money on a regular basis. Id.
13. One day late last summer (2009), Jeremy was at Petitioner's home and they had
some alcoholic beverages. Id. at 5 \ 27. After Jeremy had several drinks and appeared
somewhat inebriated, he began informing Petitioner of his and Bruce's plans to move
Ms. Guynn from Texas to Utah. Id. He stated that he was going to "drag" Ms. Guynn to
the airport (in Texas) and "throw her on the plane." Id. Jeremy went on to state that he
planned on getting a power of attorney so that he could sell $200,000 worth of
Ms. Guynn's stock. Id.
14. A few days later, Petitioner called her mother in Texas and found that Jeremy
was there in the process of moving his grandmother to Utah. Id. at 5 % 28. During that
call, Jeremy began yelling at Petitioner for her not to interfere with him or Bruce. Id. He
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then hung up on Petitioner, and he has never called her since nor has he accepted any
calls from her. Id.
15. When Petitioner called her mother the next day, the telephone number was
disconnected. Id. at 5 ^J 29.
16. When Petitioner hadn't heard anything from her mother or from Jeremy, she
began searching in the Salt Lake County area for her mother. Id. at 5 f 30. She reported
her mother missing, and the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office conducted an
investigation. Id. Petitioner was informed that a deputy contacted Jeremy's wife,
Rebecca, to locate Petitioner's mother, but Rebecca refused to cooperate or provide any
information to the deputy. Id. Petitioner then hired a private investigator to locate her
mother. Id.
17. After four weeks, Petitioner found her mother at Atria Assisted Living Facility
in Sandy. Id. at 6 \ 31. Petitioner and her husband then went to Atria to visit Petitioner's
mother, and she welcomed them warmly. Id.
18. When they arrived at Atria, Petitioner found much of her mother's personal
belongings in a huge pile in the middle of the room. Id. at 6 \ 32. She began helping her
mother put things away, and Petitioner's husband spent the following days helping
Ms. Guynn get her apartment in order. Id.
19. Petitioner's mother expressed her desire that Petitioner help her with her
financial affairs. Id. at 6 \ 33. Petitioner's mother insisted on going to the bank with her
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daughter. Id. The bank representative suggested to Ms. Guynn that Petitioner and her
husband's names should be added to Ms. Guynn's account to set up bill pay and monitor
activity in the account. Id. Petitioner's mother agreed that it was a good idea and she
signed the necessary documents. Id. Petitioner and her husband then arranged for direct
deposits and automatic payments of Ms. Guynn's bills. Id.
20. While at the bank, the bank's representative indicated that he would place a
"watch" over Ms. Guynn's account to see if any unusual amounts began flowing out of
the account. Id. at 6 \ 34.
21. Petitioner spoke with Tim Griffin at Atria about her mother's arrival, and he
informed Petitioner that Ms. Guynn was effectively dropped off with no familial contact
information. Id. at 6 \ 35. He was grateful for Petitioner's visit and to obtain Petitioner's
contact information. Id.
22. Based on what Petitioner learned about Jeremy's plans during his visit with
Petitioner a few weeks earlier, and based on what Ms. Guynn told Petitioner about
needing help with her financial affairs, Petitioner thought it was prudent to seek legal
counsel about how best to protect her mother and her estate. Id. at 6 ^f 36. Petitioner was
also informed by her mother that Rebecca had been trying to get Ms. Guynn to sign a
power of attorney for Rebecca and Jeremy. Id. Later, after filing a petition,
Wendy Bradford and Tim Griffin at Atria also informed Petitioner that Rebecca was
seeking a power of attorney for Ms. Guynn. Id. at 7.
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23. Petitioner then arranged to file a petition to appoint a guardian and a conservator
and to have her mother properly evaluated by a physician. Id. at 7 \ 37.
24. Petitioner was present at her mother's apartment on September 4, 2009, when
her mother was served with a Notice of Petition and Hearing. Id. at 7 ^ 38. Petitioner
discussed the petition with her mother, and all her mother said was, "Bruce will be very
angry about this." Id. Petitioner's mother didn't indicate any opposition to the Petition at
that time. Id. To the contrary, she continued to express her warmth and appreciation to
Petitioner for helping her; Petitioner by that time had obtained specialized cremes or
lotions to treat her mother's dry skin condition, and I had purchased closet racks and a
lamp to help my mother settle into her apartment. Id.
25. Petitioner arranged for Dr. Newhall to examine and evaluate Ms. Guynn for the
guardianship proceeding. Id. at 7 f 39. However, Petitioner later learned that
Dr. Newhall would not accept being Ms. Guynn's physician because she refused needed
lab work. Id. This was the first indication that Petitioner's mother may have some
delusions, since she expressed her belief that Petitioner had told Dr. Newhall that
Petitioner wanted her blood drawn to get her money. Id.
26. After Bruce received notice of the petition and hearing, he called his mother.
Petitioner's mother began screaming and throwing things at Petitioner when Petitioner
next arrived for a visit. Id. at 7 % 39. Petitioner and her husband were unable to calm her
down. Id. Subsequent to that last visit, Petitioner's mother has not been the same as when
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she was first visited by Petitioner and her husband. Petitioner's mother now refuses to
speak with Petitioner. Id.
27. At the hearing held on September 21, 2009, Ms. Conley stated in open court that
Ms. Guynn needs assistance with her financial affairs.
28. Subsequently, Ms. Conley agreed in a Stipulation filed with the Court that "it is
in [Ms. Guynn's] best interest that a limited conservator be appointed to assist her with
her financial affairs and to protect her estate." See Stipulation at 2 \ 2.
ARGUMENT
I.

Ms, Conley should be disqualified from representing Ms. Guvim since a
Conservator has been appointed and she is apparently not acting in the best
interest of Ms. Guynn,
Rule 1.14 governs how an attorney treats a client with diminished capacity.

Specifically, the relevant part of Comment 4 to Rule 1.14, Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct, states the following:
If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the
lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on
behalf of the client....
Bruce Guynn has been appointed as Conservator for Ms. Guynn. In fact,
Ms. Conley wholeheartedly consented to Mr. Guynn's appointment when she entered into
that certain Stipulation filed with the Court that states:
"... it is in [Ms. Guynn's] best interest that a limited conservator be
appointed to assist her with her financial affairs and to protect her
estate.1'
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Accordingly, Ms. Conley is required to work through Bruce Guynn, Ms. Guynn's
legal representative. However, Mr. Guynn already has counsel in these proceedings and
there is evidence from Wendy Bradford that an adversarial relationship exists or has
recently existed between Mr. Guynn and his mother, Ms. Guynn.
Rule 1.9, Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibits Ms. Conley to now
represent Mr. Guynn and Ms. Guynn unless there is written consent by both parties.
Therefore it would be a conflict of interest for Ms. Conley to now represent Mr. Guynn in
his role as Conservator for Ms. Guynn while at the same time representing Ms. Guynn.
Further, Ms. Conley has a duty to act in the best interest of Ms. Guynn and not
necessarily act on Ms. Guynn's wishes. Pursuant to § 75-5-407(2), Utah Code Ann.,
Ms. Conley was appointed to represent Ms. Guynn as a guardian ad litem, with all of the
powers and duties thereof. Therefore, if Ms. Conley is to represent Ms. Guynn, she
should be acting in Ms. Guynn's best interest, not adverse to her economic interest.
Ms. Conley is not acting in the best interest of Ms. Guynn. Filing an objection to
Ms. Bradford's attorney fees will only result in economic harm to Ms. Guynn's estate
without any benefit to Ms. Guynn. If anything, Ms. Conley's objection is frivolous and
she knows very well that the law supports payment of Ms. Bradford's fees from the estate
of Ms. Guynn. Accordingly, Ms. Conley should no longer represent Ms. Guynn.
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II. Petitioner's Petition is and was not without merit
Ms. Conley has now asserted for the first time that the Petition filed in this case is
without merit. Whether or not a claim is "without merit" is a question of law.
Matthews v. Olympus Construction., L.C., 2009 UT 29 f 8 (citing In re Sonnenreich,
2004 UT 3 ^| 45). To determine whether a claim is without merit, the courts look to
whether it was "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or
fact." Id. at % 30 (citing Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102 \ 22 (quoting
Cadyv. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983))).
The declaration of Petitioner clearly demonstrates that Ms. Guynn has been in need
of assistance. Petitioner also made many other observations about her mother after her
mother arrived in Utah. However, just learning from her son about his plans to move his
grandmother to Utah and potentially exploit her assets was sufficient information for
Petitioner to take affirmative action to protect her mother:
One day late last summer in 2009, Jeremy was at Petitioner's home
and they had some alcoholic beverages. Id. at 5 H 27. After Jeremy
had several drinks and appeared somewhat inebriated, he began
informing Petitioner of his and Bruce's plans to move Ms. Guynn
from Texas to Utah. Id. He stated that he was going to "drag" Ms.
Guynn to the airport (in Texas) and "throw her on the plane." Id.
Jeremy went on to state that he planned on getting a power of
attorney so that he could sell $200,000 worth of Ms. Guynn's stock.
Id.
See Paragraph 13 above.
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Further, both Ms. Conley and Ms. Bradford have stated and acknowledged that
Ms. Guynn needs assistance with herfinancialaffairs. Moreover, Ms. Guynn has
substantial assets that may be at risk if a conservator was or is not appointed. Ms. Conley
acknowledged by entering into the Stipulation that it is in the best interest of Ms. Guynn
to have a conservator appointed to protect her estate. How then can the Petition that
sought such protection for Ms. Guynn be deemed frivolous or of little weight or
importance having no basis in law or fact? If anything, the objection filed by Ms. Conley
is frivolous; the Petition is clearly not frivolous or of little weight or importance.
Also, the erratic and sometimes volatile behavior of Ms. Guynn during these
proceedings further demonstrates her delusions or fear or paranoia. Ms. Conley has
refused all attempts to allow a meeting with Ms. Guynn or to have her properly evaluated
by medical professionals for capacity or incapacity. Ms. Conley has also refused to
provide any medical evidence from Dr. Newhall, requiring the Court and Petitioner to
rely solely on Ms. Conley's statements and/or interpretations.
Under all of these facts and circumstances, the Petition should be found to be not
without merit and Ms. Bradford's fees should be paid from Ms. Guynn's estate as
required by § 75-5-303, Utah Code Ann.
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III. If there is any doubt by the Court that the facts and circumstances of this case
suggest in anv way that the Petition was without merit Petitioner should be
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine the facts.
Ms. Conley has set forth a claim that the Petition was without merit without any
supporting evidence. To the contrary, Petitioner has set forth extensive facts showing that
her actions in seeking protection of her mother was not frivolous or of little weight or
importance. Moreover, at least part of Petitioner's concerns actually resulted in the
appointment of a conservator to protect Ms. Guynn's estate.
Nonetheless, should there be any doubt about the facts, the Court should conduct an
evidentiary hearing at which all of the relevant testimony can be taken and weighed by the
Court. In doing so, the following individuals should be required to testify: Ms. Guynn,
Ms. Conley, Ms. Bradford, Mr. Alderman, Ms. Ortega, Mr. Ennenga, Tim Griffin,
Jeremy and Rebecca Ortega, and other rebuttal witnesses as becomes necessary and
appropriate.
It is hoped, however, that such an evidentiary hearing will be unnecessary.
IV. Petitioner's Petition wasfiledin good faith and for the sole purpose of
providing protection for Ms. Guynn: hence. Petitioner's legal fees and costs in
obtaining such protection should be paid from Ms. Guynn's estate.
Petitioner is entitled to have her legal fees reimbursed from the estate of Ms. Guynn.
Petitioner did not intend to pursue such a claim for fees, and in fact was not pursuing such
fees. However, but for the litigious behavior of Ms. Conley, ostensibly on behalf of
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Ms. Guynn, but more likely on behalf of Bruce Guynn, it is only equitable and just that
Petitioner's legal fees and costs now be reimbursed from the estate of Ms. Guynn.
While there is no Code section or Utah case on point, the Nebraska Supreme Court
has weighed in on this issue.1 See In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Donley,
262 Neb. 282 (Neb 2001).2 The Nebraska Court acknowledged that it had never before
addressed this issue when it made the following statement:
While we have never considered the precise issue, we are persuaded
by the rule adopted in other states that costs and attorney fees
incurred in the good faith initiation of conservatorship proceedings
constitute necessaries for the support or benefit of the protected
person such that payment of reasonable costs incurred may be
assessed against the protected person's estate, {citing, In re Estate of
Bayers, 295 Mont. 89, 983 P.2d 339 (1999); In re Dunn, 239 N.C.
378, 79 S.E.2d 921 (1954); Penney v. Pritchard & McCall, 255 Ala.
13,49 So. 2d 782 (1950); Carney v. Aicklen, 587 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979); In re Estate and Guardianship ofVermeersch, 15
Ariz. App. 315, 488 P.2d 671 (1971); In re Estate of Sherwood, 56
111. App. 2d 334, 206 N.E.2d 304 (1965); In re Bundy, 44 Cal. App.
466,186 P. 811(1919).
The Nebraska Court further expressed its rationale on this issue:
The rationale supporting the rule is that in guardianship and
conservatorship cases, the applicant most often acts for and on behalf
of one who is unable to act or care for himself or herself. See, In re
Dunn, supra; In re Bundy, supra. Thus, thefilingof the petition and
the hearing thereon are indispensable steps in the preservation of the

1

In making its ruling, Nebraska followed the rule adopted in Montana, North Carolina, Alabama,
Texas, Arizona, Illinois, and California. Such states do not necessarily represent all states that have
adopted this rule.
2

For the convenience of the Court's review of this important Nebraska case, Petitioners have
attached hereto a copy of the case as exhibit A.
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protected person's estate. See, In re Bundy, supra; In re Estate and
Guardianship ofVermeersch, supra. It is recognized that when an
individual is in need of physical orfinancialprotection, the law must
in many instances think and act for him or her. See, In re Dunn,
supra; In re Bundy, supra. The state and society have a significant
interest in bringing the estate of individuals in need of protection
under the vigil of the county court. See In re Estate and
Guardianship of Vermeersch, supra. See, also, Penney v. Pritchard
& McCall, supra. The court, as general conservator of the rights of
persons in need of protection, is dependent upon applications being
filed by interested persons so that the court may assume control of
the estate and preserve i; for the protected person. See In re Bundy,
supra.
In Donley, the Nebraska Court went on to state:
Further, we note that an action to appoint a conservator is not an
adversarial proceeding* but, rather, is a proceeding to promote the
best interests of the person for whom the conservatorship is sought.
A conservatorship action is uniquely nonadversarial in that everyone
involved, including the petitioner and the court, is presumably
interested in protecting the interest of the person for whom the
conservatorship is sought.
Finally, the Nebraska Court stated:
Therefore, in a conservatorship proceeding, the interest to be
considered by the court and the principles to be applied are quite
unlike those in an ordinary litigation case.
In the instant case, the Court should find that Petitioner was at all times attempting
to protect Ms. Guynnfrompersonal and economic harm. Therefore, Petitioner's costs
and legal fees should be paid from the estate of Ms. Guynn, particularly since Ms. Guynn
is the only beneficiary from Petitioner's efforts. Petitioner received nothingfromher
efforts except that Bruce has turned her mother against her.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Conley should be disqualified from representing Ms. Guynn in this economic
battle when a conservator has been appointed for Ms. Guynn and where Ms. Conley is not
acting in the best interest of Ms. Guynn. The Petition is not without merit since it is not
frivolous or of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact. To the contrary,
it is Ms. Conley's objection that is frivolous. An evidentiary hearing should be conducted
if the Court is inclined tofindthat the Petition is without merit. Finally, Petitioner is
entitled to her legal fees in filing her Petition, resolving the issues through a Stipulation,
and defending the Petition against Ms. Conley's claims that it is without merit. Upon a
ruling by the Court, Petitioner's counsel will file, pursuant to Rule 73, a declaration of
fees with supporting details.

Dated this 17th day of September 2009.

Michael A. Jensen
Attorney for Petitioner, Catherine Ortega
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Civil No. 093901284
Judge Sandra Peuler
In the Matter of
MARGARET GUYNN, a Protected Person.

I, Michael A. Jensen, hereby certify that on this day 1 personally served the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF WENDY BRADFORD'S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES; MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MS. GUYNN'S
CLAIM THAT PETITIONER'S PETITION WAS WITHOUT MERIT; MOTION
TO DISQUALIFY MS. CONLEY FROM REPRESENTING MS. GUYNN;
REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING; AND REQUEST FOR
PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY FEES by personally Mailing it to:
Kent B. Alderman
Parsons Behle & Latimer
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
(801) 532-1234; kaldermanfapblutali.com
Attorney for Bruce Guynn

Elizabeth S. Conley
Attorney at Law
3604 Astro Cir
Salt Lake City UT 84109
(801) 272-0719; e_conieyfgicomcast.net
Attorney for Margaret Guynn

Wendy Bradford
147 W Election Rd Ste 200
Draper UT 84020
801-518-3623
bradfordl awofficefg) gmail. com
Former Attorney for Margaret Guynn
DATED this 17th day of September 2009.

^KitL
Michael A. Jensen
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Nebraska Court Opinion
In re Guardianship & Conserv; orship of Donley, 262 Neb. 282
Filed July 20, 20( . No.S-00-965.
1. Estates: Appeal and Error. An
appellate court reviews probate cases for
error appearing on the record made in the
county court.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When
reviewing questions of law, an appellate
court has an obligation to resolve the
question independently of the conclusion
reached by the trial court.
3. Attorney Fees. The general rule with
respect to the award of attorney fees
under Nebraska law has been that
attorney fees and expenses may be
recovered only where provided for by
statute or when a recognized and
accepted uniform course of procedure
has been to allow recovery of attorney
fees.
4. Actions: Guardians and
Conservators. An action to appoint a
conservator is not an adversarial
proceeding, but rather, is a
proceeding to promote the best
interests of the person for whom the
conservatorship is sought.
5. Estates: Guardians and Conservators:
Attorney Fees. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. §
30-2654 (Reissue 1995), a conservator
is to expend or distribute sums
reasonably necessary for the support,
Page

education, care, or benefit of the
protected person. The cost, including a
reasonable attorney fee, of initiating a
good faith petition for the appointment
of a conservator, where such
appointment is determined to be in the
best interests of the protected person,
constitutes a necessary expenditure on
behalf of the protected person and is
compensable out of the
conservatorship estate.
6. Attorney Fees. When an attorney fee is
authorized, the amount of the fee is
addressed to the discretion of the trial
court.
7.
. To determine proper and
reasonable fees, it is necessary for the
court to consider the nature of the
proceeding, the time and labor required,
the novelty and difficulty of the
questions raised, the skill required to
properly conduct the case, the
responsibility assumed, the care and
diligence exhibited, the result of the suit,
the character and standing of the
attorney, and the customary charges of
the bar for similar services.
Appealfromthe County Court for
Lancaster County: James L. Foster,
Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
of 8
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Roger P. Cox and Gregory D. Barton,
of Harding, Shultz & Downs, for
appellant.
Larry D. Ohs, P.C., for appellee Mary
Davis.
Wright, Connolly, Gerrard, Stephan,
McCormack, and Miller-Lerman, JJ.

the home they occupied during their
marriage.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As a result of Leon and Margaret's
divorce in 1994, the house and acreage
Leon and Margaret lived on in Lincoln
were awarded to Leon. The record
reveals that the property was in
Margaret's name during the couple's
marriage and that after the divorce was
final, Margaret did not formally transfer
title to the property to Leon as required
by the divorce decree. Leon and
Margaret were remarried on July 8,1998,
and on July 13, Leon and Margaret
granted, for $100,000, an option to
purchase the acreage and house in
Lincoln for $450,000. Margaret testified
that the option was granted because the
couple had plans to move to Colorado so
that they could be closer to Davis. The
$100,000 from the sale of the option was
used as part of the purchase price for a
home in Longmont, Colorado. Margaret
testified that she also contributed to the
purchase price of the home in Colorado,
and the home was titled solely in
Margaret's name. The $100,000fromthe
sale of the option was eventually placed
in Leon's conservatorship estate.

Raymond is the adult son of Leon and
is one of five children born during
Leon's first marriage to Raymond's
mother. Leon subsequently married
Margaret Donley, and the couple had a
child during their marriage, Mary Davis.
After being married for approximately 30
years, Leon and Margaret were divorced
in 1994 but continued living together in

Raymond testified that prior to these
proceedings, Leon would often visit
Raymond's automobile repair shop, just
a few blocksfromLeon's house in
Lincoln. Raymond stated that on many
occasions between October 1998 and
March 1999, Leon told Raymond that he
and Margaret would be moving to
Colorado but that Leon did not want to

Gerrard, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Raymond Donleyfileda petition in the
county court for Lancaster County to
have a guardian and conservator
appointed for his father, Leon C. Donley.
The appointment of the guardian and
conservator was contested by Leon,
Leon's wife, and Leon's daughter.
Ultimately, the guardianship proceeding
was transferred to Colorado and the
parties agreed that coconservators would
be appointed for Leon in Nebraska. The
sole issue presented on appeal is whether
the attorneys hired by Raymond, the
petitioner, can recover, from Leon's
estate, reasonable attorney fees incurred
in the efforts to have a guardian and
conservator appointed for Leon.
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move. Raymond became concerned about
his father when Leon came to Raymond's
shop one day with two bottles of
mouthwash and a bottle of cleaner,
handed the bottles to Raymond, and told
Raymond that he would not need the
bottles anymore because he was moving.
Raymond stated that this conversation
took place about 10 days after Leon's last
expression of his desire not to move to
Colorado.
Raymond decided to file the petition
for the appointment of a guardian and
conservator because he had concerns that
things were happening to Leon that Leon
did not understand. Raymond stated that
he and Leon discussed having someone
appointed to look out for Leon's best
interests and that Leon thought doing so
would be a good idea.
On March 19, 1999, Raymond, through
counsel, filed a petition for the
appointment of a guardian and
conservator for Leon. A temporary
guardian and conservator was also
requested in the petition for Leon. John
McHenry, a lawyer and an independent
third party, was suggested in the petition
as a suitable guardian and conservator.
Raymond thought having an independent
party as guardian and conservator would
be advisable to avoid potential conflict
between the families from Leon's two
marriages. In addition to requesting
McHenry as the temporary guardian and
conservator in the petition, Raymond also
had Leon sign a document, which was
filed with the county court, nominating
McHenry as his guardian and conservator.

McHenry was appointed and accepted the
position as temporary guardian and
conservator.
Leon and Margaret moved to
Longmont, Colorado, in early May 1999.
Also, on May 6, the county court
authorized the sale of Leon's property in
Lincoln, where Leon and Margaret had
been living, pursuant to the purchase
option executed in July 1998. On July 12,
1999, the county court noted that
settlement negotiations were progressing,
so the case was set for trial on August 31.
At a later hearing regarding the allowance
of attorney fees, Roger Cox, one of
Raymond's attorneys, testified that by
August 25, the parties had agreed to settle
the case and that the only thing left to do
was agree on specific wording in the
drafted settlement agreement. Cox stated
that on August 26, Cox was informed that
Davis had filed petitions for the
appointment of a conservator and a
guardian in a Boulder County, Colorado,
court on August 20 and that the settlement
was probably off. The petitions for
guardian and conservator in the Colorado
court were both signed by Leon.
A hearing on the issue whether the
proceedings should be transferred to
Colorado was held on September 22,
1999, in the county court for Lancaster
County. The county court determined that
the guardianship proceeding should be
transferred to Colorado but that the
conservatorship proceeding should stay in
Nebraska.
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The parties eventually filed a joint
stipulation for settlement on January 28,
2000, agreeing that McHenry and Davis
should be appointed as coconservators
for Leon. On February 28, the county
court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that a conservator should be
appointed for Leon and that there were
no less restrictive alternatives available.
The county court also found the joint
stipulation for settlement to be fair and
reasonable. The agreement essentially
gave Davis control of the day-to-day
spending with respect to Leon and gave
McHenry control over how Leon's assets
should be invested in the event the
coconservators disagreed as to
investment of the assets. The final
inventory of Leon's estate totaled
$841,607.80.
On April 7,2000, Raymondffieda
petition for attorney fees incurred as the
petitioner in this matter in the amount of
$28,422.02. Briefs in opposition to the
payment of fees were filed on behalf of
Leon by his attorney as well as by Davis
as coconservator. Leon's brief argued
that Raymond's attorney's services were
not required in this matter because Leon
had previously appointed a power of
attorney to provide assistance in the
future.
It was established at the hearing on the
issue of attorney fees that Raymond
initially hired the firm of Harding, Shultz
& Downs and that there was never an
express agreement between that firm and
Leon. Further, Cox, an attorney with the

Harding, Shultz & Downs law firm,
testified that as of the date of the hearing,
Raymond had paid the firm $20,000
toward the $28,422.02 incurred by the
firm for services the firm had rendered in
this matter.
The county court determined that
Raymond wras not entitled to attorney
fees. The court cited In re Guardianship
& Conservatorship of Tucker, 9 Neb.
App. 17, 606 N.W.2d 868 (2000), for the
proposition that attorney claims for
professional services must be based upon
a contract of employment made with the
person to be charged. The county court
then found that there was never an
express or implied contract between
Leon and the attorneys employed by
Raymond. Therefore, the court ruled that
the attorney fees were not to be paid
from Leon's estate. Raymond filed this
appeal, and we moved the case to our
docket pursuant to our authority to
regulate the dockets of the appellate
courts.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, Raymond assigns that the
county court erred (1) in ruling that there
was no express or implied contract
between Leon and the attorneys
employed by Raymond and (2) in failing
to award Raymond his reasonable
attorney fees to be paid by Leon's
conservatorship estate.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] An appellate court reviews
probate cases for error appearing on the
record made in the county court. In re
Estate of Myers, 256 Neb. 817, 594
N.W.2d 563 (1999). See In re
Guardianship of Zyla, 251 Neb. 163, 555
N.W.2d 768 (1996). When reviewing
questions of law, an appellate court has
an obligation to resolve the question
independently of the conclusion reached
by the trial court. Mertz v. Pharmacists
Mut. Ins. Co., 261 Neb. 704, 625 N.W.2d
197(2001).
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Raymond argues that the
county court should have ordered
attorney fees to be paid from Leon's
estate in this case because his attorney's
actions benefited Leon's estate and
because there is a uniform course of
procedure to grant such fees when a
petitioner in a guardianship and
conservatorship action is ultimately
successful. Raymond further argues that
attorney fees are appropriate because the
petition was ultimately successful, as a
guardian and co-conservators were
appointed for Leon.
[3] The general rule with respect to the
award of attorney fees under Nebraska
law has been that attorney fees and
expenses may be recovered only where
provided for by statute or when a
recognized and accepted uniform course
of procedure has been to allow recovery

of attorney fees. See Nebraska Nutrients
v. Shepherd, 261 Neb. 723, 626 N.W.2d
472 (2001). Raymond argues that
attorney fees should be paid out of
Leon's conservatorship estate under this
general rule. The appellee Davis, on the
other hand, asserts that there is no
uniform course of procedure in
guardianship/conservatorship matters to
allow attorney fees for petitioner's
attorneys. Moreover, Davis argues that
the county court correctly determined
that there was never an express or
implied contract between Leon and the
attorneys employed by Raymond and
that, therefore, there was no basis for the
recovery of an attorney fee in this
conservatorship proceeding. We find that
when the petitioner's good faith actions
are a necessary expense to the
conservatorship estate, attorney fees are
authorized by statute in Nebraska and are
compensable under the general rule
regarding attorney fees.
While we have never considered the
precise issue, we are persuaded by the
rule adopted in other states that costs and
attorney fees incurred in the good faith
initiation of conservatorship proceedings
constitute necessaries for the support or
benefit of the protected person such that
payment of reasonable costs incurred
may be assessed against the protected
person's estate. See, In re Estate of
Bayers, 295 Mont. 89, 983 P.2d 339
(1999); In re Dunn, 239 N.C. 378, 79
S.E.2d 921 (1954); Penney v. Pritchard
& McCall, 255 Ala. 13,49 So. 2d 782
(1950); Carney v. Aicklen, 587 S.W.2d
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507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); In re Estate
and Guardianship of Vermeersch, 15
Ariz. App. 315,488 P.2d 671 (1971); In
re Estate of Sherwood, 56 111. App. 2d
334,206 N.E.2d 304 (1965); In re
Bundy, 44 Cal. App. 466, 186 P. 811
(1919).
The rationale supporting the rule is
that in guardianship/conservatorship
cases, the applicant most often acts for
and on behalf of one who is unable to act
or care for himself or herself. See, In re
Dunn, supra; In re Bundy, supra. Thus,
the filing of the petition and the hearing
thereon are indispensable steps in the
preservation of the protected person's
estate. See, In re Bundy, supra; In re
Estate and Guardianship of Vermeersch,
supra. It is recognized that when an
individual is in need of physical or
financial protection, the law must in
many instances think and act for him or
her. See, In re Dunn, supra; In re Bundy,
supra. The state and society have a
significant interest in bringing the estate
of individuals in need of protection under
the vigil of the county court. See In re
Estate and Guardianship of Vermeersch,
supra. See, also, Penney v. Pritchard &
McCall, supra. The court, as general
conservator of the rights of persons in
need of protection, is dependent upon
applications being filed by interested
persons so that the court may assume
control of the estate and preserve it for
the protected person. See In re Bundy,
supra.

[4] Further, we note that an action to
appoint a conservator is not an
adversarial proceeding, but, rather, is a
proceeding to promote the best interests
of the person for whom the
conservatorship is sought. A
conservatorship action is uniquely
nonadversarial in that everyone involved,
including the petitioner and the court, is
presumably interested in protecting the
interest of the person for whom the
conservatorship is sought. See Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 30-2630 (Reissue 1995)
(conservator may be appointed if trial
court is satisfied by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) person is unable to
manage his or her property effectively
and (2) person has property which will be
wasted or dissipated unless proper
management is provided or that funds are
needed for support of person and that
protection is necessary to obtain or
provide funds). Therefore, in a
conservatorship proceeding, the interest
to be considered by the court and the
principles to be applied are quite unlike
those in an ordinary litigation case.
[5] Thus, we cannot agree with the
appellee that the county court lacked
power to assess the costs of the
conservatorship proceeding and the
petitioner's attorney fees against the
alleged protected person's estate. In
Nebraska, under Neb. Rev. Stat. §
30-2654(a)(2) (Reissue 1995), a
"conservator is to expend or distribute
sums reasonably necessary for the
support, education, care or benefit of the
protected person." Clearly, the cost of
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initiating a good faith petition for the
appointment of a guardian or
conservator, where such appointment is
determined to be in the best interests of
the protected person, constitutes a
necessary expenditure on behalf of the
protected person. We hold that such
costs, including reasonable attorney fees,
are compensable out of the
conservatorship estate as they are
necessary expenditures on behalf of the
protected person. Therefore, attorney
fees are authorized by statute when a
good faith petition results in the
appointment of a conservator and, under
the general rule regarding attorney fees
in Nebraska, may be recovered from
Leon's estate. See § 30-2654.
In the instant case, the trial court and
the parties agreed that the appointment of
coconservators was in the best interests
of Leon, and the parties all agreed that
the appointment of a guardian was in
Leon's best interests. However, in
denying Raymond's petition for attorney
fees, the county court cited In re
Guardianship & Conservatorship of
Tucker, 9 Neb. App. 17, 606 N.W.2d 868
(2000), and focused on whether there
was a contractual relationship between
Leon and the lawfirmRaymond hired to
assist him infilingthe petition for the
appointment of a guardian and
conservator. The county court stated that
"it is apparent to me that the Courts of
this State are taking the position that
attorney claims for professional services
must rest upon a contract of employment
made with the person sought to be

charged."
The Court of Appeals, in In re
Guardianship & Conservatorship of
Tucker, supra, granted attorney fees
based upon an implied contract between
the petitioner's attorney and the protected
person. The court, however, did not hold
that a contractual relationship was
required in a guardianship and
conservatorship case in order to grant
attorney fees to a successful petitioner. In
fact, many situations arise in which an
incapacitated individual is in dire need of
a guardian or conservator, yet he or she
contests the
guardianship/conservatorship
proceeding. In such a case, a successful
petitioner whofiledan action in good
faith would not be entitled to attorney
fees under an express or implied contract
theory because the protected person
would not have accepted the benefit of
the attorney's services by agreeing to the
protection. Basing the decision whether
to grant attorney fees on whether an
incapacitated person, who has been
adjudged unfit to manage his or her own
affairs, has expressly or impliedly
entered into a fee agreement is generally
not sound policy, given that the
incapacitated person's ability to
understand and enter into such
agreements is often the very question at
issue in conservatorship proceedings.
Such a rule can only have the effect of
encouraging manipulation of
incapacitated persons in order to secure
an "agreement" that would make fees
recoverable. This would be contrary to
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the interest of the protected person and
inconsistent with the nature of the
proceedings.
We determine that the existence of an
express or implied contractual
relationship between a petitioner's
attorney and an incapacitated person is
not a prerequisite for the award of
attorney fees in a guardianship or
conservatorship proceeding. Therefore,
because the county court erred in
concluding that ar express or implied
contract between Leon and Raymond's
attorneys was necessary prior to the
award of attorney fees, we reverse the
order of the county court.
Based on the circumstances of the
instant case, we conclude that the costs,
including reasonable attorney fees, of
initiating and prosecuting proceedings
that ultimately resulted in the
appointment of a guardian and
co-conservators for Leon should be
compensable out of the conservatorship
estate as they are necessary expenditures
for the benefit of the protected person.
See § 30-2654. Because the county court
did not address the issue of the amount
of attorney fees in this case, we remand
the matter to the county court to
determine a reasonable fee to be paid
from the conservatorship estate to
Raymond's attorneys. We remand the
cause for a fee determination, keeping in
mind that the county court has seen and
heard the witnesses and is familiar with
the background and intricacies of these
proceedings. Moreover, the county court

expressly noted in its August 8,2000,
order that there was sufficient evidence
presented to the court to allow it to make
a determination as to the amount of
attorney fees without further hearing.
[6,7] We note that when an attorney
fee is authorized, the amount of the fee is
addressed to the discretion of the trial
court. See In re Estate of Stall, 261 Neb.
319,622N.W.2d886(2001).To
determine proper and reasonable fees, it
is necessary for the court to consider the
nature of the proceeding, the time and
labor required, the novelty and difficulty
of the questions raised, the skill required
to properly conduct the case, the
responsibility assumed, the care and
diligence exhibited, the result of the suit,
the character and standing of the
attorney, and the customary charges of
the bar for similar services. See Schirber
v. State, 254 Neb. 1002, 581 N.W.2d 873
(1998).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the order of the county court and remand
the cause to the county court for a
determination of reasonable attorney fees
to be paid to Raymond's attorneys out of
the conservatorship estate.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE #093901284

MARGARET GUYNN.
February 24, 2010
Judge Sandra Peuler

Before the court is a Request to Submit for Decision on Petitioner's motion for
attorney fees. The memorandum filed on December 18, 2009, in support of the motion
aiso requests that the court disqualify Ms Coniey from representing Ms Guynn, that the
court order payment of Ms. Bradford's attorneys fees, and opposes Ms. Guynn's claim that
Petitioner's petition was filed without merit. All of these matters have been briefed by other
counsel, and the court has previously ruled on the issue of Ms Bradford's fees. Although
a request has been made for hearing, the Court does not find that a hearing would assist
with ruling, and would only serve to increase attorneys fees, which is the major issue at this
time. Accordingly, the court rules as follows, based on the memoranda filed.
1. As noted above, the court has previously ruled on the issue of Ms Bradford's
fees. Mr Guynn has filed a motion to set that ruling aside, based upon Rule 60(b)(3). The
court finds that the statement referred to giving rise to the motion does not rise to the level
of misrepresentation, as it was in the nature of a future promise to refrain from seeking
attorneys fees, rather than a statement of presently existing fact. Mr. Guynn has failed to

Rrm

set forth a sufficient basis for the court to revisit the issue of Ms. Bradford's fees.
2. Petitioner's motion to disqualify Ms. Conley as counsel is denied. The court finds
no basis to disqualify an attorney retained by Ms. Guynn. Although petitioner argues that
Ms. Guynn's representation must be through the limited conservator, Ms. Conley
represented at the hearing on September 22, 2009, that she had been retained by Ms.
Guynn personally, and that was reflected in the order prepared from that hearing.
3. The petitioner's motion for payment of her attorneys fees is denied. This
substance of this matter was resolved in November 2009, by a stipulation signed by
counsel for all parties, and an order entered by the court on November 30, 2009. The
stipulation and order did not contain a provision for attorneys fees; that issue, apparently,
arose later after disagreements between the petitioner and conservator. Based upon the
pleadings filed since the entry of the order, it is apparent to the court that many of the
requested attorneys fees have been incurred since then.
Based on the resolution of this matter, which did not provide for petitioner's
attorneys fees, as well as the increase of fees since the order was entered, the court
declines to award attorneys fees to the petitioner.
4. The court has previously determined that the petition was not filed in bad faith.
Although both parties have recently set forth their disagreements and family disputes in
great detail, the standard to be used is what information the petitioner had at the time the
petition was filed, that caused her to take the action that she did. While, as previously
noted, there are many disputes between the parties, the court cannot find that the actions
of the petitioner at that time were in bad faith.
This minute entry is the Order of the Court, and no further order is required to be

prepared by counsel.

Dated this ^

day of February, 2010

DISTRICT COURT J
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Date:

,
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040: mikefg.utahattornev.com
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street, PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
801-238-7020 (DeVonya); 238-7051 (Kathy); 238-7022 (MaKae); 238-7021 (Rhonda); 238-7509 (Kim)

In the Matter of

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER'S RULE 59 MOTION

MARGARET GUYNN
A Protected Person.

HEARING REQUESTED
Civil No. 093901284
Judge Sandra Peuler

Pursuant to Rule 7, Utah R. Civ. P., Petitioner Catherine Ortega, by and through
counsel, hereby submits her memorandum in support of her Rule 59(a)(7) Motion, and
requests the Court to grant the motion based on an error in law.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner filed her petition for the protection of her mother, Margaret Guynn. The
Court has ruled that the petition was not filed in bad faith. The parties, by and through
their respective attorneys, entered into a stipulation that wasfiledwith the Court on
November 25,2009 (the "Stipulation"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

The Stipulation provides for the appointment of a Conservator for Ms. Guynn, and in fact,
the Court appointed Ms. Guynn's son, Bruce Guynn, as her Conservator.
Subsequent to the filing of the Stipulation, Petitioner sought the reimbursement of
her attorney fees and submitted an initial memorandum and a reply memorandum with
various declarations in support.
The Court entered a signed Minute Entry on February 24,2010 (the "Ruling") in
which the Court denied Petitioner's request for her attorney fees. The Court's denial
appears to be based on its interpretation of the Stipulation. However, the Stipulation was
void of any mention of attorney fees, and the Court confirmed that observation in her
Ruling. This then leads to the question of how the Court could possibly conclude that the
attorney fee issue "was resolved" by the Stipulation when there is no language in the
Stipulation relating to attorney fees or the waiver of attorney fees. It would appear that
the Court wrongly interpreted the Stipulation, and that is the basis for Petitioner's motion.
RELEVANT AND MATERIAL FACTS
1. On August 31,2009, Petitioner filed her Petition to Appoint a Guardian and
Conservator for Margaret Guynn, Petitioner's mother.
2. After negotiations between Ms. Elizabeth Conley, representing Ms. Guynn, and
Kent Alderman, representing Bruce Guynn, and Michael Jensen, representing Petitioner,
Catherine Ortega, an agreement was reached to appoint only a conservator for
Ms. Guynn.
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3. On November 25,2009, the parties' agreement was filed with the Court, entitled
Stipulation for Appointment ofLimited Conservator, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
4. On December 18, 2009. Petitioner filed her motion for reimbursement of her
attorney fees, and on February 1, Petitioner filed her reply memorandum in support of her
motion for attorney fees.
5. On February 24,2010, the Court entered its Ruling denying Petitioner's attorney
fees.
ARGUMENT
The Stipulation is void of any reference to attorney fees: therefore, the
Stipulation, unless ambiguous, cannot be the basis for denying attorney fees to
Petitioner.
That part of the Court's Ruling that deals with the issue of Petitioner's attorney fees
is contained in Paragraph No. 3, and set forth in its entirety below:
The petitioner's motion for payment of her attorney fees is denied. This
(sic) substance of this matter was resolved in November 2009, by a stipulation
signed by counsel for all parties, and an order entered by the court on
November 30, 2009. The stipulation and order did not contain a provision for
attorneys fees; that issue, apparently, arose later after disagreements between
the petitioner and conservator. Based upon the pleadings filed since the entry
of the order, it is apparent to the court that many of the requested attorneys fees
have been incurred since then.
Based on the resolution of this matter, which did not provide for
petitioner's attorneys fees, as well as the increase of fees since the order was
entered, the court declines to award attorneys fees to the petitioner.
Court's Ruling, February 24, 2010 at 2 If 3; see also Exhibit B attached hereto.
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A. The Stipulation is construed as a contract
It is basic law that a stipulation is construed as a contract. Lloyd v. Lloyd,
2009 UT 314 P6 (citing Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206,1209). And,
interpretation of contract terms is a question of law. Tom Heal Commer. Real Estate v.
yarfc, 2007 UTApp 265 P 7.
B.

A contract is first interpreted by looking within the four corners of the
document

The Utah Supreme Court held in Inner light, Inc. v. Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31
the following:
When interpreting a contract, we begin by looking within the four corners
of the contract "to determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling."
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc. , 2002 UT 62, P 16, 52 P.3d 1179
(citations omitted). "If the language within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous,... a court determines the parties' intentions from the plain
meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law." Id.
Innerlight, Inc. V. Matrix Group, LLC, 2009 UT 31 P14.
In this case, the Stipulation contains six simple agreements:
1. The parties agree that Margaret needs assistance in handling her financial
affairs.
2. The parties agree it is in Margaret's best interest that a limited conservator
be appointed to assist her with her financial affairs and to protect her estate.
3. The limitations of the Conservator are intended to grant Margaret as much
financial independence and freedom as possible.
4. To that end, the Conservator shall assist Margaret in her financial affairs by
first consulting with her to ascertain her desires regarding her finances.
-4-

5. The parties agree that Bruce be appointed as Margaret's Conservator with
the limitations described herein.
6. The parties agree not to purse a guardianship at this time.

Looking within the four corners of the Stipulation, there is absolutely no reference to
any waiver of attorney fees or any mention of attorney fees. Further, the Stipulation is
void of any language that waives any claims by any party. Moreover, the Court's Ruling
also confirms that the Stipulation does "not contain a provision for attorneys fees."
Therefore, the Stipulation cannot be the basis for concluding that the issue of attorney
fees for Petitioner "was resolved" or waived or treated in any manner whatsoever. There
is no logical way to conclude that the attorney fee issue was resolved by looking at the
four corners of the Stipulation.
Further, there is no rule or law that requires all issues to be included in a stipulation.
In fact, the issue of attorney fees was discussed among the attorneys without resolution.
Therefore, the issue was intentionally omitted from the Stipulation and raised in a
separate motion with the Court.
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner requests the Court to amend its Ruling to
specifically address and grant her request for attorney fees based on the arguments
submitted previously and to allow the increase in fees incurred as provided by law and set
forth in her Reply Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Attorney Fees.
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CONCLUSION
The Court's Ruling appears to be based solely on its interpretation of the Stipulation.
In looking at the four corners of the Stipulation, the Stipulation is completely silent on the
issue of Petitioner's attorney fees or any attorney fees. Therefore, the Stipulation cannot
logically be the basis for denying Petitioner's request for attorney fees. The Court should
amend its Ruling and grant Petitioner's motion, including Petitioner's request for
additional fees incurred in defending the attorney fees she sought in the first place.

Dated this 1st day of March 2010.

^/ffejt^
Michael A. Jensen ( ^ y
Attorney for Petitioner, Catherine Ortega
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Civil No. 093901284
Judge Sandra Peuler

In the Matter of
MARGARET GUYNN, a Protected Person.
I, Michael A. Jensen, hereby certify that on this day I personally served the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S RULE 59
MOTION by personally Mailing it to:
Elizabeth S. Conley
Attorney at Law
3604 Astro Cir
Salt Lake City UT 84109-3843
(801) 272-0719; e_conlev(Steomcast.net
Attorney for Margaret Guynn

Kent B. Alderman
Parsons Behle & Latimer
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
(801) 532-1234; kalderman@pblutah.com
Attorney for Bruce Guynn
Wendy Bradford
147 W Election Rd Ste 200
Draper UT 84020-6436
801-518-3 623; bradfordlawoffice@gmail.com
Former Attorney for Margaret Guynn

Dated this 1st day of March 2010.

Michael A. Jensen

(J
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EXHIBIT A

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

.NOV 2 5
Deputy Clerk

ELIZABE1H S. CONLEY(4815)
Attorney for Margaret Guyim
3604 Astro Circle
Telephone: (801) 272-0719

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
MARGARET GUYNN,
A protected persoa

STIPULATION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF LIMITED CONSERVATOR
Probate No. 093901284 GU
Judge Sandra Peuler

The parties to this action being Margaret Guynn ("Margaret"), represented by
Elizabeth S Conley, Donald Bruce Guynn ("Bruce"), represented by Kent B. Alderman of
Parsons Behle & Latimer and Petitioner Catherine Ortega ("Catherine"), represented by Michael
A. Jensen, hereby enter into a stipulation and agreement for the appointment of a conservator for
Margaret.
INTRODUCTION
Margaret is an 85 year old woman currently residing at Atria Assisted Living in Salt Lake
County, Utah. Margaret hved on her own in Tyler, Texas until the summer of 2009 when her
son Bruce assisted her in selling her Texas home and moving to Utah

Exhibit A
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On or about August 31, 2009, Catherine, the daughter of Margaret, filed a petition
seeking appointment as guardian and conservator of Margaret. Bruce and Margaret objected to
the appointment of Catherine as a conservator and guardian.
While Catherine believes that Margaret lacks the capacity to manage her own care and
financial affairs, Bruce and Margaret disagree. Nonetheless, to avoid further litigation, they have
reached an agreement on the level of protection that is now needed. Accordingly, the parties
agree that a limited conservatorship should be established and that Bruce will serve as the
Conservator for Margaret.
STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Therefore, the parties now agree as follows and intend to be bound by the terms of this
Stipulation.
1.

The parties agree that Margaret needs assistance in handling herfinancialaffairs.

2.

The parties agree it is in Margaret's best interest that a limited conservator be

appointed to assist her with herfinancialaffairs and to protect her estate.
3.

The limitations of the Conservator are intended to grant Margaret as much

financial independence andfreedomas possible.
4.

To that end, the Conservator shall assist Margaret in herfinancialaffairs by first

consulting with her to ascertain her desires regarding her finances.
5.

The parties agree that Bruce be appointed as Margaret's Conservator with the

limitations described herein.
6.

498848.1

The parties agree not to pursue a guardianship at this time.

2

DATED this JV_

day of October, 2009.

u
Elizabeths. Conley
Attorney for Margaret Guynn

Michael A Jensen
Attorney for Catherine Ortega

£UA

-^Kent B. Alderman
Attorney for Bruce Guynn
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DATED this

day of ©ttetR5rr2009.

Elizabeth S. Conley
Attorney for Margaret Guynn

"-Yk^od,
Michael A. Jensen
Attorney for Catherine Ortega

Kent B. Alderman
Attorney for Bruce Guynn
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE # 093901284

MARGARET GUYNN.
February 24, 2010
Judge Sandra Peuler

Before the court is a Request to Submit for Decision on Petitioner's motion for
attorney fees. The memorandum filed on December 18, 2009, in support of the motion
also requests that the court disqualify Ms Conley from representing Ms Guynn, that the
court order payment of Ms. Bradford's attorneys fees, and opposes Ms. Guynn's claim that
Petitioner's petition was filed without merit. All of these matters have been briefed by other
counsel, and the court has previously ruled on the issue of Ms Bradford's fees. Although
a request has beeii made for hearing, the Court does not find that a hearing would assist
with ruling, and would only serve to increas^attorneys-fees,-whiGh is theroapr-issue-atthis
time. Accordingly, the court rules as follows, based on the memoranda filed.
1. As noted above, the court has previously ruled on the issue of Ms Bradford's
fees. Mr Guynn has filed a motion to set that ruling aside, based upon Rule 60(b)(3). The
court finds that the statement referred to giving rise to the motion does not rise to the level
of misrepresentation, as it was in the nature of a future promise to refrain from_seeking
attorneys fees, rather than a statement of presently existing fact Mr. Guynn has failed to
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set forth a sufficient basis for the court to revisit the issue of Ms. Bradford's fees.
2. Petitioner's motion to disqualify Ms. Conley as counsel is denied. The court finds
no basis to disqualify an attorney retained by Ms. Guynn. Although petitioner argues that
Ms. Guynn's representation must be through the limited conservator, Ms. Conley
represented at the hearing on September 22, 2009, that she had been retained by Ms.
Guynn personally, and that was reflected in the order prepared from that hearing.
3. The petitioner's motion for payment of her attorneys fees is denied. This
substance of this matter was resolved in November 2009, by a stipulation signed by
counsel for all parties, and an order entered by the court on November 30, 2009. The
stipulation and order did not contain a provision for attorneys fees; that issue, apparently,
arose later after disagreements between the petitioner and conservator. Based upon the
pleadings filed since the entry of the order, it is apparent to the court that many of the
requested attorneys fees have been incurred since then.
Based on the resolution of this matter, which did not provide for petitioner's
attorneys fees, as well as the increase of fees since the order was entered, the court
declines to award attorneys fees to the petitioner.
4. The court has previously determined that the petition was not filed in bad faith.
Although both parties have recently set forth their disagreements and family disputes in
great detail, the standard to be used is what information the petitioner had at the time the
petition was filed, that caused her to take the action that she did. While, as previously
noted, there are many disputes between the parties, the court cannot find that the actions
of the petitioner at that time were in bad faith.
This minute entry is the Order of the Court, and no further order is required to be

prepared by counsel.

Dated this

Q. f

day of February, 2010

By.
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
MARGARET GUYNN.

MINUTE ENTRY
Case 093901284
Judge Sandra N. Peuler

Petitioner, Catherine Ortega has filed a motion under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(a)(7). The motion has been objected to by both Margaret Guynn and
Bruce Guynn. Petitioner has requested a hearing on her motion, however the court finds
that oral argument will not assist it in resolving this matter, as the issues presented and
relevant law are straightforward. The Court having been fully informed, rules as follows.
Petitioner requests that the court amend its minute entry of February 24, 2010, in
which it denied petitioner's prior request for attorney fees. Petitioner argues that the
court denied her prior request for attorney fees simply because the parties' Stipulation
did not provide for attorney fees. Petitioner claims that this leads to the question of how
the Court could possibly conclude that the attorney fee issue 'was resolved' by the
Stipulation when there is no language in the Stipulation relating to attorney fees or the
waiver of attorney fees."
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59 permits the court to order a new trial or amend a
judgment, based upon several grounds, including an "error in law." UT R. Civ. Pro.
59(a)(7). The denies petitioner's Rule 59 motion based on the following.

RfV<S4

In Utah, "[although courts have inherent equitable power to award attorney fees
when justice or equity requires .. . attorney fees are typically recoverable only if an
applicable statute or contract so provides." A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v.
Guy, 2004 UT 47, fl 7 (citations omitted); and see Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n.
885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) (stating "in the absence of a statutory or contractual
authorization, a court has inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees
when it deems it appropriate in the interest of justice and equity."). The situations where
a court may properly exercise this power are limited. Carrier v. Salt Lake County. 2004
UT 98, U 42 (rejecting a request for fees and noting in Stewart the court "held that the
invocation of this exception is appropriate only when the Vindication of a strong or
societally important public policy takes place and the necessary costs in doing so
transcend the individual plaintiffs pecuniary interest to an extent requiring
subsidization.'" (citations omitted)).
In its prior ruling, the court made clear that there was no provision in the
Stipulation nor in any other underlying contract or statute that authorized petitioner's
request for attorney fees. Feb. 24, 2010 Minute Entry, fl 3. Petitioner did not dispute
this. Mem, of Pet. 13 (requesting petitioner's attorney fees from Ms. Guynn's estate but
acknowledging "there is no Code section or Utah case on point."). Nor did the Court find
any reason to consider awarding attorney fees based in the interest of justice and
equity, where "the increase of fees since the order was entered" justified the denial of
-2-

petitioner's request. Minute Entry, fl 3.
Petitioner has not shown that the court made any error in law in its ruling.
Petitioner is not entitled to have that judgment set aside and petitioner's motion is
therefore DENIED.

This is the final order of the court no other order is required.
Dated this

1

day of April, 2010.

<g^i^^ugt>JiO
^

andra N. Peuler
District Court J u d g l ^ ^ f g
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Nebraska Court Opinion
In re Guardianship & Conserve torship of Donley, 262 Neb. 282
Filed July 20, 20( 1. No. S-00-965.
1. Estates: Appeal and Error. An
appellate court reviews probate cases for
error appearing on the record made in the
county court.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When
reviewing questions of law, an appellate
court has an obligation to resolve the
question independently of the conclusion
reached by the trial court.
3. Attorney Fees. The general rule with
respect to the award of attorney fees
under Nebraska law has been that
attorney fees and expenses may be
recovered only where provided for by
statute or when a recognized and
accepted uniform course of procedure
has been to allow recovery of attorney
fees.

education, care, or benefit of the
protected person. The cost including a
reasonable attorney fee, of initiating a
good faith petition for the appointment
of a conservator, where such
appointment is determined to be in the
best interests of the protected person,
constitutes a necessary expenditure on
behalf of the protected person and is
compensable out of the
conservatorship estate.
6. Attorney Fees. When an attorney fee is
authorized, the amount of the fee is
addressed to the discretion of the trial
court.

4. Actions: Guardians and
Conservators. An action to appoint a
conservator is not an adversarial
proceeding, but rather, is a
proceeding to promote the best
interests of the person for whom the
conservatorship is sought.
5. Estates: Guardians and Conservators:
Attorney Fees. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. §
30-2654 (Reissue 1995), a conservator
is to expend or distribute sums
reasonably necessary for the support,

7.
. To determine proper and
reasonable fees, it is necessary for the
court to consider the nature of the
proceeding, the time and labor required,
the novelty and difficulty of the
questions raised, the skill required to
properly conduct the case, the
responsibility assumed, the care and
diligence exhibited, the result of the suit,
the character and standing of the
attorney, and the customary charges of
the bar for similar services.
Appeal from the County Court for
Lancaster County: James L. Foster,
Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions,
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the home they occupied during their
marriage.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As a result of Leon and Margaret's
divorce in 1994, the house and acreage
Leon and Margaret lived on in Lincoln
were awarded to Leon. The record
reveals that the property was in
Margaret's name during the couple's
marriage and that after the divorce was
final, Margaret did not formally transfer
title to the property to Leon as required
by the divorce decree. Leon and
Margaret were remarried on July 8, 1998,
and on July 13, Leon and Margaret
granted, for $100,000, an option to
purchase the acreage and house in
Lincoln for $450,000. Margaret testified
that the option was granted because the
couple had plans to move to Colorado so
that they could be closer to Davis. The
$100,000 from the sale of the option was
used as part of the purchase price for a
home in Longmont, Colorado. Margaret
testified that she also contributed to the
purchase price of the home in Colorado,
and the home was titled solely in
Margaret's name. The $100,000 from the
sale of the option was eventually placed
in Leon's conservatorship estate.

Raymond is the adult son of Leon and
is one offivechildren born during
Leon's first marriage to Raymond's
mother. Leon subsequently married
Margaret Donley, and the couple had a
child during their marriage, Mary Davis.
After being married for approximately 30
years, Leon and Margaret were divorced
in 1994 but continued living together in

Raymond testified that prior to these
proceedings, Leon would often visit
Raymond's automobile repair shop, just
a few blocksfromLeon's house in
Lincoln. Raymond stated that on many
occasions between October 1998 and
March 1999, Leon told Raymond that he
and Margaret would be moving to
Colorado but that Leon did not want to

Gerrard, J.
NATURE OF CASE
Raymond Donley filed a petition in the
county court for Lancaster County to
have a guardian and conservator
appointed for his father, Leon C. Donley.
The appointment of the guardian and
conservator was contested by Leon,
Leon's wife, and Leon's daughter.
Ultimately, the guardianship proceeding
was transferred to Colorado and the
parties agreed that coconservators would
be appointed for Leon in Nebraska. The
sole issue presented on appeal is whether
the attorneys hired by Raymond, the
petitioner, can recover, from Leon's
estate, reasonable attorney fees incurred
in the efforts to have a guardian and
conservator appointed for Leon.
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move. Raymond became concerned about
his father when Leon came to Raymond's
shop one day with two bottles of
mouthwash and a bottle of cleaner,
handed the bottles to Raymond, and told
Raymond that he would not need the
bottles anymore because he was moving.
Raymond stated that this conversation
took place about 10 days after Leon's last
expression of his desire not to move to
Colorado.
Raymond decided to file the petition
for the appointment of a guardian and
conservator because he had concerns that
things were happening to Leon that Leon
did not understand. Raymond stated that
he and Leon discussed having someone
appointed to look out for Leon's best
interests and that Leon thought doing so
would be a good idea.
On March 19,1999, Raymond, through
counsel, filed a petition for the
appointment of a guardian and
conservator for Leon. A temporary
guardian and conservator was also
requested in the petition for Leon. John
McHenry, a lawyer and an independent
third party, was suggested in the petition
as a suitable guardian and conservator.
Raymond thought having an independent
party as guardian and conservator would
be advisable to avoid potential conflict
between the families from Leon's two
marriages. In addition to requesting
McHenry as the temporary guardian and
conservator in the petition, Raymond also
had Leon sign a document, which was
filed with the county court, nominating
McHenry as his guardian and conservator.

McHenry was appointed and accepted the
position as temporary guardian and
conservator.
Leon and Margaret moved to
Longmont, Colorado, in early May 1999.
Also, on May 6, the county court
authorized the sale of Leon's property in
Lincoln, where Leon and Margaret had
been living, pursuant to the purchase
option executed in July 1998. On July 12,
1999, the county court noted that
settlement negotiations were progressing,
so the case was set for trial on August 31.
At a later hearing regarding the allowance
of attorney fees, Roger Cox, one of
Raymond's attorneys, testified that by
August 25, the parties had agreed to settle
the case and that the only thing left to do
was agree on specific wording in the
drafted settlement agreement. Cox stated
that on August 26, Cox was informed that
Davis had filed petitions for the
appointment of a conservator and a
guardian in a Boulder County, Colorado,
court on August 20 and that the settlement
was probably off. The petitions for
guardian and conservator in the Colorado
court were both signed by Leon.
A hearing on the issue whether the
proceedings should be transferred to
Colorado was held on September 22,
1999, in the county court for Lancaster
County. The county court determined that
the guardianship proceeding should be
transferred to Colorado but that the
conservatorship proceeding should stay in
Nebraska.
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The parties eventually filed a joint
stipulation for settlement on January 28,
2000, agreeing that McHenry and Davis
should be appointed as coconservators
for Leon. On February 28, the county
court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that a conservator should be
appointed for Leon and that there were
no less restrictive alternatives available.
The county court also found the joint
stipulation for settlement to be fair and
reasonable. The agreement essentially
gave Davis control of the day-to-day
spending with respect to Leon and gave
McHenry control over how Leon's assets
should be invested in the event the
coconservators disagreed as to
investment of the assets. The final
inventory of Leon's estate totaled
$841,607.80.
On April 7, 2000, Raymond filed a
petition for attorney fees incurred as the
petitioner in this matter in the amount of
$28,422.02. Briefs in opposition to the
payment of fees were filed on behalf of
Leon by his attorney as well as by Davis
as coconservator. Leon's brief argued
that Raymond's attorney's services were
not required in this matter because Leon
had previously appointed a power of
attorney to provide assistance in the
future.
It was established at the hearing on the
issue of attorney fees that Raymond
initially hired the firm of Harding, Shultz
& Downs and that there was never an
express agreement between that firm and
Leon. Further, Cox, an attorney with the

Harding, Shultz & Downs law firm,
testified that as of the date of the hearing,
Raymond had paid the firm $20,000
toward the $28,422.02 incurred by the
firm for services the firm had rendered in
this matter.
The county court determined that
Raymond was not entitled to attorney
fees. The court cited In re Guardianship
& Conservatorship of Tucker, 9 Neb.
App. 17, 606 N.W.2d 868 (2000), for the
proposition that attorney claims for
professional sendees must be based upon
a contract of employment made with the
person to be charged. The county court
then found that there was never an
express or implied contract between
Leon and the attorneys employed by
Raymond. Therefore, the court ruled that
the attorney fees were not to be paid
from Leon's estate. Raymond filed this
appeal, and we moved the case to our
docket pursuant to our authority to
regulate the dockets of the appellate
courts.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, Raymond assigns that the
county court erred (1) in ruling that there
was no express or implied contract
between Leon and the attorneys
employed by Raymond and (2) in failing
to award Raymond his reasonable
attorney fees to be paid by Leon's
conservatorship estate.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] An appellate court reviews
probate cases for error appearing on the
record made in the county court. In re
Estate of Myers, 256 Neb. 817, 594
N.W.2d 563 (1999). See In re
Guardianship of Zyla, 251 Neb. 163, 555
N.W.2d 768 (1996). When reviewing
questions of law, an appellate court has
an obligation to resolve the question
independently of the conclusion reached
by the trial court. Mertz v. Pharmacists
Mut. Ins. Co., 261 Neb. 704, 625 N.W.2d
197(2001).
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Raymond argues that the
county court should have ordered
attorney fees to be paidfromLeon's
estate in this case because his attorney's
actions benefited Leon's estate and
because there is a uniform course of
procedure to grant such fees when a
petitioner in a guardianship and
conservatorship action is ultimately
successful Raymond further argues that
attorney fees are appropriate because the
petition was ultimately successful, as a
guardian and co-conservators were
appointed for Leon.
[3] The general rule with respect to the
award of attorney fees under Nebraska
law has been that attorney fees and
expenses may be recovered only where
provided for by statute or when a
recognized and accepted uniform course
of procedure has been to allow recovery

of attorney fees. See Nebraska Nutrients
v. Shepherd, 261 Neb. 723, 626 N.W.2d
472 (2001). Raymond argues that
attorney fees should be paid out of
Leon's conservatorship estate under this
general rule. The appellee Davis, on the
other hand, asserts that there is no
uniform course of procedure in
guardianship/conservatorship matters to
allow attorney fees for petitioner's
attorneys. Moreover, Davis argues that
the county court correctly determined
that there was never an express or
implied contract between Leon and the
attorneys employed by Raymond and
that, therefore, there was no basis for the
recovery of an attorney fee in this
conservatorship proceeding. We find that
when the petitioner's good faith actions
are a necessary expense to the
conservatorship estate, attorney fees are
authorized by statute in Nebraska and are
compensable under the general rule
regarding attorney fees.
While we have never considered the
precise issue, we are persuaded by the
rule adopted in other states that costs and
attorney fees incurred in the good faith
initiation of conservatorship proceedings
constitute necessaries for the support or
benefit of the protected person such that
payment of reasonable costs incurred
may be assessed against the protected
person's estate. See, In re Estate of
Bayers, 295 Mont. 89, 983 P.2d 339
(1999); In re Dunn, 239 N.C. 378, 79
S.E.2d 921 (1954); Penney v. Pritchard
& McCall, 255 Ala. 13, 49 So. 2d 782
(1950); Carney v. Aicklen, 587 S.W.2d
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507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); In re Estate
and Guardianship of Vermeersch, 15
Ariz. App. 315,488 P.2d 671 (1971); In
re Estate of Sherwood, 56 111. App. 2d
334, 206 N.E.2d 304 (1965); In re
Bundy, 44 Cal. App. 466, 186 P. 811
(1919).
The rationale supporting the rule is
that in guardianship/conservatorship
cases, the applicant most often acts for
and on behalf of one who is unable to act
or care for himself or herself. See, In re
Dunn, supra; In re Bundy, supra. Thus,
the filing of the petition and the hearing
thereon are indispensable steps in the
preservation of the protected person's
estate. See, In re Bundy, supra; In re
Estate and Guardianship of Vermeersch,
supra. It is recognized that when an
individual is in need of physical or
financial protection, the law must in
many instances think and act for him or
her. See, In re Dunn, supra; In re Bundy,
supra. The state and society have a
significant interest in bringing the estate
of individuals in need of protection under
the vigil of the county court. See In re
Estate and Guardianship of Vermeersch,
supra. See, also, Penney v. Pritchard &
McCall, supra. The court, as general
conservator of the rights of persons in
need of protection, is dependent upon
applications being filed by interested
persons so that the court may assume
control of the estate and preserve it for
the protected person. See In re Bundy,
supra.

[4] Further, we note that an action to
appoint a conservator is not an
adversarial proceeding, but, rather, is a
proceeding to promote the best interests
of the person for whom the
conservatorship is sought. A
conservatorship action is uniquely
nonadversarial in that everyone involved,
including the petitioner and the court, is
presumably interested in protecting the
interest of the person for whom the
conservatorship is sought. See Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 30-2630 (Reissue 1995)
(conservator may be appointed if trial
court is satisfied by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) person is unable to
manage his or her property effectively
and (2) person has property which will be
wasted or dissipated unless proper
management is provided or that funds are
needed for support of person and that
protection is necessary to obtain or
provide funds). Therefore, in a
conservatorship proceeding, the interest
to be considered by the court and the
principles to be applied are quite unlike
those in an ordinary litigation case.
[5] Thus, we cannot agree with the
appellee that the county court lacked
power to assess the costs of the
conservatorship proceeding and the
petitioner's attorney fees against the
alleged protected person's estate. In
Nebraska, under Neb. Rev. Stat. §
30-2654(a)(2) (Reissue 1995), a
"conservator is to expend or distribute
sums reasonably necessary for the
support, education, care or benefit of the
protected person." Clearly, the cost of
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initiating a good faith petition for the
appointment of a guardian or
conservator, where such appointment is
determined to be in the best interests of
the protected person, constitutes a
necessary expenditure on behalf of the
protected person. We hold that such
costs, including reasonable attorney fees,
are compensable out of the
conservatorship estate as they are
necessary expenditures on behalf of the
protected person. Therefore, attorney
fees are authorized by statute when a
good faith petition results in the
appointment of a conservator and, under
the general rule regarding attorney fees
in Nebraska, may be recovered from
Leon's estate. See § 30-2654.
In the instant case, the trial court and
the parties agreed that the appointment of
coconservators was in the best interests
of Leon, and the parties all agreed that
the appointment of a guardian was in
Leon's best interests. However, in
denying Raymond's petition for attorney
fees, the county court cited In re
Guardianship & Conservatorship of
Tucker, 9 Neb. App. 17, 606 N.W.2d 868
(2000), and focused on whether there
was a contractual relationship between
Leon and the lawfirmRaymond hired to
assist him infilingthe petition for the
appointment of a guardian and
conservator. The county court stated that
"it is apparent to me that the Courts of
this State are taking the position that
attorney claims for professional services
must rest upon a contract of employment
made with the person sought to be

charged."
The Court of Appeals, in In re
Guardianship & Conservatorship of
Tucker, supra, granted attorney fees
based upon an implied contract between
the petitioner's attorney and the protected
person. The court, however, did not hold
that a contractual relationship was
required in a guardianship and
conservatorship case in order to grant
attorney fees to a successful petitioner. In
fact, many situations arise in which an
incapacitated individual is in dire need of
a guardian or conservator, yet he or she
contests the
guardianship/conservatorship
proceeding. In such a case, a successful
petitioner who filed an action in good
faith would not be entitled to attorney
fees under an express or implied contract
theory because the protected person
would not have accepted the benefit of
the attorney's services by agreeing to the
protection. Basing the decision whether
to grant attorney fees on whether an
incapacitated person, who has been
adjudged unfit to manage his or her own
affairs, has expressly or impliedly
entered into a fee agreement is generally
not sound policy, given that the
incapacitated person's ability to
understand and enter into such
agreements is often the very question at
issue in conservatorship proceedings.
Such a rule can only have the effect of
encouraging manipulation of
incapacitated persons in order to secure
an "agreement" that would make fees
recoverable. This would be contrary to
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the interest of the protected person and
inconsistent with the nature of the
proceedings.
We determine that the existence of an
express or implied contractual
relationship between a petitioner's
attorney and an incapacitated person is
not a prerequisite for the award of
attorney fees in a guardianship or
conservatorship proceeding. Therefore,
because the county court erred in
concluding that an express or implied
contract between Leon and Raymond's
attorneys was necessary prior to the
award of attorney fees, we reverse the
order of the county court.
Based on the circumstances of the
instant case, we conclude that the costs,
including reasonable attorney fees, of
initiating and prosecuting proceedings
that ultimately resulted in the
appointment of a guardian and
co-conservators for Leon should be
compensable out of the conservatorship
estate as they are necessary expenditures
for the benefit of the protected person.
See § 30-2654. Because the county court
did not address the issue of the amount
of attorney fees in this case, we remand
the matter to the county court to
determine a reasonable fee to be paid
from the conservatorship estate to
Raymond's attorneys. We remand the
cause for a fee determination, keeping in
mind that the county court has seen and
heard the witnesses and is familiar with
the background and intricacies of these
proceedings. Moreover, the county court

expressly noted in its August 8, 2000,
order that there was sufficient evidence
presented to the court to allow it to make
a determination as to the amount of
attorney fees without further hearing.
[6,7] We note that when an attorney
fee is authorized, the amount of the fee is
addressed to the discretion of the trial
court. See In re Estate of Stull, 261 Neb.
319, 622 N.W.2d 886 (2001). To
determine proper and reasonable fees, it
is necessary for the court to consider the
nature of the proceeding, the time and
labor required, the novelty and difficulty
of the questions raised, the skill required
to properly conduct the case, the
responsibility assumed, the care and
diligence exhibited, the result of the suit,
the character and standing of the
attorney, and the customary charges of
the bar for similar services. See Schirber
v. State, 254 Neb. 1002, 581 N.W.2d 873
(1998).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the order of the county court and remand
the cause to the county court for a
determination of reasonable attorney fees
to be paid to Raymond's attorneys out of
the conservatorship estate.
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Chief Justice, Utah Supreme Court
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Dear Chief Justice Durham:
On behalf of the Judicial Council's ad hoc Committee on Probate Law and Procedure, 1 am
pleased to submit this final report with recommendations.
The Judicial Council's charge to the committee was very broad, encompassing nearly any
part of probate policy that we decided needs attention. We focused immediately on protective
proceedings m the district court. Yet, as narrowly as we have focused our attention, the topic is
complex enough to have required all of our time. So the work on the probate code and the needs
of the elderly remains unfinished
We offer extensive recommendations in the area of guardianships and conservatorships. This
package combines necessary changes to statutes and rules, improved forms and education, and
nothing less than a cultural shift in the way we think of guardianships and conservatorships.
The appointment of a guardian or a conservator removes from a person a large part of what it
means to be an adult; the ability to make decisions for oneself. The appointment often comes
later in one's life, but not always. Younger adults incapacitated by accident, disease or
developmental limitations also are affected. We terminate this fundamental and basic right with
all the procedural rigor of processing a traffic ticket.
> The definition of incapacity is essentially the same as it was 100 years ago.
> The respondent is sometimes not represented.
> The respondent is sometimes represented by a lawyer recruited by the petitioner's lawyer.
> The respondent's lawyer sometimes acts as guardian ad litem rather than advocate.
> There is little or no procedure to elicit and challenge evidence.
> The evidence itself is cursory.
> Once appointed, guardians are often given the authority of a conservator whether or not
that authority is warranted by the respondent's circumstances.
> Statutes claim to prefer limited authority for guardians and conservators, but fail to
describe less restrictive alternatives.
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> Plenary appointments are common with little evidence to support the need.
> There is no planning to help the respondent live life as independently as possible.
> There is no regulation of professional guardians.
> There is little education or assistance for family guardians.
> There is little training forjudges and clerks.
The Deseret News recently reported that when it "went to court to watch guardianship
proceedings, it was startling how quickly someone could be stripped of all decisionmaking
rights. Once the paperwork is in order, 'hearings' average seconds, not minutes."
Utah is not unique. Quite the contrary. Most states have let slip this important area of the law.
We classify guardianships and conservatorships as probate cases, but they have more in
common with family law cases than with the intergenerational transfer of property. They share
many of the emotional and financial issues of a divorce. The court defines future family
relationships. We offer our recommendations with this idea in mind.
Our recommendations retain the basic concept of the Uniform Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act to avoid contested litigation whenever possible. But uncontested does not mean
automatic. We recommend a much more fully developed process to better protect the respondent
and to present better evidence on which to make a measured intervention.
We have three recommendations that require public money:
> attorney fees and expenses of indigent respondents;
> interpreting guardianship and conservatorship proceedings and translating forms and
materials for non-English speaking respondents; and
> a coordinator to recruit and train volunteers to serve as court visitors.
We recognize that the significant decline in state revenue means there will be no general fund
appropriation for programs such as these. Nevertheless, we make the recommendations hoping
that funding may someday be available. In the meantime, we recommend that the courts and the
Bar pursue funds that might be available through and Justice for All, the Utah Bar Foundation,
grants, and other sources. And we recommend that the Utah Access to Justice Council and the
Utah State Bar organize and support a panel of trained, pro bono attorneys.
Beyond these funds, we recognize that our recommendations require a particularized inquiry
into the respondent's circumstances. The inquiry replaces traditional subjective judgments about
the reasonableness of the respondent's behavior with a more focused decision about the
respondent's capabilities and limitations. And all of that translates into more time.
We recommend that this report be presented to judges, lawyers, guardians, conservators,
health care providers, service providers and other stakeholders for critical analysis which can be
integrated into legislation and rules for 2010.

The Honorable Christine M. Durham
February 23,2009
Page Three
I want to thank the committee members and staff for their dedicated time and attention to the
grand concepts and the many, many details of a program of this scope. We were well served.
Finally, I want to thank Judge Sheila McCleve for her work as the first chair of the
committee. Circumstances meant that she was not able to remain as chair, but her initial
guidance showed us the way.
Sincerely,

GeorgeWvL Harmond
Committee Chair
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(2) Summary of recommendations
> Modernize the definition of incapacity to focus on functional limitations. Require
proof of incapacity (among other grounds) to appoint a conservator or a guardian.
> Enforce the requirement to prove incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.
> Consider in every case ordering that the respondent be evaluated by a physician
or psychiatrist and by a court visitor. Adopt uniform forms on which to report the
results of a clinical and social evaluation.
> Appoint a lawyer to represent the respondent in conservatorship cases, as is now
done in guardianship cases.
> Require the respondent's lawyer to be from a roster of qualified lawyers
maintained by the Utah State Bar. Establish minimum qualifications for the roster.
Appropriate funds to pay the respondent's lawyer if the respondent cannot afford
a lawyer and does not qualify for existing programs.
> Respondent's lawyer should be an independent and zealous advocate, rather
than a guardian ad litem.
> If the court determines that a petition resulted in an order beneficial to the
respondent, and if funds are available in the estate, permit the court or
conservator to pay the reasonable and necessary expenses, costs and attorney
fees from the estate.
> Require the respondent to attend all hearings unless the respondent waives that
right or unless the court finds that attending the hearing would harm the
respondent. Take steps to accommodate the special needs of respondents at
court hearings.
> Appoint a certified court interpreter if the respondent does not understand
English.
> Refer protective proceedings to mediation. The mediation community should
develop training for mediating protective proceedings, including especially the
skills and accommodations necessary when mediating with a person of potentially
diminished capacity.
> Consider appointing a commissioner to hear probate matters, including
guardianship and conservatorship cases, in districts with sufficient caseload.
> With a few exceptions, classify guardianship and conservatorship records as
private.
> Require the petitioner to show that alternatives less restrictive than appointing a
fiduciary have failed or that they would not be effective. Presume, rather than
favor, limited guardianships. Adopt laws, procedures and forms that make limited
guardianships a realistic option.
> Require the fiduciary to use the "substituted judgment" standard for
decisionmaking on behalf of the respondent except in those limited circumstances
in which the "best interest" standard may be used.
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> Adopt special procedures for temporary emergency appointments.
> Eliminate "school guardianships."
> Permit a person to nominate, rather than appoint, a guardian for self, a child or a
spouse, and to petition to confirm the nomination during one's lifetime.
> Require the fiduciary to write a management plan and file it with the court.
> Appoint a coordinator to develop a program of volunteer court visitors.
> Regulate the profession of guardian through the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing. Require private guardians and conservators to disclose
any criminal convictions that have not been expunged.
> Develop training for lawyers, judges and court staff. Develop outreach and
assistance to guardians, conservators, respondents and the public.
> Unify the laws regulating guardians and conservators except where there is sound
policy to differentiate them.
(3) Introduction
The general state of guardianships and conservatorships may depend upon whom
one talks to. Although a bit dated, one court group, while recognizing that abuses occur,
notes that, "the great majority of guardianships ... are initiated by people of goodwill
who are in good faith seeking to assist and protect the respondent. ... Furthermore, in
the great majority of guardianship proceedings, the outcome serves the best interests of
the respondent and an appointed guardian acts in the respondent's best interests." On
the other side of the coin, empirical researchers from a
similar time period, while noting the benefits of
Appointing a guardian or
guardianships, report that "guardianship ... often
conservator legally changes
benefits] the guardian more than the ward and [can]
an adult into a child once
hasten institutionalization for the protected person. ...
more, and, as with a child,
[Hearings
[are] extremely brief, [do] not rely upon
someone else decides those
medical
testimony,
and often [result] in plenary orders
questions.
The committee members' experience supports both views. Many of the conclusions
we reach are based on our observations and experience. We have no statistics to offer
because, like most jurisdictions, other than the number of petitions filed, we record little
in a systematic way. In how many cases is the respondent excused from the trial? In
how many cases is the respondent not represented by counsel? Not evaluated by a
physician or psychiatrist? By a court visitor? In the end, we do not know. Based on our

1

National Probate Court Standards, Commission on National Probate Court Standards and Advisory
Committee on interstate Guardianships, Section 3.3 (1993). Hereafter cited as National Probate Court
Standards
2
Clinical Evidence in Guardianship of Older Adults Is Inadequate: Findings From a Tri-State Study,
The Gerontologist Vol. 47, No. 5 (2007) by Jennifer Moye, PhD, Stacey Wood, PhD, Barry Edelstein,
PhD, Jorge C. Armesto, PhD, Emily H. Bower, MS, Julie A. Harrison, MA, and Erica Wood, JD. pp 604605, citing earlier studies. Hereafter cited as "Moye."
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experience we know which observations in the national literature and in the committee
testimony ring true.
Appointing a guardian or a conservator is one the most significant interventions by a
court into a person's life. Like a prison sentence or commitment to a mental health
facility, the appointment takes from that person the freedom to decide for oneself many,
and often times all, of the large and small issues we face every day. Appointing a
guardian or conservator legally changes an adult into a child once more, and, as with a
child, someone else decides those questions.3
Ideally, "procedural protections work to ensure that putative wards are fully informed,
properly evaluated, zealously defended, that the issues are fully developed and heard,
and that an intervention is finely tuned to the needs and preferences of individuals."4 Yet
those protections are applied inconsistently at best.
The law requires that the respondent be represented, but that does not always
happen. If the respondent is represented, the attorney might have been recruited by the
petitioner's attorney. Or might fulfill the role of a guardian ad litem rather than advocate.
The standard to declare someone incapacitated is clear and convincing evidence, but
clinical evidence is usually modest. Procedures are cursory. The Deseret News reports
that "'hearings3 average seconds, not minutes."5
The guardian is usually granted plenary authority over the respondent with little or no
exploration of the respondent's capabilities and in the face of laws that prefer limited
authority. Annual reports by guardians and conservators have been required for many
years, but only recently has the district court enforced the requirement. The court has
no way to verify the truth of those reports, except
by objections from the respondent's family,
This is what we hope to achieve:
which might be uninterested or perhaps does not
• a deliberate inquiry into the
exist.
limitations and needs of the

respondent;
• a measured intervention based on
those limitations and needs; and
• oversight to protect the quality of
life of a respected individual.

Press reports and official investigations in
other states have revealed ruined lives and have
sent fiduciaries to prison.6 Although Utah has so
far avoided the scandalous headlines in which a
fiduciary abuses, neglects or defrauds the
person s/he is responsible for, there is no reason
to believe that guardians and conservators in Utah are any less prone to abuse or fraud
than those in other states whose malfeasance and negligence have been discovered.

3

Indeed, under current Utah law, "Absent a specific limitation .... the guardian has the same powers,
rights, and duties respecting the ward that a parent has respecting the parent's unemancipated minor
child...." Utah Code Section 75-5-312(2).
4
Charles P. Sabatino, Competency: Refining Our Legal Fictions, Older Adults' Decision making and
the Law 1, 2 (Michael Smyer, K. Warner Schaie & Marshall B. Kapp eds., Springer Publg. 1996), pp 2021.
5
http://deseretnews.com/article/l5143.705265008.0Q.html?pq=2 Deseret News, November 24,
2008. Who should make choices for the elderly? By Elaine Jarvik and Lois M. Collins.
6
See e.g., stories linked at: http://www.citibav.com/caibin/directorv.pl?etvpe=odp&passurl=/Societv/lssues/\/iolence and Abuse/Elder/Guardianships/.

Most petitions are filed in good faith to appoint a person of goodwill who will serve in
the best interests of the protected person, but we rely primarily on good faith and
goodwill to achieve that result. Good intentions and lack of oversight have, over time,
led to summary proceedings that presume to protect the respondent from others and
from self, but that offer little real protection from the process itself or from those we put
in charge of the respondent's life. And even one case in which the fiduciary takes
advantage of the person s/he is supposed to take care of is one too many. Summary
proceedings and trust in the capability and goodwill of guardians and conservators are
easy, but they deny many respondents the level of independence they may be capable
of.
To be sure, there are cases in which the respondent is so clearly incapacitated that
substantial medical evidence would be costly and without purpose. There are cases in
which the respondent is so fully incapacitated that plenary control over that person is
the most appropriate arrangement. But not in all cases. Many cases present nuances
that need to be explored and capacities that need to be protected.
In Utah, as in most states and in national standards, guardianships and
conservatorships are classified as probate cases, yet today they have more in common
with family law than with probate law. Those who need protection or help are often
seniors but not always. The family faces the same emotional and financial drain faced in
divorce. Although we do not intend to reclassify an entire area of the law, we
recommend significant changes to many statutes and rules with the dynamics of family
relationships in mind.
This is an area that is ripe for collective action. There are roles here for all three
branches of government, the Bar, the health care community, and even the larger public
community. This is what we hope to achieve:
> a deliberate inquiry into the limitations and needs of the respondent;
> a measured intervention based on those limitations and needs; and
> oversight to protect the quality of life of a respected individual.
(4) Definition of "incapacity"
(a) Inadequacy of current definition
Merely defining the term "incapacity" is a complex matter. Is it a legal standard or
medical? Is it cognitive or functional? What factors I
|
are relevant? Can a person lack capacity for some I
The keystone to the entire
I
purposes and have capacity for others? Yet we must I protective arch is not that much '
agree on a definition because the appointment of a I different from the definition at
guardian or conservator7 rests upon the finding that I
the time of statehood.
|
a person is incapacitated.
•

Current Utah law permits the appointment of a conservator if the respondent "is unable to manage
the person's property and affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency,
physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, confinement, detention by a foreign
power, or disappearance...." Utah Code Section 75-5-401(2). Except for confinement, detention and
disappearance as reasons to appoint a conservator, this definition is essentially the same as incapacity

7

The current statutes governing guardians and conservators were enacted in 1975
and are based on the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act of 1968.
Medical care for and everyday functioning of people well into later life has improved a
lot in 40 years, but our definition of "incapacity," the keystone to the entire protective
arch, is not that much different from the definition at the time of statehood.
Utah law defines an incapacitated person as:
any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency,
physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or
other cause, except minority, to the extent of lacking sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions.
Utah Code Section 75-1-201(22).
Although the statute has never been amended to reflect the decision, our Supreme
Court has added that the lack of understanding or capacity to make or communicate
decisions must be so impaired that the person is unable to care for personal needs or
safety to such an extent that illness or harm may occur.
We hold that ... a determination that an adult cannot make 'responsible
decisions concerning his person' and is therefore incompetent, may be
made only if the putative protected person's decisionmaking process is so
impaired that he is unable to care for his personal safety or unable to
attend to and provide for such necessities as food, shelter, clothing, and
medical care, without which physical illness or harm may occur.
In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah 1981).
In other words, poor choices alone - even choices that a reasonable person would
describe as irresponsible - do not make one incapacitated.
The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act of 1997 moves away
from the traditional "physical illness" and "mental illness" found in the 1968 Uniform Act
to focus on the ability to receive and evaluate information or to make or communicate
decisions.8
Many states and the National Probate Court Standards have moved away from
cognition and decisionmaking to focus on functional limitations: What can the
respondent do and not do? In this approach, cognition and executive functioning remain
important, perhaps more important than most other functioning, but, in the end, they are
simply functions in which the respondent may face limitations. This definition inherently
answers the question: Can a person lack capacity for some purposes and retain
capacity for others? At least potentially, the answer is "yes," depending on the nature of
the functional limitations.
This approach requires a particularized inquiry into the respondent's circumstances,
which necessarily is more difficult and time-consuming. The inquiry replaces traditional
for the appointment of a guardian. Later in this report, we recommend using one standard for both
appointments.
8
Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act of 1997, Section 102(5). Hereafter cited as
1997 Uniform Act.

subjective judgments about the reasonableness of the respondent's behavior with a
more focused decision about the respondent's capabilities and limitations.9
Whether the determination of incapacity is a medical
or legal decision is more easily concluded. Given the
consequences of the decision, it has to be a legal
decision judicially made. The decision might be heavily
influenced by medical evidence and opinions, but the
decision itself remains a legal consequence.

Poor choices alone - even
choices that a reasonable
person would describe as
irresponsible - do not make
one incapacitated.

(b) Recommended definition
Choices that are linked with
lifetime values are rational
By evaluating our current statute and case law, the
for an individual even if
definitions in other states and those recommended in
outside the norm.
national standards, and by considering similar concepts
from Utah law in other applications, we recommend the
following definition of incapacity for the appointment of either a guardian or a
conservator:
"Incapacity" means a judicial determination that an adult's ability, even
with assistance, to
(a) receive and evaluate information,
(b) make and communicate decisions,
(c) provide for necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, health care or
safety,
(d) carry out the activities of daily living, or
(e) manage his or her property
is so impaired that illness or physical or financial harm may occur.
Incapacity is a judicial decision, not a medical decision, and is measured
by functional limitations.
Although not mentioned in the Boyer holding, we recommend adding "financial
harm" to the definition of Incapacity" so that one definition can serve as the grounds for
appointing a guardian or a conservator, rather than the separate but similar definitions
we have now. The importance of this small change can be lost in the enormity of the
project. Historically, appointment of a conservator has not been a determination of the
respondent's incapacity.10 With this change, a conservator cannot be appointed unless
the respondent is incapacitated.
The grounds for appointing a conservator should also include that the respondent is
missing, detained, or unable to return to the United States, and the person to be
protected should be able to voluntarily request the appointment. But the definition of

9

Judicial Determination of Capacity of Older Adults in Guardianship Proceedings, American Bar
Association Commission on Law and Aging - American Psychological Association (2006). Hereafter cited
as Judicial Determination of Capacity.
10
Utah Code Section 75-5-408(2); 1997 Uniform Act Section 409(d).
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incapacity as grounds to appoint a guardian or conservator should be the same for both
offices.
(c) Factors
We propose several factors that the judge might consider when determining the
respondent's capacity. Most will be familiar to those experienced in protective
proceedings.
(1) whether the respondent's condition, limitations and level of functioning
leave the respondent at risk of:
(a) his or her property being dissipated;
(b) being unable to provide for his or her support, or for the support of individuals
who are entitled to the respondent's support;
(c) being financially exploited;
(d) being abused or neglected, including self injurious behavior; or
(e) having his or her rights violated;
(2) whether the respondent has a physical or mental illness, disability,
condition, or syndrome and the prognosis;
(3) whether the respondent is able to evaluate the consequences of
alternative decisions;
(4) whether the respondent can manage the activities of daily living
through training, education, support services, mental and physical health
care, medication, therapy, assistants, assistive devices, or other means
that the respondent will accept;
(5) the nature and extent of the demands placed on the respondent by the
need for care;
(6) the nature and extent of the demands placed on the respondent by his
or her property;
(7) the consistency of the respondent's behavior with his or her longstanding values, preferences and patterns of behavior, and
(8) other relevant factors.
We want to focus on one factor in particular: the respondent's values, preferences
and patterns of behavior. Although it comes late in the list, it is perhaps one of the more
important factors. Two brief quotes from the benchbook Judicial Determination of
Capacity of Older Adults in Guardianship Proceedings by the ABA indicate why.
Capacity reflects the consistency of choices with the individual's life
patterns, expressed values, and preferences. Choices that are linked with
lifetime values are rational for an individual even if outside the norm."11
Each of the above factors must be weighed in view of the individual's
history of choices and expressed values and preferences. Do not mistake
11

Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 5.
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eccentricity for diminished capacity. Actions that may appear to stem from
cognitive problems may in fact be rational if based on lifetime beliefs or
values. Long-held choices must be respected, yet weighed in view of new
medical information that could increase risk, such as a diagnosis of
dementia.12
(5) Evidence of incapacity

(a) Inadequacy of current evidence
On what basis should the court decide
whether a person is incapacitated?
Although the statute requires only that the
judge be "satisfied"13 that the respondent is
incapacitated, the actual standard - clear
and convincing evidence - is well settled.
This is the law from the Utah Supreme
Court14, and it is in keeping with the 1997
Uniform Act.15

The danger of relying exclusively on an
evaluation arranged by the petitioner is
shown by physicians' disagreement about
determining capacity.
In other words, physicians consistently
diagnosed the obvious subjects at either
end of the spectrum and disagreed about
the subjects in the middle for whom the
diagnosis was a closer question.

Yet from the experience of committee
members, it often does not require very
much evidence to satisfy that high standard. In an empirical study of guardianship cases
in Colorado, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania,16 researchers found:
> Written evaluations were filed in all but one case in Massachusetts and Colorado,
and in 75% of the cases in Pennsylvania.
> Evaluations were submitted by physicians in 98% of the Massachusetts cases
and in 88% of the Pennsylvania cases. In Colorado, clinical reports were
submitted by physicians (57%), psychologists (27%), other professionals (9%), or
a multidisciplinary team (6%) consistent with the 1997 Uniform Act.
> The average length of clinical reports in Colorado as 781 words, 244 words in
Pennsylvania and 83 words in Massachusetts.
> 75% of the Massachusetts reports were hand written, and 65% of these had at
least some portion that was illegible. In Pennsylvania and Colorado, reports were
almost always typed.
That 83 words, some of which are illegible, might be offered as clear and convincing
evidence is beyond belief.
A judge should never rely exclusively on a clinical evaluation secured by the
petitioner. "A clinical evaluation secured by the petitioner is for the purpose of
supporting the petition and may lack attention to the individual's areas of strength, a

12

Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 12.
Utah Code Section 75-5-304(1)
14
In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085,1092 (Utah 1981).
15
1997 Uniform Act, Sections 311 and 4 0 1
16
Moye, p 608.
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prognosis for improvement, or important situational factors. An independent assessment
can flesh out skeletal or purely one-sided information."17
The danger of relying exclusively on an evaluation arranged by the petitioner is
shown by physicians' disagreement about determining capacity. In a study reported in
1997,18 "physicians experienced in competency assessment showed ... virtually
unanimous judgment agreement [98%] for older normal controls but dramatically lower
... agreement [56%] for patients with miid [Alzheimer's disease]." "Overall pairwise
physician ratings showed excellent percentage judgment agreement for the control and
a severely demented AD patient but lower percentage agreement for patients with mild
to moderate [Alzheimer's disease]." In other words, physicians consistently diagnosed
the obvious subjects at either end of the spectrum and disagreed about the subjects in
the middle for whom the diagnosis was a closer question.
(b) Recommendation
The American Bar Association Commission on Law and Aging, in conjunction with
I
I the American Psychological Association and the
I
A fuller picture of the
I National College of Probate Judges, has prepared a
I respondent - gained through I template for a clinical evaluation of the respondent.19
I more complete evidence - is I yVe have studied it and expanded upon it with
I
desperately needed.
I suggestions from other sources. It is extensive. Parts
•
• of it may not be relevant in some cases, and we
recommend that those be excised. The judge should not be required to order the
respondent to submit to a clinical evaluation, but we recommend its consideration in
every case.
Although Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 35 governs the examination of a party when
the party's "mental or physical condition ... is in controversy," we recommend that a
special rule govern the respondent's examination in protective proceedings. Rule 35
was written for personal injury cases and contains provisions inappropriate to these
circumstances.
The Wingspan Conference recommends that "the pre-hearing process include a
separate court investigator or visitor, who must identify the respondent's wants, needs,
and values."20 The 1997 Uniform Act also recommends that a court visitor be required.
Utah law provides that the court may appoint a visitor to interview the respondent, but
there is no requirement to do so, unless the petitioner proposes that the respondent be
excluded from the hearing. By omitting this step, the court denies itself critical
independent information with which to assess the respondent's functional abilities and
limitations, values and history, all of which affect the fiduciary's appointment and
authority.

Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 8.
Journal of the American Geriatrics Society - Volume 45, Issue 4, pages 453-457 (April 1997).
19
Judicial Determination of Capacity, pp 25-32.
20
Wingspan - The Second National Guardianship Conference, Recommendations, Recommendation
30, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 601 (2002). Hereafter cited as Wingspan Conference.
21
1997 Uniform Act Section 305.
18
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An evaluation by a multidisciplinary team, as in Colorado, may be beyond the means
of nearly all families, but we recommend at least the perspective of a court visitor in
addition to that of the clinician. Evaluation by a medical professional will probably occur
in a clinical setting, but evaluation by the court visitor should, whenever possible, be in
the respondent's usual environment and with all due consideration for his or her privacy
and dignity.22
Evidence from family, friends, colleagues, religious ministers, care providers and
others will provide the judge with information about who this respondent is, and will
enable the judge to decide, not just the respondent's capacity, but also the details of the
guardianship plan. A fuller picture of the respondent - gained through more complete
evidence - is desperately needed.
(6) Respondent's lawyer
Under Utah law, the court must appoint a lawyer to represent a respondent in a
guardianship proceeding23 and may do so in a conservatorship proceeding24 unless the
respondent has a lawyer of his or her own choice. Given the importance of the
proceedings, it is critical that the respondent have a lawyer.
(a) Current availability of lawyers
Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake and Utah Legal Services are the primary free legal
service providers in Utah. Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake is limited to Salt Lake County.
Utah Legal Services represents clients throughout the state. Both represent clients in a
variety of cases for which the client must income qualify or meet other eligibility
requirements.
•
I Given the importance of the
I proceedings, it is critical that
I the respondent have a lawyer.
•

•
I
I
I
'

With intermittent grant funding, the Legal Aid
Society of Salt Lake represents for free the
respondent in a guardianship petition in Salt Lake
County if the respondent meets the income
guidelines. There is no age restriction.

Utah Legal Services, by contract with many of the counties under the Older
Americans Act,25 represents for free the respondent in a guardianship petition if the
respondent is 60 or older and if there is sufficient funding through the local Area Agency
on Aging. There is no income-qualification under the Older Americans Act, but
resources are limited, so the local Area Agencies on Aging find legitimate ways to
prioritize services. If there is not sufficient funding through the local Area Agency on
Aging, Utah Legal Services tries to recruit a lawyer to represent the respondent for free.
If the respondent is under 60, Utah Legal Services tries to recruit a lawyer to represent
the respondent for free, but the respondent must meet income guidelines.

22
Guardianship, An Agenda for Reform: Recommendations of the National Guardianship Symposium
and Policy of the American Bar Association. Recommendation lil-B. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L.
Rep. 271,289 (1989). Hereafter cited as the Wingspread Conference.
23
Utah Code Section 75-5-303(2).
24
Utah Code Section 75-5-407(1).
25
Utah Legal Services is not the exclusive provider. Some counties contract with individual lawyers.
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Sometimes a respondent will have a lawyer who has represented her or him in
another matter. The respondent - or perhaps the petitioner on the respondent's behalfwill seek representation by that lawyer. Sometimes that lawyer may be the "family"
lawyer, whose interests may be divided between the respondent and the family
members who are trying to do their best by the respondent. In some cases the
petitioner's lawyer might recruit a lawyer to represent the respondent.
We focus on the need for representation of an indigent respondent because that is
where the need is most acute. But the private bar is doing its share. Private attorneys
represent respondents and are paid by the respondent in very traditional arrangements.
Lawyers represent respondents for free or for a reduced charge when recruited by the
Office of Public Guardian, Utah Legal Services or Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake.
However, some respondents simply will be missed by the conditional and informal
arrangements for free legal representation, yet they cannot afford to hire a lawyer.
Regardless who represents the respondent, the question "Who pays?" is equally
critical. Utah law provides that if the petition is "without merit," the petitioner pays court
costs and the respondent's lawyer. Otherwise, the respondent must pay for
representation, but the respondent often cannot afford an attorney even though s/he
may not qualify for one of the free Utah programs.
Finally, how qualified is the lawyer? Lawyers from Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake and
Utah Legal Services are highly qualified and overworked. Their pro bono recruitment
efforts usually produce a lawyer qualified for the case, which may run from well-qualified
for a complex case to well-qualified for simpler, uncontested cases. In the experience of
committee members, however, and from testimony by lawyers experienced in this area,
there are many cases in which the respondent's lawyer lacks the qualifications to
present the respondent's case for capacity or for less restrictive alternatives.
(b) Recommendation
The Wingspread Conference recommends that "courts should help develop an
ongoing system that will ensure effective legal representation of respondents."26 We
recommend an ambitious program to give real effect to that policy: to ensure in a
systemic way that respondents are represented by qualified attorneys.
(i) Conservatorships
We begin by recommending legislation to require representation for the respondent
in petitions to appoint a conservator as well as in petitions to appoint a guardian. Utah
law currently requires representation in the latter case and permits it in the former. The
reason for the distinction usually involves the explanation that a conservator controls
only the respondent's property, while a guardian controls the respondent's person. But
in our society, a person who loses the right to decide how to invest and spend money
and how to manage property has lost just as much as the person who loses the right to
vote or to make health care decisions. Representation in conservatorships is just as

26

Wingspread Conference. Recommendation IV-D.2 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271,
295(1989).

14

necessary as in guardianships. Mandatory representation in both types of appointments
is recommended by the National Probate Court Standards.27
(ii) Roster
The Wingspread Conference recommends that "training should be ... required for
attorneys who wish to be appointed as counsel in guardianship cases...."28 To better
ensure the qualifications of the lawyer representing the respondent, we recommend
that, unless the respondent has the lawyer of his or her own choosing, the district court
appoint a lawyer from a roster of lawyers maintained by the Utah State Bar under the
authority of the Supreme Court. There should be minimum requirements for training,
observation, mentoring and continuing education to qualify for the roster. We
recommend an appropriation to pay for some of the appointments, but all appointments
should be from the roster, unless the respondent has retained his or her own lawyer.
The appointment would be, essentially, a rotation: I
•
When a petition in a protective proceeding is filed, the I Training should be required I
clerk would offer the appointment to the first lawyer in I for attorneys who wish to I
order on the roster willing to accept assignments in that I
be appointed as counsel.
|
county. The lawyer would review the case for conflicts 1
•
of interest and other factors that might impede the lawyer from independent and zealous
representation of the respondent. If the lawyer declines the appointment, the clerk
would offer the appointment to the next lawyer on the roster. Upon accepting the
appointment, the judge would enter an order appointing the lawyer, and the clerk would
move the lawyer's name to the bottom of the roster.
The executive director of the Utah State Bar would maintain and publish a roster of
lawyers qualified to represent respondents in protective proceedings. A lawyer would be
added to the list in the order in which s/he certifies to meeting the minimum
requirements. To qualify for the roster, a lawyer would have to:
> acquire at least four hours of MCLE or four hours of accredited law school
education in the law and procedures of protective proceedings;
> observe, serve as co-counsel, and serve as lead counsel with a mentor
representing at least one respondent, which may be satisfied under Rule 14-807,
Law student assistance; and
> be recommended by one's mentors.
To be retained on the roster the lawyer would biannually certify to have:
> acquired at least two hours of MCLE in the law and procedures of protective
proceedings; and
> represented at least two indigent respondents.
Minimum education requirements would be part of and not in addition to existing
mandatory continuing legal education requirements. If there are not at least two indigent
respondents to be represented, that requirement would be waived The executive
National Probate Court Standards Standards 3.3.5 and 3.4.5.
Wingspread Conference. Recommendation ll-D(2). 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271,
286(1989)
28
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director should be able to waive the initial or continuing requirements that show
competence if the lawyer demonstrates by education and experience proficiency in the
law and procedures of protective proceedings.
Even if the respondent has retained a lawyer, the court should have the discretion to
evaluate the lawyer's qualifications and, if they are found lacking, to appoint someone
from the roster.
(Hi) Money
The Wingspan Conference recommends that "innovative and creative ways be
developed by which funding sources are categorically directed to guardianship."29
Finding the money to pay lawyers willing to take assignments is the most difficult part of
this program. Until the significant recession and the decline in state revenue, we were
prepared to recommend using public funds to pay lawyers to represent indigent
respondents who do not qualify for other free programs. Under current economic
conditions, it would be futile and irresponsible to pursue that objective, but we continue
to believe the objective is sound. So we describe our proposal but include no
implementing legislation. We do, however, recommend that the courts and the Bar
pursue funds that might be available through and Justice for All, the Utah Bar
Foundation, grants, and other sources. And we recommend that the Utah Access to
Justice Council and the Utah State Bar organize and support a panel of trained, pro
bono attorneys.
The needs of the most indigent are being met - as well as they can be met through Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake and Utah Legal Services. We mean not to
interfere with those services. Utah Legal Services can serve clients whose income is
below 200% of the federal poverty guideline, so we start our program where they leave
off.
We recommend that a lawyer appointed from the roster be paid $50 per hour if the
respondent's income is between 200% and 300% of the federal poverty guidelines or
the respondent does not have sufficient income, assets, credit, or other means to pay
the expenses of legal services without depriving the respondent or the respondent's
family of food, shelter, clothing, and other necessities. In future years, the $50 per hour
wage would be adjusted for inflation. Respondents who do not meet this test would pay
for representation from their estates, based on the ability to pay.
(iv) Role of respondent's lawyer
Currently, Utah law distinguishes between the role of the respondent's lawyer in
guardianship and conservatorship cases. If the petition is to appoint a guardian, the
lawyer has the traditional duty to "represent" the respondent. If the petition is to
appoint a conservator, the lawyer "has the powers and duties of a guardian ad litem "^
Under the 1997 Uniform Act, the court appoints a lawyer to "represent" the respondent
in guardianship and conservatorship cases.32 The National Probate Court Standards
Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 7, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 596 (2002).
Utah Code Section 75-5-303(2).
31
Utah Code Section 75-5-407(2).
32
1997 Uniform Act, Section 406

30
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recommend that the role of counsel is to advocate for his or her client. The
Wingspread Conference34 and the Wingspan Conference35 recommend zealous
advocacy by the respondent's lawyer.
We concur that the lawyer's role is to represent the respondent independently and
zealously, just as in any other attorney-client relationship. If the court sees a need for an
independent voice to represent the respondent's best interests, the court can appoint a
guardian ad litem. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14 already advises the lawyer on
representing a person of diminished capacity,36 and that rule has recently been revised,
in keeping with the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission and the recommendations of the
Wingspan Conference,37 to allow the lawyer greater flexibility to take protective action.
The Probate Code should not interfere with that relationship.
(7) Petitioner's lawyer
Utah law does not contain any provisions for petitioner's representation in a
guardianship proceeding, but permits the petitioner in a conservatorship proceeding to
charge the cost of his or her lawyer to the respondent's estate.38 There is no sound
reason to distinguish the two.
Public policy should encourage family members to serve as guardians as well as
conservators. Family members know and love the respondent better than anyone.
Without family members willing to serve, the role falls to the Office of Public Guardian,
which will increase the cost to the state. The tasks of a guardian and conservator are
already difficult and time-consuming. The recommendations in this report, although they
will improve the process, also will increase the cost.
If a protective proceeding is legally necessary to benefit the respondent, and if the
respondent's estate is ample enough to provide for the respondent and still pay the
expense of that process, then the court or conservator should be permitted to pay
reasonable and necessary fees and expenses from the estate. This is the conclusion of
the 1997 Uniform Act.39
If a petition is brought in good faith with the goal of protecting the respondent, and
the court appoints a guardian or conservator, or enters some other protective order,
then the petitioner's costs should be paid, if possible, by the respondent's estate. This
will encourage family members who may hesitate to file a protective proceeding
because of their own lack of funds. It is far better to expend the estate to protect the
respondent than to preserve it for the heirs.
There should be restrictions. The petition should be found to have been brought in
good faith and prosecuted responsibly. The costs and fees should be reasonable and
34

National Probate Court Standards. Standards 3.3.5 and 3.4.5.
Wingspread Conference. Recommendation ll-C. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 285

(1989)
35
Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 28. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 601 (2002).
36
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14. See also RPC 1.6, also amended as part of the Ethics 2000
project to allow disclosure of some information.
37
Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 59. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 607 (2002).
38
Utah Code Sections 75-5-414 and 75-5-424(3)(w).
39
1997 Uniform Act, Section 417.
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necessary. The petition should result in the appointment of a guardian or conservator or
in another order that benefits the respondent. And the respondent's estate must be able
to afford the expense.
The Legislature rejected a similar policy in the 2005 General Session,40 but we
believe it to be a sound policy, and urge the Legislature to reconsider.
(8) Court process
(a) The hearing
Although called a "hearing" by statute, it has all of the trappings of a trial. The
respondent has the right to be present and to be represented by a lawyer. The
respondent has the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. The
respondent in a guardianship proceeding has the right to a trial by jury,41 although that
right is seldom exercised, and is not included in the 1997 Uniform Act. Much more
concerning than the infrequency of trial by jury is the frequency with which the
respondent is absent from the hearing. The statute establishes the respondent's right to
be present, but in our experience, the respondent often
is not.
There is no inadequacy in
The due process hearing rights that are uniformly
due process rights. Rather,
recommended42 are all recognized by Utah law. There
the inadequacy is in
is no inadequacy in that regard. Rather, the inadequacy
practicing what the law
is in practicing what the law requires or permits.
requires or permits.
Beyond ensuring the rights already established, we
recommend that, if possible, the court conduct the hearing in a setting that is accessible
by and comforting to the respondent. This would include ADA accommodations, but
also:
>
>
>
>

holding the hearing later in the morning, rather than first thing;
more open space in the hearing room to accommodate wheelchairs;
holding the hearing in chambers or other less intimidating surroundings; and
slowing the frenetic pace of too many hearings in too short a time.

We began this report by likening the effect of appointing a guardian or conservator to
a criminal sentence or commitment to a mental health facility. The deprivation of civil
liberties is almost as great. Therefore, just as in a criminal or commitment proceeding,
we recommend that the judge appoint a certified interpreter at state expense if the
respondent does not adequately speak or understand English. The forms and other
public information and instructions recommended later in this report should be
translated into Spanish. We recommend that Rule 3-306 be amended to add protective
proceedings to the list of casetypes requiring a court-appointed certified interpreter.

40

See HB 167, Elder Protection Provisions by Rep. Patricia Jones.
Utah Code Section 75-5-303(4).
42
National Probate Court Standards, Standard 3.3.8; 1997 Uniform Act, Section 308. Wingspan
Conference. Recommendation 27, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 601 (2002); Wingspread Conference.
Recommendation ll-B(2); 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 283 (1989).
41
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(b) Mediation
Mediation would seem to be particularly suitable for adult guardianship
cases for a number of reasons. These cases usually 1) involve ongoing
family relationships and the inevitably-attendant emotional issues; 2)
include sensitive information that the participants would prefer to keep
private; 3) sometimes require flexible and creative resolutions; and 4)
often involve parties who cannot afford protracted litigation. Yet the use of
mediation in adult guardianship cases raises a host of questions. ... An
adult guardianship case, by its very nature, centers on an individual whose
capacity is in question. Guardianship adjudications are designed to offer
maximum protection to that individual because he or she may not be
capable of protecting himself or herself. Mediation, on the other hand, is
grounded in the principle of self-determination and presumes that the
parties are capable of participating in the process and bargaining for their
own interests. Can these two concepts be reconciled?
Is the Use of Mediation Appropriate in Adult Guardianship Cases? Mary F.
Radford, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 611, 639-640 (2002), hereafter cited as
"Radford."
Although mediation of guardianship and conservatorship proceedings is not without
its critics,43 many organizations and individuals recommend that mediation be an
integral part of those cases,44 and we concur.
Mediation would seem to
be particularly suitable for
adult guardianship cases for
a number of reasons.

Professor Radford concludes, after a thorough
analysis from which we draw liberally, that mediation
is appropriate in guardianship and conservatorship
cases, but that these cases present several issues
that must be carefully considered by the mediator and
the judge.

(i) Capacity of respondent to mediate
The ADA Mediation Guidelines recommend special factors for the mediator to
consider when mediating with a person of potentially diminished capacity:
1. The mediator should ascertain that a party understands the nature of
the mediation process, who the parties are, the role of the mediator, the
parties' relationship to the mediator, and the issues at hand. The mediator
should determine whether the party can assess options and make and
keep an agreement.
2. If a party appears to have diminished capacity or if a party's capacity to
mediate is unclear, the ... mediator should determine whether a disability
43

See e.g., Winsor C. Schmidt, Jr., What is Known and not Known about the State of the
Guardianship and Public Guardianship System Thirteen Years After the Wingspread National
Guardianship Symposium. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 1027, 1032-1033 (2002).
44
See e.g., National Probate Court Standards, Standard 2.5.1. Wingspan Conference.
Recommendation 24, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 600 (2002) The Center for Social Gerontology,
http://www.tcsa.orQ/. Professor Mary F. Radford, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 611, 685 (2002).
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is interfering with the capacity to mediate and whether an accommodation
will enable the party to participate effectively.
3. The ... mediator should also determine whether the party can mediate
with support.
ADA Mediation Guidelines, Guideline I.D.45
Even if the respondent lacks capacity to participate, the ADA Guidelines permit
mediation if s/he is present and a surrogate represents the respondent's interests,
values and preferences and makes decisions for the respondent46
[The Center for Social Gerontology's] Adult Guardianship Mediation
Manual also offers mediators a set of guidelines for determining whether
the adult has capacity to participate in the mediation. These guidelines
appear in the form of eight questions:
1) Can the respondent understand what is being discussed?
2) Does he or she understand who the parties are?
3) Can the respondent understand the role of the mediator?
4) Can the respondent listen to and comprehend the story of the other party?
5) Can he or she generate options for a solution?
6) Can he or she assess options?
7) Is the respondent expressing a consistent opinion?
8) Can he or she make and keep an agreement?
Radford, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 611, 650 (2002), citing The Center for Social
Gerontology's Adult Guardianship Mediation Manual.
(ii) Power imbalance among the parties
The mediator must remain alert to power imbalances among the parties and take
appropriate measures to neutralize them, such as:
>
>
>
>
>

ensuring that the respondent is adequately represented;
structuring presentations so that the respondent is allowed to speak first;
ensuring the neutrality of the mediation site;
encouraging experts to convey information in an understandable manner; and
intervening to clear up confusion and assuage the respondent's fears. 47
The more subtle obstacle to self-determination by an adult ... is the
tendency of family members, attorneys, judges, and perhaps even
mediators to want to structure a framework that is protective of the adult
but that may not necessarily protect the adult's fundamental right to
autonomy. ... The mediator, as guardian of the principle of selfdetermination, must remain alert to the distinct possibility that the other,
"saner," parties to the mediation are asserting their own values rather than
reflecting the values of the adult.

45

http://www coicr.org/ada.html
ADA Mediation Guidelines, Guideline I.D.4.
47
Radford, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 611, 652 (2002).

46
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Radford, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 611, 653-654 (2002).
(iii) Mediator training
The Wingspan Conference recommends that "standards and training for mediators
be developed in conjunction with the Alternative Dispute Resolution community to
address mediation in guardianship related matters."48 We concur.
Mediation of protective proceedings requires
Standards and training for
training and experience that the Utah community may
mediators should be
not yet have. Because mediation of protective
developed
in conjunction
proceedings has a relatively short history in Utah,
with the Alternative
because the only specialized training of court-annexed
Dispute Resolution
ADR providers focuses on family law disputes,49 and
community.
because of the special risks of mediating protective
proceedings, we encourage the mediation community
to develop training classes and materials along the lines recommended by the
Wingspread Conference:
(a) the rights and procedures applicable in guardianship proceedings;
(b) the aging process and disability conditions, and the myths and
stereotypes concerning older and disabled persons;
(c) the skills required to effectively communicate with disabled and elderly
persons;
(d) the applicable medical and mental health terminology and the possible
effects of various medications on the respondent; and
(e) services and programs available in the community for elderly and/or
disabled persons.
The Center for Social Gerontology also offers a substantial curriculum for mediation
training in guardianship proceedings.
(c) Probate commissioner
The Wingspan Conference recommends judicial specialization in guardianships,52
however, we do not. We recommend extensive judicial education and training, but we
do not recommend appointing a specialized probate judge. Training for all will have to
serve the objectives of specialization by a few.
Although the clerks' office in some districts has a recognizable probate department,
the district court has favored the general assignment of cases among its judges for
many years. The same factors that make specialization in probate attractive - small
caseload, specialized procedures, and expansive geography - also work against
48

Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 22. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 599 (2002).
CJA4-510(3)(C).
50
Wingspread Conference. Recommendation ll-D. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 286
(1989)
51
http://www.tcsQ.ora/mediation/manual.htm.
52
Wingspan Conference Recommendation 56 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 606 (2002).
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specialization. At some point, there may be sufficient caseload to merit an arrangement
similar to the district court's "tax court," a handful of judges from around the state, who
are assigned the regular variety of cases from their
home district and who are assigned probate cases from
The district courts should
all
of the districts when a case is contested.
consider appointing
commissioners to specialize
We do recommend that the district courts consider
in probate law much as they
appointing commissioners to specialize in probate law
have done in family law.
much as they have done in family law. In the Third
District, instead of adding a judge when growth
warrants it, consider appointing a probate commissioner - not a guardianship specialist,
but a probate specialist. In the other urban districts - Districts Two, Four and Five there may be sufficient caseload between family and probate cases to warrant a
commissioner.
(d) Access to records
Public

Private

Arizona

Alaska

[ Arkansas

California

| Connecticut

Colorado

During our study, the Judicial Council
asked for our recommendations on public
access
to
guardianship
and
conservatorship
records.
We
recommended that, except for the
appointment order and letters, which
must be public, guardianship and
conservatorship records be classified as
"private": available to the court and to the
parties, but not to the public. Rule 4202.02 has since been amended
accordingly.

1

Illinois

Delaware

Indiana

Florida

Iowa

Georgia

Kansas

Idaho

Louisiana

Kentucky

Nebraska

New Mexico

Nevada

South Dakota

Oregon

Hawaii - Guardian

Our research showed that, of the
states
that
make
an
express
classification, about half allow public
access and half do not.53

As we noted in our earlier
recommendation:
guardianship
and
Washington
conservatorship records and hearings
Wyoming
historically have been public not because
of any deliberate decision, but because
Hawaii - Conservator
no one seems to have asked whether
they should be private. Hearings should remain public. Public scrutiny controls abuse
and assures people that the authority granted by the court is appropriate. Public records
serve this important goal just as much as public hearings, but court records contain
significant medical information, financial information, living situation, and personal
identifying information about the respondent. The respondent, almost by definition, is
53

The 1997 Uniform Act also recommends that guardianship and conservatorship records be
confidential. Sections 307 and 407
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vulnerable to being victimized and the court records provide the information with which
to do so. The combination of public hearings and private records, while not common,
has precedent in juvenile court cases and adoption cases.
There are records that can safely remain public. The appointment order and letters
have been mentioned. These are necessarily public because they need to be shared on
a regular basis with people not associated with the case; sometimes even recorded as
part of public land records. The existence of the case (case name and number) and the
register of actions or docket should also be public. The latter of these was swept in with
our earlier recommendation because of the district court case management system's
inability to differentiate the docket from the rest of the case. But there is no privacy or
security interest to be protected, and the administrative office of the courts is working to
sequester the documents filed in a guardianship or conservatorship case while allowing
public access to the record of the document having been filed.
(9) Fiduciary authority
(a) Less restrictive alternatives to guardianship or conservatorship
Currently, in order to appoint a guardian with plenary authority, the court must make
a finding that nothing less is "adequate."54 We believe that the petition should review the
alternatives to appointing a guardian or conservator and explain why none are
appropriate.55 The hearing should include evidence to support that conclusion.
Less restrictive alternatives may go unexplored simply because of unfamiliarity, so
we describe some here. The following options are some alternatives to guardianship or
conservatorship (There may be others.) that may meet the respondent's needs. All
require the respondent's cooperation. Some require the respondent's capacity.
(i) Alternatives for financial decisionmaking
Representative payee. Some federal agencies, such as the Social Security
Administration, can appoint a person to receive benefits on behalf of a beneficiary who
is unable to administer his or her finances. A representative payee maintains control
over the benefits, signs all checks drawn on the benefits, and spends the benefit money
to meet the needs of the beneficiary. A person applying to an agency to be a
representative payee does not first need to be appointed as a guardian or conservator.
Trust. Trusts can be useful planning tools for incapacity because they can be
established and controlled by a competent person and continue if that person later
becomes incapacitated. The trustee holds legal title to the property transferred to the
trust and has the duty to use the property as provided in the trust agreement which can
be for the benefit of the trustor during his or her lifetime. Trusts are regulated by statute
and should be drafted by a lawyer.
54

Utah Code Section 75-5-304(2).
Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 20 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 598 (2002). Wingspread
Conference. Recommendation l-A. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 277 (1989).
56
Borrowed liberally from Alternatives to Guardianship and Conservatorship for Adults in Iowa, The
Iowa Department of Elder Affairs and the Iowa Governor's Developmental Disabilities Council, pp 6-13
(2001).
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Power of attorney. Power of attorney is a document in which a person authorizes
an agent to act when the person cannot. The power of attorney can be for a specified
time or until the person cancels it. The power of attorney can grant a specific authority
or grant more general authority to act in financial transactions. Some common powers
of attorney:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

Open, maintain or close bank accounts or brokerage accounts
Sell, lease or maintain real estate
Access safe deposit boxes
Make financial investments
Borrow money, mortgage property, or renew debts
Prepare and file income tax returns
Vote at corporate meetings
Purchase insurance for the principal's benefit
Defend, prosecute, or settle a lawsuit
Start or carry on a business
Employ professional assistants, such as lawyers, accountants, and real estate
agents
> Apply for benefits and participate in governmental programs
> Transfer property to a trustee
> Disclaim an inheritance

Joint bank account. In a joint bank account a trusted friend or family member coowns the account with the person. Both have ownership of and access to the account,
so great caution should be taken.
Automatic banking. A person might retain control of his or her own affairs with the
help of automatic deposits and automatic bill payments.
Trusted help. A person may be able to manage his or her own financial affairs
simply with help, either by a trusted family member or friend or by a professional. Such
an assistant could help organize a budget, write checks for the person's signature,
assist with related paperwork, and propose and explain investments. Be watchful for
undue influence by the person providing help.
(ii) Alternatives for health care decisionmaking
Advance health care directive. Advance directives are instructions a person gives
to health care providers and family to make sure his or her wishes regarding health care
are followed.
Power of attorney. Power of attorney can also be used for health care decisions.
The agent is required to make health care decisions according to directions provided by
the principal.
(iii) Crisis intervention
Mediation, counseling, and respite support services. Counseling may be helpful
if a person does not lack capacity, but is unwilling to agree to reasonable requests. A
mediator may be able to help reach a compromise. Respite care provides temporary
relief to the caregiver if the caregiver - or the person cared for - is aged 60 or older.

24

The respite may be brief, 2-3 hours, or longer than 24 hours, and the care may take
place at the individual's residence or elsewhere.
(iv) Organizations willing to help
Area Agencies on Aging administer programs for those aged 60 and over such as:
> Access to other services: transportation, outreach, information and referral;
> Community services: congregate meals, legal services, case management, and
continuing education;
> In-home services: respite care, home health, homemaker, home-delivered meals
and chore maintenance; and
> Services to residents of care-providing facilities.
Community based services. There are free and low-cost services offered by
government agencies, religious organizations and others, such as home nursing, home
health aides, homemakers, home delivered meals, mental health services, and
transportation.
(b) Fiduciary's limited authority
If the respondent is incapacitated and a guardian is needed, plenary authority
except when the respondent is completely incapacitated, is universally condemned.
Although plenary appointments are relatively common under our current statutes, even
current law directs the judge to "prefer" limited authority over plenary appointments.5
Unfortunately, after that brief admonishment, the statute does nothing to support the
result, other than require a finding that nothing else will do.

The order should be tailored to the
respondent's particular limitations.
The guardian's authority should be
presumed limited to the authority
expressly stated in the order.
The respondent should retain all
rights, power, authority and
discretion not expressly granted to
the guardian by statute or court order.

We believe that the "petition and order
should include detailed statements of the
respondent's functional capabilities and
limitations".59 The hearing should include
evidence of the same. The order should be
tailored to the respondent's particular
limitations. In our proposed statutes, rather
than presuming full authority and requiring an
express limitation of it, as the Code does
now,60 the guardian's authority should be
presumed limited to the authority expressly
stated in the order. Only by listing all available
authority would the court be able to make a
plenary appointment, which should require

57

Wingspread Conference. Recommendations lll-D and IV-B. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep.
271, 290 and 292 (1989). Wingspan Conference. Recommendations 38 and 39. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595,
602-603 (2002). National Probate Court Standards, Standard 3.3.10. 1997 Uniform Act, Section 314.
Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 2.
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Utah Code Section 75-5-304(2).
59
Wingspread Conference. Recommendation IV-B. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 293
(1989).
60
Utah Code Section 75-5-312(2).
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findings supported by clear and convincing evidence that such a result is necessary.
There is no simple formula that will help judges make the determination.
The following broad classification could serve as an initial schema:
If minimal or no incapacities, petition not granted, use less restrictive
alternative.
If severely diminished capacities in all areas or if less restrictive
interventions have failed, use plenary guardianship.
If mixed strengths and weaknesses, use limited guardianship.
The cases in which there are "mixed areas" of strengths and weaknesses
present the greatest challenge - and the greatest opportunity - for the
"judge as craftsman" to tailor a limited order to the specific needs and
abilities of the individual.
Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 13.
(i) Guardian or Conservator?
In determining the appropriate authority, the judge should decide whether the
respondent's limitations require a guardian, a conservator or both. And this ultimate
decision should be reflected in the petition that starts the case. Practice over the years
has degenerated to the point that many, probably most, petitioners request appointment
to both offices, when one or the other alone might do. Petitioners, who know only the
basic idea that a conservator is responsible for the respondent's estate and a guardian
is responsible for the respondent's care and well-being, may not realize the significant
additional fiscal responsibility that comes with being a conservator.
Currently, guardians have some modest authority over the respondent's estate.62
We propose delineating the guardian's authority for many everyday property
transactions, reserved to a conservator if one is appointed, that may reduce the need
for a conservator. Only if the petitioner requests authority beyond these transactions
and the judge agrees that it is needed should a conservator be appointed.
Under current law, a guardian may receive the respondent's money and property
and has a duty to "conserve any excess for the ward's needs,"63 a simple standard met
by a simple savings account. A conservator, on the other hand, must meet the much
higher standards of a trustee,64 exercising reasonable care, skill, and caution as would a
prudent investor65 and making reasonable efforts to verify facts66 while investing and
reinvesting the respondent's estate.67 Family guardians probably do not have that
acumen, do not need that authority, and would do well to leave the responsibility to a
Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 39. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 603 (2002).
Utah Code Section 75-5-312(2)(b) (commence protective proceedings); (2)(d)(i) (initiate
proceedings to compel support); (2)(d)(ii) ((receive money and property deliverable to the respondent).
63
Utah Code Section 75-5-312(2)(d)(ii).
64
Utah Code Section 75-5-417(1); Utah Code Section 75-5-424(1).
65
Utah Code Section 75-7-902(1).
66
Utah Code Section 75-7-902(4).
87
Utah Code Section 75-5-424(2).
62
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professional conservator or seek professional advice in carrying out a conservator's
duties.
(ii) Retained rights - Restrictions on authority
The respondent should retain all rights, power, authority and discretion not expressly
granted to the guardian by statute or court order.
The right of the respondent to vote in governmental elections is particularly difficult.
The right cannot be assigned to the guardian in any event, but when is it properly
denied to the respondent? We propose the standard recommended by the ABA. The
respondent retains the right to vote in governmental elections unless "the court finds [by
clear and convincing evidence] that the person cannot communicate, with or without
accommodations, a specific desire to participate in the voting process."68 It would be
helpful if further statutory and practical changes were implemented to accommodate
voting by respondents determined to be incapacitated, but that is beyond the scope of
this report.
The guardian should not be able to:
> consent to commitment of the respondent to a mental retardation facility (The
guardian should petition the court for an order under Title 62A, Chapter 5, Part 3,
Admission to Mental Retardation Facility.);
> consent to commitment of the respondent to a mental health authority (The
guardian should petition the court for an order under Title 62A, Chapter 15, Part
6, Utah State Hospital and Other Mental Health Facilities.);
> consent to sterilization of the respondent; (The guardian should petition the court
for an order under Title 62A, Chapter 6, Sterilization of Handicapped Person.); or
> consent to termination of the parental rights in the respondent or of the
respondent's parental rights in another. (The guardian should petition the juvenile
court for an order to terminate parental rights under Title 78A, Chapter 6, Part 5,
Termination of Parental Rights Act.)
Unless permitted by the court, the guardian should not be able to:
> consent to the admission of the respondent to a psychiatric hospital or other
mental health care facility;
> consent to participation in medical research, electroconvulsive therapy or other
shock treatment, experimental treatment, forced medication with psychotropic
drugs, abortion, psychosurgery, a procedure that restricts the respondent's
rights, or to be a living organ donor;
> consent to termination of life-sustaining treatment if the respondent has never
had health care decisionmaking capacity;
> consent to name change, adoption, marriage, annulment or divorce of the
respondent;
> prosecute, defend and settle legal actions, including administrative proceedings,
on behalf of the respondent;
> establish or move the respondent's dwelling place outside of Utah; or
Resolution of the ABA House of Delegates approved on August 13, 2007.
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> restrict the respondent's physical liberty, communications or social activities more
than reasonably necessary to protect the respondent or others from harm.
(iii) Maximizing respondent's independence - Decisionmaking
standard
Our Supreme Court requires that when appointing a guardian, the court "must
consider the interest of the ward in retaining as broad a power of self-determination as
is consistent with the reason for appointing a guardian of the person."69 Further, "the
court's order should reauire the guardian to attempt to maximize self-reliance, autonomy
and independence...."76 Reacquiring capacity is legally and practically possible, and the
guardian should take reasonable steps to that end.
Regardless whether the respondent might
If the court and the fiduciary
reacquire capacity, maximizing independence
are to give any realistic
includes applying the "substituted judgment"
meaning to the standard of
standard when making decisions
on the
"substituted judgment," it is
respondent's behalf. When the guardian or
critical to learn the
conservator uses the substituted judgment standard
s/he makes the decision that the respondent would
respondent's values,
have made when competent. The fiduciary therefore
preferences and patterns of
has a duty to learn the respondent's values,
behavior that form the basis
preferences and patterns of behavior that form the
of what the respondent
basis of what respondent would have done.
would have done.
Substituted judgment is the decisionmaking
standard used in all circumstances except those that permit the "best interest" standard
to be used.
The fiduciary may use the best interest decisionmaking standard when:
(a) following the respondent's wishes would cause her or him harm;
(b) the guardian or conservator cannot determine the respondent's wishes; or
(c) the respondent has never had capacity.
When the guardian or conservator uses the best interest standard, s/he makes the
decision that is the least intrusive, least restrictive, and most normalizing course of
action to accommodate the respondent's particular functional limitations.
(iv) Respondent's values, preferences and patterns
The respondent's values, preferences and patterns of behavior should play a big
role in shaping the outcome of a petition to appoint a guardian or conservator. Not only
are they important in determining capacity, as discussed in Section (4) (c), but also in
determining who the fiduciary should be, the fiduciary's authority, and even in some of
the fiduciary's decisions, such as medical and financial decisions and living
arrangements.71 If the court and the fiduciary are to give any realistic meaning to the
In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085,1090-1091 (Utah 1981).
Wingspread Conference Recommendation IV-B. 13 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 271, 293
(1989).
71
Judicial Determination of Capacity, p 5.
70
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standard of "substituted judgment," it is critical to learn what those values, preferences
and patterns are. The respondent may have something to say. The clinician and court
visitor should include the respondent's values, preferences and patterns of behavior as
part of their investigation. Family, friends, colleagues, religious ministers, care providers
and others also may have useful evidence.
(10)
Emergency appointments
Current Utah law permits the emergency appointment of a temporary guardian,72 but
there is no similar provision for a temporary conservator. Emergency appointments are
sometimes necessary, but our current statute provides less protection to the respondent
than the Rules of Civil Procedure provide to a defendant for a temporary restraining
order.73 The 1997 Uniform Act addresses these shortcomings and we have integrated
many of its features into our proposed legislation. We have also integrated the features
of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, procedures lawyers and
judges are familiar with.
The authorities differ on whether a regular petition should be filed with the
emergency petition. Standard 3.3.6(a)(2) of the National Probate Court Standards
recommends it. The 1997 Uniform Act Section 312 recommends against it. The
Wingspan Conference also seems to recommend that a regular petition be required.74
The commentary to the 1997 Uniform Act argues that requiring a petition "lends an air of
inevitability that a permanent guardian should be appointed;" that respondent's need for
a guardian might be temporary and his or her long-term needs might be met by other
mechanisms.
Our current Utah statute is silent on the question, and usually courts do not require a
regular petition. We endorse that model, for the reasons explained in the 1997 Uniform
Act, and simply because requiring a regular petition, especially the more detailed
petition we envision, in the midst of an emergency is unrealistic. On the other hand, the
court must guard against the emergency appointment becoming de facto permanent
because of the failure to monitor the appointment.
Our proposal requires a hearing on the emergency petition and notice to the
respondent unless the respondent would be harmed before a hearing could be held.
Only in the latter case, may the judge consider evidence of the emergency ex parte.
The guardian's authority would be limited to what is justified by the emergency and
expressly stated in the order. A hearing on the emergency appointment must be held
within 5 days after the appointment and notice of the appointment and hearing given

u

Utah Code Section 75-5-310
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A Injunctions. Our current statute regulating emergency petitions
does not require appointment of counsel for the respondent, even though counsel is required for regular
petitions
74
Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 34. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 602 (2002). Although not
stating directly that a regular petition should be required, the Conference recommends that the
emergency appointment require "a hearing on the permanent guardianship as promptly as possible...."
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within 2 days. An emergency order without hearing and notice would expire after 5
days. An emergency order with hearing and notice would expire after 60 days.75
(11)
"School guardianships"
In 1985, the Legislature attempted to create bifurcated authority to appoint a
guardian for a child who resides outside of Utah, giving the authority to the district court
and local school boards. In the vernacular, these appointments have become known as
"school guardianships." Their primary purpose appears to be to prevent a non-resident
from avoiding non-resident tuition. Using the law of guardianship to answer such a
simple question is poor policy. These appointments simply do not fit the generally
accepted model for appointing a guardian for a minor, and we recommend that they be
eliminated.
Schools need the authority to distinguish resident from non-resident, and the child
needs a guardian to make myriad decisions about schooling. Our recommendations do
not interfere with these objectives, but the general laws of residency and guardianship
are sufficient to reach these objectives. There is no need for a special process that was
so poorly drafted over two decades ago that it removes from the district court the
authority to enter the orders the schools rely upon.
The Legislature intended to give the district court jurisdiction to appoint a "school
guardian," but the statutes' plain language fails to do so. "A person becomes a guardian
of a minor by acceptance of a testamentary appointment, through appointment by a
local school board under Section 53A-2202,
or upon appointment by the court."76
Under current law, a school board may
"The court may appoint a guardian for an
permit a non-resident minor to attend
unemancipated minor if all parental rights
school in Utah and may treat a nonof custody have been terminated or
resident minor as a Utah resident, even
suspended by circumstances or prior court
without the appointment of a guardian.
order."77 Since the parents' custodial rights
have not been terminated or suspended, the court has no authority to appoint a
guardian. Although the district courts have been handling these appointments for many
years, they have not had jurisdiction.
For school tuition purposes, a minor is treated as a Utah resident, even though the
minor's parent or guardian is not, if "the child lives with a resident of the district who is a
responsible adult and whom the district agrees to designate as the child's legal guardian
under Section 53A-2-202...."78 Section 53A-2-202 clearly gives the local school boards
the authority to "designate" someone as a child's legal guardian and just as clearly gives
the local school boards the discretion to opt out of that authority. Most of the local
boards have opted out. Thus, there is a right to have a guardian appointed, but
75
Sixty days conforms to the 1997 Uniform Act, Section 312, but it is twice as long as current Utah
law. We believe that by imposing a more rigorous process on the emergency appointment, it is safe to
extend the time in which to conduct the medical and social evaluations and prepare evidence for the
regular hearing.
76
Utah Code Section 75-5-201
77
Utah Code Sction 75-5-204.
78
Section 53A-2-201(2)(b).
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technically no forum in which to do so. The district court does not have the authority,
and the school boards have opted out.
The petitioner must file the parents' affidavit as evidence of the parents' consent to
the termination of parental rights, the appointment of the guardian and the minor's intent
to reside in Utah. If the parent is not available to swear out the affidavit, the proposed
guardian may do so on the parents' behalf.79 The Legislature has since passed laws
imposing significantly more protections and requirements for relinquishing parental
rights.80 Those laws certainly do not permit anyone other than the parent to waive the
parent's rights.
The judge may deny the petition to appoint a guardian if the school proves that the
primary purpose of the guardianship is to attend a Utah public school81 or to avoid
paying non-resident tuition.82 Having the purpose of attending a public school or
avoiding non-resident tuition may be reasons to charge non-resident tuition, but they are
not sufficient reasons to deny the guardianship.
There are numerous other difficulties with the statutes regulating school
guardianships. There is no need for this elaborate process. A school board may permit
a non-resident minor to attend school in Utah under current law, even without the
appointment of a guardian.83 A school board may treat a non-resident minor as a Utah
resident under current law, even without the appointment of a guardian.84 A child may
need a guardian for a variety of purposes, including school-related purposes. If there
are grounds to appoint a guardian, the court should make that appointment. That
appointment may affect the minor's residency, which in turn may affect the child's
tuition, but that is governed by other Utah law.85 In all respects, the regular law of
guardianships should apply.
(12)
Appointments by will or signed writing
This is one of our more technical recommendations, and one in which we move
away from current Utah law and the 1997 Uniform Act. Currently, Utah allows a person
to appoint a guardian for a minor child or an incapacitated adult child or spouse by will
or signed writing.86 A person may also nominate a guardian for a spouse or child, but
the difference between a nominee and an appointee is not entirely clear.87 A person
may nominate, but not appoint, a conservator for a spouse or child. 8 Other designated
people may nominate a guardian or conservator to replace them in the priority list of
appointees.89

/y

Utah Code Section 53A-2-202(2)(d).
Utah Code Section 78A-6-514.
81
Utah Code Section 53A-2-202(2)(a)(i).
82
Utah Code Section 75-5-206(3)(b).
83
Utah Code Section 53A-2-205.
84
Utah Code Section 53A-2-201(2)(c).
85
Utah Code Sction 53A-2-201(1)(a).
86
Utah Code Sections 75-5-202.5 and 75-5-301.
87
Compare Utah Code Section 75-5-311 with 75-5-301.
88
Utah Code Section 75-5-410.
89
Utah Code Sections 75-5-311 and 75-5-410.
80
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The 1997 Uniform Act clarifies some points, but not others. The 1997 Uniform Act
continues the distinction between appointing a guardian and nominating a conservator.
It permits the appointing parent or spouse to petition the court to confirm the
appointment before the parent's or spouse's death or incapacity but not to confirm a
nomination. It permits a respondent to nominate a guardian or conservator while s/he
still has capacity to do so, but it does not permit a respondent to confirm the nomination.
The respondent's nominee has top priority, but that is always subject to the court's
authority to appoint in a different order.
The 1997 Uniform Act requires the appointee, whether confirmed beforehand or not,
to file an acceptance of appointment, and if not confirmed beforehand, to file a petition
to confirm the appointment. The 1997 Uniform Act makes the appointment effective
upon acceptance by the appointee, without ever determining that the respondent is
incapacitated.90
There is no need for such complexity. There is need for more protection.
We propose a simpler model applicable to guardians and conservators, minors and
adults that better protects the respondent's rights. We begin with the premise that, if a
guardian or conservator is to act under judicial approval, the court should make the
appointment, not the parent or spouse.
A person should be able to nominate a guardian or a conservator for oneself, for
one's child or for one's spouse. And that person should be able to petition the court to
confirm the nomination and cut off the rights of others to object. It is, in effect, a
contingent appointment, subject to later determining the respondent's incapacity and
determining that the appointment remains in the respondent's best interest.
We endorse this new feature of the 1997 Uniform Act, but couch it in terms of
nomination rather than appointment. A person who anticipates incapacity should be
able to take comfort in the knowledge that his or her preference of guardian or
conservator will be appointed at some future date; similarly for the spouse of an
incapacitated person or parent of an incapacitated or minor child. Confirmation does not
determine incapacity; only who will be the fiduciary. Upon the death or incapacity of the
nominating person, the court would still determine the respondent's incapacity and the
limits of the fiduciary's authority. If the nomination is not confirmed beforehand, the
nominee would have his or her designated priority for appointment, subject to the usual
court authority to appoint in a different order.
Our recommended approach creates a simple, uniform process for all combinations
of guardians and conservators, minors and adults. And it ensures that a court will
determine the nature and extent of the respondent's incapacity and the limits of the
fiduciary's authority.
(13)

Monitoring guardians and conservators

(a) Planning

1997 Uniform Act Sections 202, 302, 303, 310, and 413.
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Oversight of guardians and conservators begins with the fiduciary's assurance to the
court that s/he recognizes his or her authority, its limits and how it will be exercised. We
recommend that guardians and conservators develop a plan for how they will implement
the authority given them and that the plan be filed with the court. Some states require a
new plan annually, but we do not. Once filed, the plan should be sufficient until there is
a significant change in circumstances.
The law should allow modest deviation from the plan. Circumstances are never
entirely stable, and filing a new plan for every change, no matter how slight, merely
increases the burden on the fiduciary without protecting the respondent. But the law
should impose liability on the fiduciary for significant
Oversight of guardians and
deviations from the plan, and whether the deviation is
conservators begins with
slight or significant may have to be decided by the
the fiduciary's assurance to
judge after the fact.
the court that s/he
The plan will provide a baseline against which to
recognizes his or her
evaluate
the guardian's or conservator's actions, but the
authority, its limits and how
primary
purpose
of planning is not to trap the fiduciary.
it will be exercised.
Rather, the purpose is to assure the court that the
fiduciary knows how s/he will help manage the
respondent's life before undertaking to do so. We recommend that a form for the
fiduciary's plan be developed by the court and Bar.
(b) Annual reports
The Judicial Council and the district courts have already taken the important step of
monitoring and enforcing the annual reporting requirements for guardians and
conservators, and the administrative office of the courts has developed forms and an
interactive web interview to guide the fiduciaries through that process. We recommend
that the district court continue these essential efforts.
If the protected person's parent is the guardian or conservator, current Utah law
exempts the parent from annually reporting the protected person's condition or estate.91
The 1997 Uniform Act does not contain this exception, and we recommend that it be
eliminated. A protected person is no better off for having been abused or defrauded by
a parent. We recommend that annual reports be required of all guardians and
conservators.
(c) Volunteer court visitors
Annual reporting about the respondent's well-being and estate are a necessary first
step to protect the respondent's personal and financial health and safety. But unless
someone reviews those reports and follows up as necessary, they are of little value.
Current Utah law relies for protection on objections by family members. If anyone
objects, the court will conduct proceedings to decide the competing claims. If no one
objects, the court is left on its own, which usually means the report will be approved.
Giving those interested in the respondent standing to object is a necessary second
step, but it is inadequate. Mistreatment of the respondent or misappropriation of money,
Utah Code Sections 75-5-312(2)(e)(vi) and 75-5-417(5).
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whether with intent or through neglect, may occur without it being obvious in the reports.
Those who are interested in the respondent may themselves participate to harm or
defraud. Perhaps the respondent is without family. We recommend, therefore, as does
the 1997 Uniform Act,92 that the court select reports to be reviewed for errors or fraud
and to follow up based on the results. We recommend that the court appoint visitors
periodically to review records and interview respondents, fiduciaries and others after the
appointment.
Other jurisdictions have successfully established volunteer programs to monitor
appointments more closely.93 The model is very similar to the Court Appointed Special
Advocate (CASA) program in the juvenile court,
which has been so successful at helping children
The model is very similar to
whose parents are accused of abuse. The courts
the CASA program in the
would hire a coordinator whose job is to recruit and
juvenile
court, which has been
train volunteers to perform the duties of a court
so
successful
at helping
visitor. The results can be invaluable to the court.

children whose parents are

The model came to light as we investigated
accused of abuse.
methods of monitoring guardians and conservators
after appointment, but court visitors should be used in the initial investigation of
incapacity as well. An organized volunteer program such as this offers the best hope of
also serving that need. The courts can create a volunteer program only over time, but
eventually, in a fully developed volunteer program, a court visitor might:
>

Before appointment
o Interview the respondent and proposed fiduciary
o Interview family members and others as appropriate
o Visit the respondent's current and proposed residences
o Report to the court
> After appointment
o Review inventories, management plans, annual reports and other records
of guardians and conservators
o Interview the respondent, fiduciary, family members and others as
appropriate
o Report to the court

The role of the coordinator is to build and support the program.
> Develop partnerships (AARP, CPAs, Lawyers, Law students, Law enforcement,
social workers, etc.)
> Recruit volunteers from among partners
> Develop training materials
> Develop and conduct training classes for volunteers (initial and continuing)
82

1997 Uniform Act Sections 317 and 420
Volunteer Guardianship Monitoring Programs: A Win~Win Solution, Ellen M. Klem, American Bar
Association Commission on Law and Aging (2007); Guarding the Guardians: Promising Practices for
Court Monitoring, Naomi Karp and Erica Wood, AARP Public Policy Institute (2007); Guardianship
Monitoring:
A
Demographic
Imperative,
Hon.
Steve
M.
King,
http://www.ncpi.orQ/auardianshiD%2Qmonitorina.htm.
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>
>
>
>
>
>

Develop and conduct training classes for judges and court staff
Supervise and recognize volunteers
Reimburse expenses
Troubleshoot problems
Develop checklists, forms, & other aids
Record and report outcomes

We recommend that the Judicial Council hire a coordinator to build and support a
volunteer court visitor program.
(d) Regulating guardians and conservators.
(i) Professional conservators
By a series of statutes, only a handful of financial institutions under permit from the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions may be appointed as professional
conservators.94 Professional conservators, therefore, are already highly regulated and
nothing further should be needed.
(ii) Professional guardians
Professional guardians are regulated by virtue of their credentials in other regulated
professions, but they are not regulated as guardians, and they should be. Like most
states, Utah lists the priority of a person or institution to be appointed guardian. Last on
that list is "a specialized care professional."95 A specialized care professional is defined
as a person who:
(i) has been certified or designated as a provider of guardianship services
by a nationally recognized guardianship accrediting organization;
(ii) is licensed by or registered with the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing as a health care provider including, but not limited
to, a registered nurse licensed under Section 58-31b-301, a social service
worker, certified social worker, or clinical social worker licensed under
Section 58-60-205, a marriage and family therapist licensed under Section
58-60-305, a physician licensed under Title 58, Chapter 67, or a
psychologist licensed under Title 58, Chapter 61; or
"Trust business" means ... a business in which one acts in any agency or fiduciary capacity,
including that of... conservator...." Utah Code Section 7-5-1 (1)(b). "Only a trust company may engage in
the trust business in this state." Utah Code Section 7-5-1(2). Trust company" means an institution
authorized to engage in the trust business under this chapter. Only the following may be a trust
company...." Utah Code Section 7-5-1(1)(d) (naming four types of depository institutions and any
corporation continuously engaged in trust business since 1981). "No trust company shall accept any
appointment to act in any agency or fiduciary capacity, such as ... conservator... under order or judgment
of any court ... unless and until it has obtained from the commissioner a permit to act under this chapter."
Utah Code Section 7-5-2(1).
Under special circumstances (administration of the estate is supervised by the court and no trust
company is willing to act as conservator after notice of the proceedings is given to every trust company
doing business in Utah) the court may appoint a certified public accountant (or other listed financial
professional) as conservator. Utah Code Section 7-5-1 (1)(c)(viii).
95
Utah Code Section 75-5-311(4)(g).
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(iii) has been approved by the court as one with specialized training and
experience in the care of incapacitated persons.
Utah Code Section 75-5-311(1 )(a).
So, Utah law leaves designation as a professional guardian to (1) unnamed
organizations with unknown standards; (2) licensure or registration with DOPL as a
health care provider, which includes unnamed professions; and (3) the judge on a caseby-case basis with no standards by which to decide.
The most prominent "nationally recognized guardianship accrediting organization" is
the National Guardianship Association. According to the National Guardianship
Association, "Certification entitles the guardian to represent to the courts and the public
that he or she is eligible to be appointed, is not disqualified by prior conduct, agrees to
abide by universal ethical standards governing a person with fiduciary responsibilities,
submits to a disciplinary process, and can demonstrate through a written test an
understanding of basic guardianship principles and laws."
Certification as either a Registered Guardian or a Master Guardian is administered
through the Center for Guardianship Certification (CGC), an "allied foundation" of the
National Guardianship Association. According to the
Center "CGC has developed a two-tiered certification
Professional guardians are
process, certifying Registered Guardians (RG) at the
regulated by virtue of their
entry level and Master Guardians (MG) with a higher
credentials in other regulated
level of experience and responsibility. The eligibility
professions, but they are not
standards, as well as content and level of difficulty of
regulated as guardians, and
the core competencies tested, for the Master
they should be.
Guardian certification are much higher. Nevertheless,
both the RG and MG must affirm they will abide by
the NGA Model Code of Ethics and maintain a high level of conduct to be re-certified.
The same process is used to determine if either certificate should be withheld or
revoked."
The health care providers listed in the Code as potential professional guardians are
not exclusive.96 A quick review of the DOPL website shows any number of licensed
professions that might be considered health care providers:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

Acupuncture
Athletic Trainer
Audiology
Certified Dietitian
Certified Medication Aide
Certified Nurse Midwifery
Chiropractic
Dentistry
Direct-Entry Midwifery
Genetic Counseling
Health Facility Administration

' Utah Code Section 75-5-311(1 )(a)(ii).

36

Occupational Therapy
Optometry
Osteopathy
Pharmacy
Physical Therapy
Physician and Surgeon
Physician Assistant
Podiatry
Professional Counseling
Psychology
Radiology

>
>
>
>

Hearing Instrument
Marriage and Family Therapy
Massage Therapy
Nursing

>
>
>
>

Recreation Therapy
Respiratory Care
Speech Language Pathology
Substance Abuse Counseling

All are valuable professions, and many might assist the respondent with his or her
incapacity, but none are qualified professional guardians merely because of their other
licensure, including those in the more traditional health care professions.
We recommend that the administrative office of the courts begin discussions with the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and professional guardians in Utah
to draft legislation according to the DOPL model to regulate the professional guardian
industry as it does other professions. We recommend that under that legislation only a
guardian licensed by DOPL be permitted to be appointed as a professional guardian.
Until then, we recommend that only someone certified by the National Guardianship
Association be permitted to be appointed as a professional guardian.
(Hi) Private fiduciaries
We recommend that before a person is appointed guardian or conservator, s/he be
required to disclose convictions that have not been expunged. We recommend no
automatic disqualifications, but it is important that the judge know the background of the
respondent's fiduciary, and whether an alternative might be more appropriate.
(14)
Conservators
Some states have abandoned the distinctions between a guardian and conservator.
If the respondent is incapacitated, the court appoints one or more fiduciaries and grants
authority, which may be authority traditionally held by a guardian, authority traditionally
held by a conservator, or some combination of the two. We do not recommend going so
far.
However, we recommend combining the laws common to both offices in order to
isolate and emphasize the laws that create differences. Many of the standards for both
officers are or should be the same. Many of the procedures are or should be the same.
Many of the policies are or should be the same.
But there are important differences.
> The law should continue to permit protective orders short of appointing a
conservator.
> The grounds for appointing a conservator should include because the respondent
is missing, detained, or unable to return to the United States.
> The reasons for a conservator or protective order should continue to include
because funds are needed for the support, care, and welfare of a person entitled
to be supported by the respondent.97
> If the reason for a protective proceeding is because the respondent is missing,
detained, or unable to return to the United States or the respondent's request,
there should be no need for an evaluation or a finding of incapacity.
Utah Code Section 75-5-401 (2)(a)
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> The authority of a conservator provided by statute is extremely detailed, listing
almost 50 permitted acts.98 So, unlike a guardian's authority, which should be
specified in the appointment order, the statutes should continue to identify the
conservator's authority which flows to the conservator by reason of being
appointed. The court might then expressly limit the statutory authority.
(15)
Training forjudges, lawyers, court personnel and volunteers
Although they can be improved, we have found that Utah statutes currently provide
reasonable due process protections." What seems to be lacking is the sense that this
matters. Perhaps the law itself too easily permits its avoidance. Perhaps courts are
pressed by contested cases and pay less attention to these in which the parties seem to
agree. Perhaps it is a well-meaning but misplaced notion of doing what is thought to be
in the respondent's best interest. Whatever the reason, too many short cuts are being
taken.
Education programs would seem to be the proverbial "no brainer." For judicial
training at least, some of the work is already done. The American Bar Association
Commission on Law and Aging in conjunction with the American Psychological
Association and the National College of Probate
Judges has prepared a manual entitled Judicial
Utah statutes currently
Determination of Capacity of Older Adults in
provide reasonable due
Guardianship Proceedings. It serves as a wonderful
process protections. What
benchbook,
and the administrative office of the courts
seems to be lacking is the
has
already
included it on the court's website among
sense that this matters.
the benchbooks available to district court judges.100 But
it is of little value unless it is used. We recommend it to the Judicial Institute as an
outline on which to build a curriculum for district court conferences.
The Utah State Bar's Committee on Law and Aging and Estate Planning Section
sponsor CLE programs on protective proceedings, and we recommend they continue
that important effort focusing on the recommendations in this report.
We recommend that the Judicial Institute develop training programs for clerks and
other court personnel on the new concepts, laws and procedures of guardianships and
conservatorships and on the special importance of cases in which the court shares
responsibility for the care and well being of a person with diminished capacity.
We recommend that the volunteer coordinator work with the Judicial Institute to
develop training programs for people who volunteer as court visitors:
> How to draw out evidence of the respondent's capabilities and limitations.
> How to draw out evidence of the respondent's values, preferences and patterns
of behavior.
> How to evaluate the respondent's circumstances during a guardianship or
conservatorship.
w

Utah Code Sections 75-5-408 and 424.
Appointment of counsel, medical examination, court visitor, presence at hearing, limits on
emergency appointments, and others.
http://www.utcourts.Qov/intranet/dist/docs/auardianship proceedinqs.pdf
99
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> How to evaluate the guardianship or conservatorship plan and annual reports.
> How to recognize evidence of fraud and abuse.
> Other matters on which the court visitor acts as the judge's surrogate.
(16)

Outreach and assistance for the public

We urge the lawyer who represents the fiduciary to advise his or her client of a
fiduciary's responsibilities and good practice standards.101 Sometimes the fiduciary does
not have a lawyer, but often the petitioner, who is more probably represented, will be
the fiduciary. A lawyer's representation of the petitioner may end with the appointment,
but the lawyer's counseling on the fiduciary's continuing responsibilities is probably the
single best opportunity to impress upon the guardian or conservator that s/he is
responsible for someone else's life and that the law imposes many requirements.
The Wingspan Conference recommends that "all guardians receive training and
technical assistance in carrying out their duties."102 We recommend that the Committee
on Resources for Self-represented Parties work with the
All guardians should
Committee on Law and Aging of the Utah State Bar to
receive training and
develop web-based information and resources about
technical assistance in
guardianships, conservatorships, and less restrictive
carrying out their duties.
alternatives. The manual entitled Basic Guidelines for
m
Court-Appointed Guardians and
Conservators
developed by the administrative office of the courts and the Bar committee is a start, but
more thorough information is needed.
We developed forms for an extensive clinical and social evaluation. Additional forms
and information need to be developed. We again recommend that the Committee on
Resources for Self-represented Parties work with the Committee on Law and Aging to
continue this important work. We suggest to them that the following forms, as well as
others that they may identify, be developed for the court's website:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

Acceptance of appointment
Estimated estate value worksheet
Findings of fact and conclusions of law
Letters of guardianship (conservatorship)
Management plan for guardian (conservator)
Motion and order directing services for respondent
Motion and order to appoint a lawyer to represent a respondent
Motion and order to appoint a court visitor
Motion and order to evaluate respondent
Motion and order to withdraw money from a court-guarded account
Notice of petition and hearing
Order appointing a guardian (conservator)
Petition (and subsequent pleadings) to Accept Transfer of Guardianship or
Conservatorship

101

Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 66. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 596, 608 (2002).
Wingspan Conference. Recommendation 9. 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 597 (2002).
103
http://www.utcourts.gov/howto/seniors/BasicGuidennes-20Q7.pdf.

102
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>
>
>
>
>
>

Petition to appoint a guardian (conservator)
Petition to confirm nomination
Proof of service
Report on clinical evaluation of respondent
Report on social evaluation of respondent
Special versions of forms adapted for use in protective proceedings for a minor

(17)
Information gathering
As noted in the introduction, Utah, like most states, does not systematically record
very much information about guardianships and conservatorships. We believe it would
be helpful to distinguish the appointment of a guardian from that of a conservator, to
distinguish an appointment for a minor from an appointment for an adult. It would have
been helpful in our study to know how many respondents were not represented, were
not interviewed by a visitor, not examined by a physician, or not present at the hearing.
We recommend that the administrative office of the courts evaluate processing of these
casetypes and determine what operational information and management information
would help improve processing and help evaluate the success of our recommendations.
We also recommend that the courts monitor how many annual reports and accountings
result in findings of abuse, termination, or other modification. Such data would be
groundbreaking.
(18)
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1.

The undersigned Kent Alderman being over the age of 21 years, declare based on

my personal knowledge, the same as I would testify in court as follows:
2.

I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar.

3.

I specialize my practice in the area of Elder Law, which includes guardianships

and conservatorships.
4.

I have been for more than ten years a member of the Utah State Bar's Committee

on Law and Aging (fkna as the Needs of the

Elderly Committee), and I also have served as the

Chair of the Committee.
5.

I have also served on the Judicial Council's Ad Hoc Committee on Probate and

Procedure.
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Exhibit A

6.

For more than 20 years, I have represented scores of either incapacitated persons

or petitioners who have sought the appointment of a guardian or conservator for incapacitated
persons.
7.

It has been my general experience that petitioners for the appointment of a

guardian or conservator genuinely seek the protection of the incapacitated person, and therefore,
such proceedings are not adversarial as between the petitioners and the incapacitated person.
8.

It has been my experience that the legal fees incurred by petitioners in

guardianship proceedings are subsequently paid from the incapacitated person's estate, since the
protection sought and achieved by court appointment was &em the benefit of the incapacitated
person.
9.

I have not experienced a case where the petitioners' legal fees were not allowed to

be paid from the incapacitated person's estate, unless the court found that the petition was not
brought in good faith.
10.

In my opinion, if the legal fees in guardianships proceedings were not allowed to

be paid from the incapacitated person's estate, it would have a substantial chilling effect on the
family members who most often are the petitioners seeking the protection of their parents. In
that event, the very protection that an incapacitated person needs would be either delayed or not
provided.
11.

Other states that have also adopted the Uniform Probate Code (like Utah) have

found that guardianship proceedings are generally not adversarial as between petitioners and the
incapacitated person. As such, those jurisdictions have found that payment of the legal fees

48134979-0083.1
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incurred in establishing the guardianship should be paid from the estate that benefits from the
guardianship; that is, the incapacitated person's estate.

See e.g., In re Guardianship &

Conservatorship of Donley, 262 Neb. 282 (Neb. 2001). Furthermore, I believe that the powers
granted to the guardian are broad enough to encompass the authority to engage and pay counsel.
".. .the guardian has the same powers, rights and duties respecting minor child.. ." (CA 75-5-312
(2). Certainly a parent has the authority to hire and pay an attorney to protect the interest of his
child.
12.

I submit this declaration in the hope that the Court understands the public policy

impact its recent ruling will likely have on prospective petitioners who seek the protection of a
parent or loved one. In effect, this Court's ruling denying fees to Petitioners will have a chilling
effect on any petitioners who seek the protection of their unprotected family members.
13.

I personally urge the Court to reconsider its recent ruling on this issue and the

adverse impact it will have on the willingness of family to seek protection of incapacitated
family members.
14.

I have reviewed my declaration carefully, and I have not stated anything herein

that is not supported by my personal experience and conviction.
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As provided by § 78B-5-705, Utah Code (2008), I declare and certify under criminal
penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated this 2-1 day of October, 2008.

KENT B. ALDERMAN (BAR #000034)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
(801) 536-6715
kalderman@parsonsbehle. com
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264
mike@utahattornev.com
Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH
135 North 100 West, Logan UT 84321
First District Clerk: 435 750-1300; Angie 750-1313

In the Matter of

DECLARATION OF ATTORNEY
TROY T. WILSON

EVAN KOLLER
An Incapacitated Person.

Civil No. 073100106
Judge Clint S. Judkins

1.

I am Troy Wilson; I am over the age of 21 years, and my declaration is being made on

my personal knowledge, the same as I would testify in court.
2.

I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar.

3.

I focus my practice in the area of Estate Planning, Probate and Elder Law, which

includes guardianships and conservatorships.
4.

I have been for more than 4 years a member of the Utah State Bar's Committee on

Law and Aging (fka as the Needs of the Elderly Committee).

Exhibit B

5.

Over the past six years, I have represented many incapacitated persons as well as

petitioners who have sought the appointment of a guardian or conservator for incapacitated
persons.
6,

It has been my general experience that petitioners for the appointment of a guardian or

conservator genuinely seek the protection of the incapacitated person, and therefore, such
proceedings are generally not adversarial as between the petitioners and the incapacitated person.
1.

It has also been my experience that the legal fees incurred by petitioners in these

guardianship proceedings are subsequently reimbursed and paidfromthe incapacitated person's
estate by the conservator once appointed, since the protection sought and achieved by court
appointment was directly for the benefit of the incapacitated person,
8.

I have never experienced a case where the petitioners' legal fees were not paid from

the incapacitated person's estate, unless and only unless the court did not appoint a guardian
and/or conservator.
9.

In my opinion, if the legal fees in guardianship proceedings were not to be paid from

the incapacitated person's estate, it would have a substantial chilling effect on the petitioner, who
are most often the children seeking the protection for their parents. That is, the very protection
that an incapacitated person needs would be either delayed or not obtained at all
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10. I have conferred with other Elder Law Attorneys about this issue of payment of legal
fees for petitioners seeking guardianships, and this is the first case I have ever heard of where a
court has denied such fees for petitioners.
11. I agreed to submit my declaration in this case in the hope that the Court would better
understand the impact its recent ruling on this issue will likely have on prospective petitioners
who seek the protection of a parent or loved one. In effect, this Court's ruling denying fees to
Petitioners will have a chilling effect on any children who seek the protection of their parent or
parents.
12. I personally implore this Court to reconsider its recent ruling on this issue so as to
avoid the adverse effect it will have on the protection of incapacitated persons.
13. I have reviewed my declaration carefully, and I have not stated anything herein that is
not supported by my personal experience and conviction.

Dated this 23rd day of October 2008.

Troy T.Cfiiilson
Attorney at Law
1555 E Stratford Ave, Ste 100
Salt Lake City UT 84106-3581
(801) 467-5800; Fax: 467-5170

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264
mike@,utahattorney. com
Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH
135 North 100 West, Logan UT 84321
First District Clerk: 435 750-1300; Toni 750-1311

In the Matter of

DECLARATION OF ATTORNEY
MICHAEL A, JENSEN

EVAN ROLLER
An Incapacitated Person.

Civil No. 073100106
Judge Clint S. Judkins

1. I am Michael A. Jensen; I am over the age of 21 years, and my declaration is
being made on my personal knowledge, the same as I would testify in court.
2. I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar.
3. The primary focus of my law practice is in the area of Elder Law, which includes
guardianships and conservatorships.
4. I have been for more than ten years a member of the Utah State Bar's Committee
on Law and Aging (fkna as the Needs of the Elderly Committee), and I currently serve as
the Chair of the Committee.

Exhibit D
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5. For more than 10 years, I have represented scores and scores of either
incapacitated persons or petitioners who have sought the appointment of a guardian or
conservator for incapacitated persons.
6. It has been my general experience that petitioners for the appointment of a
guardian or conservator genuinely seek the protection of the incapacitated person, and
therefore, such proceedings are not adversarial as between the petitioners and the
incapacitated person.
7. It has also been my experience that the legal fees incurred by petitioners in these
guardianship proceedings are subsequently paid or reimbursed from the incapacitated
person's estate by the conservator that was appointed, since the protection sought and
achieved by court appointment was directly for the benefit of the incapacitated person.
8. I have never experienced a case where the petitioners' legal fees were not paid
from the incapacitated person's estate, unless and only unless the court did not appoint a
guardian and/or conservator.
9. In my opinion, if the legal fees in guardianships proceedings were not to be paid
from the incapacitated person's estate, it would have a substantial chilling effect on the
children who most often are the petitioners seeking the protection of their parents. That
is, the very protection that an incapacitated person needs would be either delayed or not
obtained at all.
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10. I have conferred with other Elder Law Attorneys about this issue of payment of
legal fees for petitioners seeking guardianships, and this is the first case where a court has
denied such fees for petitioners.
11. Although Utah's Probate Code is silent on the issue, other states that have also
adopted the Uniform Probate Code (like Utah) have found that guardianship proceedings
are generally not adversarial as between petitioners and the incapacitated person. As
such, those jurisdictions have found that payment of the legal fees incurred in establishing
the guardianship should be paidfromthe estate that benefits from the guardianship; that
is, the incapacitated person's estate, See e.g., In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of
Donley, 262 Neb. 282 (Neb 2001).
12. I have reviewed my declaration carefully, and I have not stated anything herein
that is not supported by my personal experience and conviction.

As provided by § 78B-5-705, Utah Code (2008), I declare and certify under criminal
penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated this 27th day of October 2008.

Michael A. Jensen
Attorney at Law
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
PO Box 571708
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264
mikeffiutahattornev.com
Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN LOGAN, STATE OF UTAH
135 North 100 West, Logan UT 84321
First District Clerk: 435 750-1300; Angie 750-1313

In the Matter of

DECLARATION OF
BECKY ALLRED (Conservator)

EVAN ROLLER
An Incapacitated Person.

Civil No. 073100106
Judge Clint S. Judkins

1. I am Becky Allred; I am over the age of 21 years, and my declaration is being
made on my personal knowledge, the same as I would testify in court.
2. I am a Partner, Karren, Hendrix, Stagg, Allen & Company and also Manager,
Stagg ElderCare Services, a Division of Karren, Hendrix, Stagg, Allen & Company.
3. With Stagg Eldercare Services ("Stagg"), I have personally been doing
Conservator and Fiduciary work for 7 years. However, Stagg has been actively involved
in conservatorship case for more than 10 years and has been appointed by many district
courts throughout the State of Utah.
4. I am an active Member of the Utah State Bar's Committee on Law and Aging.

Exhibit C
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5. I have also been working with the Judicial Council's Ad Hoc Committee on
Guardianships and Conservatorships.
6. In guardianship and conservatorship cases, Stagg is sometimes a petitioner along
with a professional guardian as a co-petitioner.
7. More often, Stagg is not a petitioner but is requested to serve as conservator by a
petitioner or a court or as a result of mediation between feuding siblings.
8. After appointment, Stagg is often presented with invoices for legal fees incurred
by the attorney representing the incapacitated person and incurred by the petitioners.
9. Generally, if a conservator has been appointed, Stagg will pay the legal fees for
petitioners since they sought the protection of the incapacitated person and thereby
benefitted the incapacitated person and protected his estate.
10. It is my belief, and understanding from working with numerous Elder Law
Attorneys, that payment of such legal fees is an acceptable practice; and while not
expressly authorized by the Probate Code, it is not prohibited by the Code.
11. As Conservator, Stagg also pays the legal fees of the attorney appointed for the
incapacitated or protected person.
12. In highly contested cases, Stagg may ask petitioners or the attorney for the
incapacitated person to submit his or her fees to the court for approval.
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13. In all cases in which I have been involved, the court has never denied legal fees
for petitioners when a guardian and/or conservator has been successfully appointed.
14. However, Stagg will generally not pay the attorney fees for a party in the
guardianship proceedings who opposed the guardianship, since such opposition was of no
benefit to the incapacitated person.
15. The rationale used by me and by Stagg in deciding whether or not legal fees
should be paid is simple: was the particular legal effort opposed to protecting the
incapacitated person or was it in support of such protection? In effect, was the opposing
party motivated by the best interest of the incapacitated person? If so, the fees are paid; if
not, the fees are not paid from the estate of the incapacitated person.
16. Stagg works closely with several providers for the incapacitated person (referred
to by Stagg as a "Client") for whom the appointment was made. These providers include
professionals such as attorneys, other accountants, real estate agents, home repair
services, or whatever services are necessary to help and protect the Client.
17. Often, the court-appointed guardian also needs assistance from professionals to
accomplish his, her or its duties in serving the ward. If those services are necessary and
the Guardian has retained professional help, such as an attorney, Stagg will pay those fees
as well, since those fees are incurred for the benefit and welfare of the Client.
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18. There have been several guardianship cases where a divorce was necessary or a
restraining order had to be obtained. These actions fall squarely under the role of the
Guardian and they most often require legal assistance. Hence, the Guardian's legal fees
should also be paid from the Client's estate, and Stagg routinely pays such fees as
provided by the Probate Code without submitting them to the court for approval.

As provided by § 78B-5-705, Utah Code (2008), I declare and certify under criminal
penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 2L.

da

Y o f September 2008.

Becky Allred Conservator)
Stagg Elderca*y Services
111 East Broadway, Ste 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-5241
(801) 521-7620 x810; Fax: 521-7641
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Civil No. 073100106
Judge Clint S. Judkins
In the Matter of
EVAN ROLLER
An Incapacitated Person.
I, Michael A. Jensen, certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing pleading,
DECLARATION OF BECKY ALLRED (Conservator), to be Mailed to the following
persons:
Kenneth C. Allsop
Attorney at Law
40 W Cache Valley Blvd Ste 9A
PO Box 255
Logan UT 84323-0255
(435) 753-2899
ken@allsoplaw.com
Attorney for LuAnn Shaffer

Steven EL Gunn
Ray Quinney & Nebeker
36 S State St Ste 1400
PO Box 45835
Salt Lake City UT 84145-0385
(801) 323-3327; Fax: 532-7543
nhall@rqn.com
Attorneys for Kathryn Prounis

Dated this

day of October 2008.

Michael A, Jensen
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